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Abstract 
 It is commonly held that contradiction and ambivalence are typical of Aboriginal 
policies, particularly those of the late 19
th
 and early 20
th
 centuries. These contradictions, often 
witnessed between policy and its application, have been recognized as a competition between 
pragmatic factors and humanitarian concerns. However, as is evidenced by the ‘mix-race 
discourse’ of the laws and policies that make up Aboriginal policy in Canada, the US, and 
Australia, these contradictions can in part be explained by a post-Enlightenment science that 
debated the role and place of mixed-ancestry Natives. While mixed-ancestry Natives were the 
specific targets of law and policy that aimed to fix their identities in a ‘Native-Newcomer’ racial 
binary, officials were ambivalent and ambiguous when it came to how they fit into that binary. 
The question of whether they should be considered ‘Aboriginal’ and if they should therefore be 
assimilated or segregated remained one of the most enduring questions of Aboriginal policy in 
the century between 1850 and 1950. 
This dissertation considers these contradictions and how the role of mixed-ancestry 
Natives in Aboriginal policies can explain them. Instead of seeing those contradictions as 
anomalies or as illogical, I posit that they are a logical product of scientific debates over racial 
hybridity. Fundamentally, I argue that mixed-ancestry Natives were the targets of ambivalent 
policies that were shaped by debates among nineteenth-century scientists about the implications 
of racial mixing. These debates were reflected in the inconsistencies and apparent contradictions 
of the laws and practices that make up Aboriginal policy in Canada, the US, and Australia. In 
particular, these debates were reflected in the ambiguity and ambivalence of policies that tried to 
direct how Indigenous peoples of mixed-ancestry should be dealt with, defined, and categorized. 
The contradictions and ambiguities in law and policy reflect on a larger scale the tension 
between attempting to apply a hypothetical dichotomized racial hierarchy on the reality of a 
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hybridized society. These tensions were a major influencing factor on the direction and 
development of Aboriginal policy in these three countries, and produced a consistent albeit 
ambivalent body of ‘mixed-race’ discourse. 
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The essential thing "in heaven and in earth" is...that there should be a  
long OBEDIENCE in the same direction,  
there thereby results, and has always resulted in the long run,  
something which has made life worth living 
Friedrich Nietzsche, Beyond Good and Evil 
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Cultural Warning and a Note on Terminology  
This dissertation contains the names of deceased Aboriginal persons as well as quotes, references, and 
terminology that many Aboriginal people will consider offensive. These materials do not reflect the 
attitudes or views of the author, but rather, are included to maintain the integrity of the historical archive 
and illuminate the ideas of race that constituted the ideological basis of Aboriginal policies. The author 
intends no disrespect to those individuals, either living or deceased. 
The author explicitly acknowledges the offensive and problematic nature of the terminology used to refer 
to those discussed in this work. Mixed-ancestry Natives are and were not a cohesive group in any of the 
three countries under consideration here; consequently, there is no single term that could properly and 
accurately designate them. However, writing about this topic requires one. I have chosen to use ‘mixed 
ancestry’ over ‘mixed race’ in most cases, but have also used ‘mixed-blood’ for the US and ‘Halfbreed’ 
for Canada. Where possible or necessary, I attempt to use the historically accurate term. There were rarely 
explicit and uniform usages and definitions in the historical record; however, some trends emerge for each 
country. 
In Canada, the most common term for mixed-ancestry Natives referenced in government documents was 
‘Halfbreed. This could refer either to those who belonged to a distinct cultural group, or individuals who 
were of mixed-ancestry but not part of a mixed-ancestry group. The term might be used to identify 
someone of mixed ancestry, even if they themselves identified as Indian. Métis, used less frequently, 
generally referred to those mixed-ancestry Natives with a specific group identity, and generally French-
speaking, at Red River. However, only those officials more intimately acquainted with the Red River 
Métis made this distinction.  
In Australia, the term ‘Half-caste’ was almost always used in government records. Particularly after the 
turn of the century, many officials became more cognizant of blood quantum, and more specific terms 
like ‘quadroon’ or ‘octoroon’ were introduced into official documentation. General terms in common 
usage in other parts of the world, namely, Aboriginal and Native, pose some challenges for Australia, 
where ‘Native’ referred to an Australian-born white person.1 
In the U.S., ‘mixed blood’ was the most common term found in government records. In some records, 
most notably census counts, a fractional blood quantum might also accompany the designation. But 
compared to Canada and Australia, there was a more consistent use of this single term without 
qualification, though as with ‘Halfbreed’ in Canada, the designation often came without consideration for 
that individual’s self-ascription. Culture, while not entirely dismissed, was rarely the first criterion in any 
of these three countries. 
While I acknowledge the problems with the above terms, I have found no solution. Like many scholars 
who write critically about race, I am stuck with the quandary of risking the validation of false racial 
categories by evoking the language required to engage in their deconstruction. 
  
                                                          
1
 John Chesterman and Heather Douglas, “‘Their Ultimate Absorption’: Assimilation in 1930s Australia,” Journal of 
Australian Studies 81 (2004): 47–58. 
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Chapter 1 - Introduction: Between Ambiguity and Ambivalence  
Half-breeds are neither white men nor Indians, as expressed in their name; and the proper treatment of 
them is neither defined in the regulations, nor, perhaps, established by usage. If it is said that they are not 
Indians, and must therefore be treated as white men, it may more plausibly be said they are not white 
men, and ought therefore to be treated as Indians, as they unquestionably have been in almost all treaties 
containing stipulations in their favor.
2
 C.A. Harris, US Congress, 1838 
It is only reasonable that the aborigines should be allowed to remain on their native soil and in their 
tribal districts in due security and comfort; but it appears to be equally reasonable and important that the 
younger half-castes should be withdrawn from their midst and gradually absorbed into the general 
community, young quadroon and half-caste children who are without parents being first removed, with a 
view to being placed in an institution or boarded out.
3
 1883 NSW Legislative Assembly, Australia, 
Aboriginal Mission Stations at Warangesda and Maloga 
It has been represented to the Department that it is desirable that half-breeds who are able and willing to 
support themselves should be allowed to give up their treaty relations with the Government, and by taking 
away the annuity, as provided in the old Act, the Government considered it was a bar to enterprise, for 
the half-breed would not have the same inducement to becoming self-supporting if obliged to give up his 
annuity.
4
 John A. Macdonald, Canada House of Commons, 1884 
 
Ambivalence has always plagued Aboriginal policies, and nowhere was this more 
apparent than in failed and dubious attempts to divide Indigenous peoples by degrees of ‘blood. 
History is replete with examples of administrations claiming assimilation as its goal while it 
practiced the opposite: segregation, anti-miscegenation, apartheid, exclusion, ostracization, and 
discrimination. Policy makers were infamously ambivalent, and at times even apathetic towards 
Indigenous affairs. Such behaviour was emblematic of the seeming lack of logic and cohesion of 
those policies, especially when viewed over time. Indeed, this has become a bit of a running joke 
among historians.  
These contradictions have traditionally been viewed as acceptable anomalies of 
Aboriginal Affairs and are rarely accorded attention as topics of inquiry unto themselves. The 
                                                          
2
 C.A. Harris, Congressional Serious Set 349, H.doc. 229, 28 February 1839.  
3
 1883 NSW Legislative Assembly, Aboriginal Mission Stations at Warangesda and Maloga, 4. 
4
 J.A Macdonald, House of Commons Debates, 7 April 1884, 1400. 
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suggestion has been that illogical behaviour is typical of governments and even expected of 
administrations that have little time, money, or motivation to be overly concerned with 
Aboriginal matters. Their apparent inattention is a result of almost whimsical responses to ever-
changing public demands, and ever-changing priorities in nations that had, between 1850 and 
1950, far greater and more important matters of concern. Building railways, opening agricultural 
land, creating business opportunities, and attracting settlers, for instance, took precedence over 
what were seen as the more minor concerns of Aboriginal affairs unless or until those concerns 
threatened the peace or security of burgeoning nations and territorial expansion. Even 
governments with a clear vision for Aboriginal policy could not execute their plans because of 
the short lives they led. The turn-over of government administrations meant that there was never 
enough time to institute comprehensive policies that, according to their creators, took decades – 
even generations – to achieve their intended results. According to this perspective, then, 
Aboriginal policies were ad hoc constructions with little logic or explanation beyond fulfilling 
immediate and shifting needs. To find inconsistencies or ambiguities, especially where mixed-
ancestry Natives are concerned, would seemingly merit little attention. 
This is true in part, but it does not tell the complete story. Human action is shaped as 
much by ideological considerations as it is pragmatic concerns, and the two are more connected 
than we usually appreciate. Ideological concerns often express themselves in empirical matters, 
and broader ideas and worldviews are expressed in mundane, everyday kinds of ways. These 
usually occur implicitly and covertly, making them difficult to identify and separate, but they are 
there nonetheless. Such is also the case in law and policy: even though the contradictions of 
policies do indeed reflect the pragmatic concerns of policy makers, they also reflect the less 
tangible, often muddled ideological influences of the era. The archival records of Canada, the 
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US, and Australia suggest such a connection where scientific theories about race and human 
difference give meaning to that ambiguity and contradiction. Indeed, mixed-ancestry Natives 
were the ‘ambivalent targets’ of law and policy.5 
Questioning Ambiguity 
The apparent ambivalence in policies simultaneously raise a number of questions and 
expose the tensions of racial identity and the contradictory policies put in place to deal with 
them. Law posits identities like ‘Indian’ or ‘Aboriginal’ in clear-cut ways, but the lived realities 
of identity and belonging are ambiguous, contested, and malleable. The ways in which 
government officials applied those categories are equally ambiguous, contested, and malleable. 
But what does that ambiguity mean? How do larger ideas like race and colonialism situate that 
ambiguity? How do we explain the apparent inherent contradictions?  How do we negotiate the 
seemingly contradictory words and actions of officials who oscillated between assimilating and 
segregating those individuals of mixed ancestry? What role did mixed-ancestry Natives play in 
that ambiguity, and thus, in Aboriginal policy?   
 The contradictions in policy and the ambivalence towards mixed-ancestry Natives are 
related matters. In fact, we can discover the rationale for the former in the latter. This dissertation 
explores these questions by considering the role that Indigenous peoples of mixed-ancestry 
played in the development and execution of Aboriginal policy between 1850 and 1950 in three 
countries: Canada, the US, and Australia. It considers how mixed-ancestry Natives were targets 
of specific policies, albeit ambiguous and ambivalent ones, as officials struggled to negotiate 
what were believed to be the immutable categories of race and the reality of hybridity created by 
                                                          
5
 ‘Mixed-ancestry Natives’ here refers to individuals who were of mixed European and Aboriginal heritage. There is 
no uniform term shared among the three countries under consideration here, so ‘mixed-ancestry Native,’ ‘mixed-
bloods,’ and ‘mixed-race Aboriginal peoples’ are used interchangeably and with consideration to accepted 
terminology in the country under discussion. 
 4 
 
the processes of colonialism. It considers the tension produced by the clash of ideology and lived 
reality, and how that tension was reflected in unstable and even inherently contradictory policies 
that simultaneously employed the competing goals of assimilation and segregation. This 
dissertation pursues three avenues of inquiry in attempting to answer those questions: to examine 
the ways in which mixed-ancestry Natives were targeted by law and policy; to do this in a 
comparative context, using Canada, the US, and Australia; and to examine these questions by 
employing postcolonial theory as its conceptual framework.  
Argument  
The inherent contradictions of Aboriginal policy and the ambiguity in its practice are the 
main considerations of this dissertation. More specifically, the role that the presence of mixed-
ancestry Natives played in those ambiguous and contradictory processes is at the heart of the 
argument presented here. The contradiction of a policy that claimed assimilation as its goal but 
practiced segregation was expressed in the way people of mixed ancestry were dealt with in law 
and policy. Governments oscillated between categorizing them as ‘Indians’ or ‘Aborigines’ and 
categorizing them as citizens – an ambivalence and ambiguity that reflected debates about racial 
mixing in mid-nineteenth-century science. As part of the dominant ‘Western’ paradigm, race 
ideology compelled colonizers to construct racial dichotomies where they did not exist in the 
lived realities of hybridized societies. The contradictions apparent in policy were a reflection of 
the tension between a European paradigm based on a biological-racial dichotomy on the one 
hand, and the reality of fluid identities in a hybridized world on the other. These contradictions 
were expressed in law and policy as government officials unsuccessfully attempted to define and 
categorize people that defied the very nature of definitions and categories. 
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Fundamentally, I will argue that mixed-ancestry Natives were the targets of ambivalent 
policies which were shaped by debates among nineteenth-century scientists about the 
implications of racial mixing. These debates were reflected in the inconsistency and apparent 
contradictions of the laws and practices that made up Aboriginal policy in Canada, the US, and 
Australia. In particular, these debates were reflected in the ambiguity and ambivalence of 
policies that tried to direct how Indigenous peoples of mixed-ancestry should be dealt with, 
defined, and categorized. The contradictions and ambiguities in law and policy reflect on a larger 
scale the tension in attempting to apply a hypothetical dichotomized racial hierarchy onto the 
reality of a hybridized society. 
Comparative History as Method 
This dissertation first and foremost uses a comparative methodology to examine these 
questions. It is the contention of this argument that exploring questions about policy and mixed-
ancestry Natives in national contexts cannot adequately address the questions raised here. Race, 
law, and colonialism are transnational issues. Even though they develop in unique ways in 
national and local contexts, they still retain some of their commonality. Using a comparative 
methodology to investigate the specific questions regarding mixed-ancestry Natives allows for a 
transnational exploration, and for uncovering those commonalities. It allows us to see past local 
differences in order to identify similarities that are attributable to patterns of colonialism. When 
we explain historical actions in their local contexts we preclude these broader transnational 
explanations: phenomena and their causes are seen as unique and local processes. Comparative 
history allows us to explore common experience and thus identify those phenomena and their 
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causes which are attributable to transnational processes.
6
 In essence, it allows us to identify 
patterns of colonialism – a phenomenon quite different from the experience of colonialism, but 
equally important to the understanding of its history. Local and comparative approaches, 
however, should not be seen as oppositional: they are, instead, complementary. 
Comparative history always requires the careful and deliberate attention to choice. 
Components must have the right balance of commonalities and differences from the outset in 
order to justify the process. The commonalities shared by Canada, the US, and Australia are 
probably more readily known. All three are former British colonies, have similar legal systems 
based on British common law, have similar histories of colonialism, colonization, and settlement, 
and have diverse and varied Aboriginal populations that had equally diverse and varied 
relationships with the newcomers. Existing comparative history suggests that these reasons alone 
are enough to warrant comparisons. Yet, these countries produced very different policies for very 
different populations with very different identity politics. Thus, the starting point for a 
comparison here is difference. 
To better understand the importance of these differences requires a close and critical 
examination of the assumptions about the supposed importance of British roots. Inarguably, 
Canada, the US, and Australia share a number of features, and do so because of their British 
colonial roots. Indeed, Britain’s global position as a major imperial power during the period 
when racial science was emerging produced a very distinct and even globally dominant idea of 
race.
7
 Even though each of these countries developed its own nuanced system, all three can claim 
                                                          
6
 Patricia Nelson Limerick, “Going West and Ending up Global,” The Western Historical Quarterly 32, no. 1 
(Spring 2001): 5–23. 
7
 Ali Rattansi, Racism: A Very Short Introduction, 1st ed. (Oxford University Press, 2007), 51–52. 
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a specifically British idea of empire as the origins of their respective Aboriginal policies.
8
 There 
are, as the editors of one volume on British settler colonization tell us, “critical links between 
similar types of colonial formation in vastly different parts of the Empire.”9 Accordingly, it is of 
little surprise to see similarities among the Aboriginal policies of former British colonies. 
But how far these common roots go to explain similarities among these three countries is 
questionable. Each developed policies and attitudes so distinct from the other that it might in fact 
be of little value to think about them as similar only because they were (former) British colonies 
with shared legal and social traditions. Indeed, one might even question the legitimacy of 
‘British’ as a category with much meaning or relevance, particularly in terms of its effect on 
shaping settler colonialism. As C.A. Bayly points out, “Britishness was a recent, fragile, and 
contested ideology of power.”10 In short, ‘British’ is not a coherent or consistent category. It is 
not in itself a stable enough concept to explain similarities, and in colonial encounters, it is of 
secondary importance. Instead, as Homi Bhabha tells us, “the representation of colonial authority 
depends less on a universal symbol of English identity than on its productivity as a sign of 
difference.”11 It is not British colonialism, then, that creates similarity point of comparison: it is 
colonialism. 
                                                          
8
 There are two exceptions. First is the influence that the Spanish legal tradition had in the US. Cohen speaks 
specifically on this point. He juxtaposes the myth of Spanish cruelty towards Indigenous peoples with the “cruelty 
and treachery” of American citizens. He maintains that what are seen as four ‘American’ principles of Native 
American law have Spanish origins. Felix S. Cohen, The Legal Conscience: Selected Papers (Yale University Press, 
1960). The second exception is in Canada, where Quebec provincial law has been shaped by a French tradition. 
9
 Julie Evans, ed., Equal Subjects, Unequal Rights: Indigenous Peoples in British Settler Colonies, 1830-1910 
(Manchester, UK: Manchester University Press, 2003), 1.  
10
 C.A. Bayly, “The British and Indigenous Peoples, 1760-1860: Power, Perception and Identity,” in Martin Daunton 
and Rick Hapern, eds, Empire and Others: British Encounters with Indigenous Peoples, 1600-1850 (Philadelphia: 
University of Pennsylvania Press, 1999), 19. In the same volume, Philip D. Morgan also discusses the problems 
associated with the use of “British” as a distinctive identity as “terminological inexactitude and unease,” see Philip 
D. Morgan, “Encounters Between British and ‘Indigenous’ Peoples, c. 1500-1800,” in Daunton and Hapern, Empire 
and Others. 
11
 Homi K Bhabha, “Signs Taken for Wonders: Questions of Ambivalence and Authority Under a Tree outside 
Delhi, May 1817,” The Location of Culture (London: Routledge, 1994), 154. 
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Importantly, Canada, the US, and Australia are also all settler societies. As such, similar 
patterns of relations between Natives and Newcomers emerge. As Lorenzo Veracini tells us, 
settler colonialism is “a global and genuinely transnational phenomenon” that is defined by the 
relationship between a minority invader and a majority Indigenous population.
12
 This ratio did 
not last, though, and as it shifted, so too did the relationship. This holds relevance here, where, 
by the time policies of assimilation were enacted and administrators began targeting mixed-
ancestry Natives, Aboriginal populations were the minority and Newcomers were the majority. 
This meant that colonizers held a power over the colonized that would be backed, not only by 
sheer numbers, but by well-developed state systems that reflected the concerns of the majority: 
land acquisition, in most cases.
13
 It made it easier – in fact, possible – to institute policies of 
assimilation, even if they would eventually fail. Accordingly, these three countries share not only 
their British roots, but also their status as settler colonies where the population of the newcomers 
gradually overtook that of the Natives. 
Furthermore, the discursive nature of identity – even on this large scale – ensured that 
colonialism in turn shaped British ideologies, values, and norms. Accordingly, ‘Britishness’ was 
created locally in colonies as much as it was in Britain. It is, then, difficult to speak of a ‘British’ 
way of administering Native Affairs in three different countries when local practice changed 
what that meant. In addition, sharing a legal or colonial tradition might have little to do with how 
those traditions were applied and how policy evolved. For instance, there were no treaties in 
Australia, but there were in Canada and the US. The lack of a uniform or national legal definition 
for ‘Indian’ in the US before 1934 is also anomalous compared to Canadian and Australian law. 
                                                          
12
 Lorenzo Veracini, Settler Colonialism: A Theoretical Overview (Houndmills, Basingstoke, Hampshire: Palgrave 
Macmillan, 2010), 2. 
13
 For a discussion about the acquisition of land as an impetus to British and later, American expansion, see John C. 
Weaver, Great Land Rush and the Making of the Modern World, 1650-1900 (Montreal: McGill-Queen’s Press, 
2003). 
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Which is ‘British’? In short, there is no set of features that might make colonialism or even 
settler colonialism distinctly British. Instead, their commonalities have more to do with the 
patterns and impetus of colonialism in general than they do of a specific brand of empire.
14
   
So, then, beyond ‘British’ roots, the commonalities appear all the more intriguing. All 
three countries entered a similar period of administration starting around the middle of the 
nineteenth century which coincided with the emergence of racial science. This period entailed a 
bureaucratic process administered by special government officials. It unfolded roughly over a 
century: from 1850 to 1950. The period of administration which followed the initial phases of 
contact and settlement initiated a complex, bureaucratic process that sought to force that which 
had not occurred on its own: enfolding Indigenous populations into the colonial power 
structure.
15
 And it did so by creating a legal infrastructure that would define, manage, and direct 
Aboriginal populations towards that stated goal of assimilation. It required a few basic 
components: defining ‘Aboriginal,’ geographically segregating Aboriginal peoples, excluding 
them from citizenship, and creating a legal and administrative framework that would apply 
distinctly to them. They all also shared another significant feature: ambiguity towards and about 
mixed-ancestry Natives. And in all three countries, this ambiguity drove policy. It was in these 
processes that the presence of mixed-ancestry Natives exposed the problems of racial thinking, 
Aboriginal policies, and ideas of progress. Policy makers became preoccupied with figuring out 
on which side to place mixed-ancestry Natives, and less time on actually executing any coherent 
policy. All three created government departments to deal exclusively with them, administer this 
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program, and execute the laws in place. And all three used mixed-ancestry Natives as a foil 
against which these aspects would be created and defined. It is only through examining the 
ideological underpinnings of colonial thinking found in late nineteenth-century theories of race 
that the subtext of Aboriginal policy as a mixed-race discourse emerges. Furthermore, it is 
through a comparative analysis that the meaning of this subtext becomes evident.  
This approach is more than just a comparative one. It is also part of a move towards 
internationalization in history. The study and writing of most history tends to be confined by the 
borders of the nation-state. Despite growing fields such as borderland studies and others that 
privilege themes over geopolitics, the profession continues to organize itself mostly in 
geopolitical terms. Some historians argue that these geographical boundaries have set 
methodological and conceptual limitations. As Australian historians Ann Curthoys and Marilyn 
Lake tell us, “History as a professional discipline was constituted to serve the business of nation 
building, and has accordingly very often seen its task as providing an account of national 
experience, values, and traditions, thus helping forge a national community. The question 
historians are now asking is: has history as handmaiden to the nation state distorted or limited 
our understanding of the past?”16 
Internationalizing history can be viewed as part of a response to this question. It consists 
of two distinct although simultaneous approaches: one considers the use of comparisons as a 
means of broadening the methodological scope of national histories, while the other proposes to 
apply theories and methods typically used outside of that study region. Ideally, a truly 
internationalized history would include both. Either way, this approach helps us to abandon 
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nation-centric understandings about our history and to employ methods that are better developed 
outside of the national frameworks of historiography.
17
   
Theoretical Frameworks: Between Binaries and Hybridity  
This dissertation takes this dual approach of internationalizing history through an 
empirical comparison and the application of a unique combination of methods and theories. 
Hybridity theory, postcolonial theory, critical race studies, and discourse analysis all play key 
roles in this approach. First, the argument is heavily premised on the intersection of 
postcolonialism and hybridity, in particular, the writings of Edward Said, Homi Bhabha, and 
Jean-Loup Amselle. While Said posited that colonialism produces binaries, Bhabha argued that 
they were hybridized; Amselle examined the product of those contradictory but simultaneous 
processes in West Africa. Critics have argued that Said’s thesis has created a false dichotomy in 
a far more complex world where distinguishing between colonizer and colonized is not that 
simple. Hybridity is offered here as the alternative, recognizing the contested, unstable, and 
mixed spaces in which colonialism happens. What results, then, is a tension between Said’s 
concept of an imagined binary, and Bhabha’s hybridized spaces.  
Edward Said’s well-known Orientalism provides a key perspective on the ideological 
mobilizations behind colonialism, particularly as it applies here to identity and difference. Said 
argued that ‘Orientals’ were in part the imagined product of a European (‘Occidental’) colonial 
undertaking. These images were based in constructed and essentialized differences between 
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‘East’ and ‘West’ (or ‘colonizer’ and ‘colonized’). Consequently, he suggested, colonialism 
constructed an imagined binary between two antithetical groups. Said was not suggesting that 
two antithetical groups actually exist; he was suggesting that this imagined dichotomy 
constituted an integral aspect of the ideology of colonialism, and in particular, how colonizers 
viewed the colonized. Colonialism, he says, was justified and motivated by the construction of 
difference and inequality. These perceived differences, imagined as they may have been, were 
constituted within the structures and institutions that propagated colonial power, such as law and 
Aboriginal policy. It is at this juncture where connections among law, identity, and colonialism 
become evident: legal and governmental institutions were used as a means of imposing and 
systematizing the imagined identities of which he speaks. Thus, in terms of countries like 
Canada, the US, and Australia, Aboriginal policies can be viewed as attempts to employ these 
imagined binaries in order to exercise power, authority, and domination; and the words and 
actions of officials, codified or otherwise, became the discourses of racial mixing. 
But the realities of colonialism complicate that simplistic dichotomy. As its critics have 
asserted, Orientialism does little to consider the nuanced, ambiguous, and ambivalent 
constructions of identities that colonialism actually produces.
18
 Homi Bhabha’s work responds to 
these gaps. He examines colonialism as processes of ‘hybridity’: that is, colonialism as a space 
of mixing. Hybridity in this context considers the relationship between the colonizer and the 
colonized as porous and rejects the clear-cut binaries posited by Said’s ‘orientalism. On the 
contrary, for Bhabha colonialism is a complex web of hybridity constituted of three basic parts: a 
process of mixing, a product of mixing, and the space in which mixing happens. The role of the 
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colonized thus becomes a more active one than Said presents, and perhaps better appreciates the 
complexities of identity when the binary is challenged.  
To be certain, colonialism was and is more complex than that binary has suggested. As 
Franz Fanon suggests, those who are part of that process of colonialism are never essentially 
colonizers or colonized.
19
 Despite these criticisms, we must not too quickly abandon the idea of 
dichotomies, for even if it does not represent the reality or experience of colonialism, it 
represents its impetus. Even though, as Bhabha tells us, colonialism was constituted of contested 
and hybridized spaces of practice (or ‘praxis’), it was maintained by the ideals set out in the 
imagination of colonizers. While typically posited as theoretical opposites in the literature, I 
argue that both are true in considering the position of mixed-ancestry populations in Aboriginal 
policy and law. This is not a contradiction of fact as much as it is of perception versus reality. 
Policy-makers, over many decades and even centuries, attempted to force populations into the 
Native-Newcomer dichotomy. In reality, people are never polar opposites, and binaries fail. The 
failure of maintaining that racial binary, and the policies that went with it, cannot be reduced 
simply to disorganization or lack of trying; rather, it must also be seen as an inherent flaw in the 
ideology behind the action. The disjuncture between the ideology and the practice ultimately 
produced tensions that were reflected in law and policy as contradiction, ambivalence, and 
ambiguity. These tensions were paralleled between the discourse of race and the discourse of 
hybridity, and are reflected in the tension between the discourse of orientalism and the discourse 
of hybridity theory. These sets of binaries inform the clash between the desire to maintain racial 
boundaries and the reality of a hybridized colonial world. Exploring that tension constitutes a 
main consideration of this dissertation. 
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Jean-Loup Amselle’s work helps conceptualize these tensions as explanations, not just 
curious contradictions. Amselle, a French anthropologist, posits a theory of colonialism in West 
Africa which combines hybridity and binaries. He argues that hybridity and mixing was the 
cultural norm, but attempts by governments to impose categories (cultural, racial, or otherwise) 
on colonial and postcolonial societies has changed the otherwise fluid process of identity-
construction. This same effect is evident in the three countries under consideration here where 
certain individuals, most of whom were mixed ancestry, were excluded from the legal category 
of Aboriginal with lasting social and cultural effects. As the official recognition of contemporary 
Aboriginal identities is based in genealogical evidence, the crystallization of identity became 
lasting and often permanent: the exclusion of an individual from the legal category of Aboriginal 
applies to his or her descendants. Granted, Indigenous peoples have resisted and challenged these 
impositions, and in some cases, effected change. However, these attempts have been persistent. 
Amselle argues that writing is the root of this process where, in centralized bureaucratic states, 
“tradition and culture are merely optical illusions resulted precisely from the paucity of written 
sources relative to ‘primitive societies’.” 20  The relationship between ethnic identity, human 
difference, and written records is central to my argument here where ‘discourse’ serves as the 
primary indicator of how theory is expressed in practice. 
The works of historian and postcolonial critic, Robert J.C. Young are also relevant to 
unravelling the complexities of law and identity in regard to people of mixed ancestry. Young’s 
position on hybridity in colonialism also carries the connotation of ambivalence: that colonialism 
was a concurrent desire and repulsion.
21
 However, Young makes his argument via nineteenth-
century racial theory – a departure from the largely contemporary focus of Bhabha and Amselle. 
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Young tells us that in nineteenth-century racial theories, such as those posited by de Gobineau 
and Morton, for instance, this simultaneous desire/repulsion was evidenced by discussions 
surrounding racial miscegenation: such theories were premised on a social requirement to protect 
racial purity, yet advocated mixing as a way to advance less ‘civilized’ races. In this way, Young 
historicizes hybridity in the context of nineteenth-century colonialism as the other two do not. He 
also establishes a key connection in those contradictions between policy and practice on the one 
hand and post-Enlightenment racial science on the other. While his emphasis is on sex, gender, 
and ‘miscegenation,’ the correlation is equally applicable to identity and legal definitions.  
This study also employs critical race theory as a key conceptual framework. Like all 
critical studies of race, this one posits itself on a contradiction: we must acknowledge that which 
we claim is not real. On the one hand, it questions and criticizes race as an invalid conceptual 
framework for dividing the world; but on the other, it evokes the very concept of race in order to 
make this critique.
22
 A number of arguments from both scientists and social scientists have been 
made regarding the fallacy of race, and it is now widely accepted that race is a biological myth. 
But in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, race was accepted as a biological fact. 
Indeed, the biological myth of race matters little in a world that uses race to perceive it,
23
 and 
where race-based law and its practice has effected real consequences.
24
 To paraphrase Michael 
Root, race is not real but we act as if it is.
25
 Consequently, how people understand race becomes 
a valid means of analyzing cross-cultural relations and colonial contexts. It is through critical 
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race theory that the social construction of race has been uncovered, thus illuminating both overt 
and covert ways in which race operates in society. Accordingly, I employ race as an organizing 
tool, since how race is practiced on the ground might matter more than its invalidation by 
science. 
Three aspects of critical race theory are particularly important to this study.
26
 First, as a 
critique of liberalism, critical race theory seeks to expose the assumptions that nineteenth-
century science brought to colonialism and how it constructed notions of mixed race. Second, it 
employs a structural determinism that seeks to reveal how the structure and content of law are 
informed by social thought, and how they affect society. The third and most poignant aspect of 
critical race theory used here is the essential/anti-essential theme. This aspect questions the 
inherent homogenization and essentialization of racial categorization and the very categories of 
race. Such a critical approach to race ties critical race theory in well with Said’s Orientalism and 
Bhabha’s hybridity. It also enables a shift from better known studies of ‘race’ to the lesser 
known study of ‘mixed race. Because race is posited on the existence of essential categories, and 
mixed-race is posited on an opposition to essentialism, ‘race’ and ‘mixed race’ must necessarily 
be understood and recognized as different constructions. While they overlap in significant ways, 
how they have evolved historically as both concepts as well as lived realities is not precisely the 
same. How essentialism was buttressed against anti-essentialism, and what that meant for the 
development and evolution of Aboriginal policies will be a major underlying consideration of 
this study. 
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This study also constitutes a critical legal history.
27
 One of the relevant factors, I 
hypothesize, in how identity develops is under the influence of law and official state policy. How 
Indigenous peoples have been categorized and defined has ultimately shaped the historical 
trajectory of their identity as an internalized process. Law can either create or deny space for the 
growth of ethnic identities; this is also true for those of mixed ancestry. Mixed-ancestry Natives 
were both included and excluded from official recognition that has ultimately affected their 
identities. Law is also a mirror for dominant social values: it often reflects how policy-makers 
view race, and can reveal how race intersects with power. An analysis of the legal element of 
Indigenous mixed-ancestry identities reveals much about state policies of assimilation and 
segregation, about colonialist attitudes towards race and miscegenation, and about the 
implications of external and state impositions on group identity. Law and policy proved a 
significant factor in shaping the course of Indigenous identity by the conviction of racial (and 
racist) ideas and reactions to miscegenation, particularly as it applied to colonized Indigenous 
peoples and their European colonizers.
28
 This study proposes that Aboriginal law and policy was 
as relevant to the history of mixed-ancestry Natives as it was to those legally defined as 
‘Indians.’29  
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Methodology and Sources 
This dissertation relies on legislation and government documents generated primarily by 
Aboriginal departments to uncover a mixed-race discourse. However, the search for attitudes 
about race and mixed race can be a search for the absent. Ideas about race are often unspoken 
and assumed, a result of the ‘common sense’ element they assume over time. These attitudes 
were so ingrained in popular thought by the last decades of the nineteenth century that 
individuals had little need or impetus to articulate them. However, more is at work here. As 
Michel-Rolph Trouillot tells us, “the production of historical narratives involves the uneven 
contribution of competing groups and individuals who have unequal access to the means for such 
production.”30 Mixed-ancestry Natives are certainly among those with ‘unequal access,’ many 
having been disenfranchised as state-recognized Aboriginal people in some cases, and separated 
from their communities as a consequence of law in others. They are also among those with 
‘unequal access’ because they have often been denied full acceptance in a mainstream society 
that, ironically, continues to discriminate against them based on their Aboriginality. Thus, 
discourses of mixed race are hidden from view in two ways: on the one hand, by the power of 
those who created the records and the lack of power of those who did not; and on the other, by 
the very nature of race as a dominant discourse that its users have seen no need to explain.  
The perspectives of those individuals of mixed ancestry are hidden in another way. The 
records under consideration here rarely documented the views and experiences of these 
individuals themselves, particularly in how they constructed, interpreted, and posited their own 
identities. Instead, they focus on the actions of the policy makers: government officials who were 
charged with the task of creating and administering the policies which often attempted to order 
the human world into categories of race. But, as we have learned from generations of historians, 
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it is sometimes possible to ‘read between the lines’ and uncover histories that do not always sit 
visible on the surface. Moreover, the stories of the officials are not always separate from the 
stories of Aboriginal people. As historian Kristyn Harman argues in her historical biography of 
Duall, an Indigenous convict in early nineteenth-century Australia, “the colonial forces that 
shaped this archive are the very same forces that impacted on Duall’s lived experiences and 
shaped his destiny.”31 Likewise, the forces of colonialism that shaped the laws and policies 
which targeted mixed-ancestry Natives also shaped the lives of those individuals. 
One of the ways in which it becomes possible to uncover these ‘silent archives’ is 
through discourse analysis.
32
 As a methodological approach, it allows for a unique critical 
examination of the history of Aboriginal policy. Fundamentally, critical discourse analysis 
considers the relationship between the form and function of language on the one hand, and social 
practices on the other.
33
 In the case presented here, the language used to identify and describe 
individuals of mixed ancestry is articulated as a continuous and comprehensive, though 
changing, narrative comprised of a set of words, statements, ideas, and actions towards and about 
them. Said’s approach to critical discourse analysis is crucial here. One aspect of his three-part 
definition of ‘Orientalism’ is in fact based on a discourse analysis. He says that “Orientialism can 
be discussed and analyzed as the corporate institution for dealing with the Orient – dealing with 
it by making statements about it, authorizing views of it, describing it, by teaching it, settling it, 
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ruling over it.”34 It is the combination of these aspects that creates the discourse, beyond mere 
conversations or statements. 
 ‘Mixed race’ also has a ‘corporate institution,’ some of which has been recorded in 
archival and government records. Government officials made statements about mixed-ancestry 
Natives, authorized views of them, described them, taught about them, settled them, and ruled 
over them. It is, more specifically, the qualitative and quantitative examination of the use of 
terms that suggest the importance of racial mixing and the racially mixed. The frequency with 
which specific words are used, such as ‘halfbreed’ and ‘half-caste,’ or references to ‘blood’ or 
blood quantum imply that the concepts behind these words are significant. That officials used 
these terms in vague and undefined ways has veiled their importance, and in fact, the importance 
of ideas about mixed race to the development of Aboriginal policies and the broader processes of 
colonialism. The ambiguous and ambivalent ways in which they used them also exposes 
underlying assumptions and uncertainties about race, racial mixing, sex, and the ways in which 
colonialism employed tools like law and government to control them. The lack of explanation 
about these terms suggests that unspoken assumptions about race are at work here; thus, it is 
what is missing that exposes its importance. Moreover, these terms had far-reaching, if 
unintended, consequences. Discourse is not just the words themselves, but the accumulative 
effect of them when taken together, along with actions and practices.
35
 So, even though laws and 
policies that targeted mixed-ancestry Natives may not have intended to do so in any unified or 
coherent way, those laws and policies and the way they were executed or practiced had that 
effect. Just as nineteenth-century literary texts created a coherent discourse of ‘Orientals,’ 
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government officials created a textual record that constitutes a coherent discourse on ‘mixed-
ancestry Natives.’ 
There are two aspects of discourse analysis relevant here. The first, discourse theory, 
holds that discourse constructs meaning in the social world. However, that meaning cannot be 
fixed, as the use and meaning of language is constantly in flux. Hence, discourse is “constantly 
being transformed through contact with other discourses,” or through “discursive struggle” as 
different discourses engage with each other to “achieve hegemony.”36 Where the discourse of 
mixed-ancestry Natives here represents multiple, competing theories, this perspective is 
especially helpful. The second aspect is critical discourse analysis, which examines discourse 
among the many other means by which social production is generated. Thus, the discourse on 
mixed-ancestry Natives is not the final word. It competes with identity-production and self-
ascription, for instance, which contrasts how government officials imagine or create mixed-
ancestry Natives. This parallels Said’s methodology of ‘Orientals’ who are both ‘imagined’ by 
colonialism, but also exist independently and outside of those constructions. Accordingly, the 
discourse about mixed-ancestry Natives does not necessarily or completely define who they are 
or how they experienced their relationships with governments. 
Taking a discourse analysis approach requires identifying key terms, but their definitions 
are difficult to discern. The term ‘mixed-ancestry Native’ is undefinable and ambiguous – a 
condition that makes calculating the size of those populations equally ambiguous. While 
governments in all three countries attempted to document mixed-ancestry populations as part of 
regular census counts, there could never be any accuracy given the undefined or ill-defined 
terms. Furthermore, there is no one, singular term that can correctly designate all peoples of 
mixed ancestry. Here, the term refers to individuals who are of dual European and Indigenous 
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ancestry, in whatever combination that might be and irrespective of how those individuals 
constitute their individual or collective identities. It focuses on this combination in order to 
isolate ways in which Aboriginal policy specifically targeted mixed-ancestry Natives so as not to 
confuse those processes with other sets of discriminatory practices that derived from slavery and 
immigration, both of which carry different implications and considerations. It refers to those who 
identified as Indigenous, those who identified as white or ‘ordinary citizens,’ as well as those 
who identified as Métis, Halfbreed, half-caste, mixed-blood, or any other self-ascription. The 
term is purposely meant to be undefined so as to leave space for a variety of identities, and not 
impose an external definition to the exclusion of an internal one (even though that space was not 
always allowed historically). It is also purposely undefined so as to not assign any specific 
identity to those individuals. Furthermore, officials were always ambivalent and ambiguous 
about definitions, so it is never entirely clear to whom they are referring in laws and policies. To 
be clear, the point here is not to define or identify mixed-ancestry Natives, but to discuss how 
they have been defined, talked about, and administered, as well as to uncover the ambiguity of 
those terms.  
The crux of the research relies on laws and policies that were employed to define, 
exclude, or include individuals and groups of mixed ancestry. They fall under the jurisdictions of 
departments that were created solely for the purposes of administering Aboriginal populations, 
though occasionally they may also include laws and policies administered by land departments 
whose main function was the control, administration, and allotment of land. Some of those 
records are the same for all three countries, such as legislation and annual reports of Aboriginal 
departments. But the emphasis of the research varies among these countries, a reflection of the 
differences in how policies of colonialism were executed. The analysis of each country’s 
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approach to mixed-ancestry Natives begins with a corpus of key legislation and policy, discussed 
further below, that does not appear the same but served a similar function in targeting mixed-
ancestry Natives: in Canada, the Indian Acts and their predecessors, treaties, and scrip; in 
Australia, various laws which explicitly included, excluded, and defined Indigenous mixed-blood 
groups; in the US, treaties and allotment policy documents.  
In the US, the Office of Indian Affairs, now called the Bureau of Indian Affairs, was the 
main repository for records related to the identification of Native Americans. There are two main 
policies that have produced documents relevant to this study: treaties and allotment. While no 
uniform definition for ‘Native American’ existed across the many phases of policy experienced 
in that country, treaties and allotment are the two policies that provide the most evidence 
regarding the treatment of mixed-ancestry Natives and uncover mixed-race discourses. Some 
treaties singled out mixed-ancestry Native individuals and groups for special concessions at the 
tribes’ request, suggesting specific attitudes about race and identity. Allotment, the second policy 
of serious consideration for the US, produced a different set of documents. Legislation was 
enacted at the federal level to implement the policy of allotment, but this is not where discourse 
about mixed-ancestry Natives is found. Instead, views on identity and eligibility were discussed 
and recorded in the congressional hearings and reports that investigated the many disputes over 
eligibility. The latter set of documents is of particular value in regard to identifying specific 
attitudes about mixed-ancestry Natives and their place in American society. They have the dual 
benefit of not only helping to locate broader government attitudes about race and racial mixing, 
but also to provide a sense of how Indigenous peoples themselves felt about policies, including 
those that attempted to impose external race-based notions of identity. In contrast to Canada and 
Australia, then, the text of legislation is of little value. 
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For Australia, the research relies most heavily on legislation compared to the other two 
countries. Each state governed its Aboriginal affairs, and each state had legislation that was 
specifically for Aboriginal peoples. Most major policies were enacted under this legislation, 
which served as a continuous umbrella for policy. In relation to Canada and the US, Australia 
possessed the most detailed body of legislation on the identity of Indigenous mixed-race 
populations. Under what were typically called ‘protection’ acts, states legislated a broad array of 
legal controls over Aboriginal lives. There are three factors which make those laws relevant in 
terms of examining the role of mixed-ancestry Natives in Aboriginal policy. First was that they 
sought to define ‘half-castes,’ the term used to describe ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal peoples, and to 
distinguish them from definitions of ‘Aborigine’ or so-called ‘full-bloods. Second, protection 
acts served as anti-miscegenation laws, legally restricting who Aboriginal people could marry or 
otherwise associate with, including in the labour sector. Not surprisingly, these laws were 
difficult, if not impossible, to enforce, and ‘mixed-blood’ populations arose despite these laws.37 
Third, and in contrast to the second, these laws also introduced a policy that sought to forcibly 
assimilate Indigenous mixed-blood individuals into mainstream society by removing children 
from their Aboriginal families. Now widely known as ‘The Stolen Generations,’ the policy of 
child removal was enabled largely under these protection acts. The analysis of this body of 
legislation is supplemented by a number of documents, both archival and government 
publications. Debates in state legislatures, annual protection reports, an extensive array of state-
level commissioned reports, and both state and federal archival documents provide context to the 
legislation. Each of these exhibits more overt comments about racial mixing than do similar 
documents in Canada and the US. 
                                                          
37
 See especially Freeman, 2005. 
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For Canada, discourse on mixed-ancestry Natives is most difficult to discern, but there is 
a broader range of documents from which to glean it. Three larger areas of policy are relevant 
here: the Indian Act, treaties, and scrip. The first is comprised of comprehensive legislation 
enacted for the administration of Aboriginal people. It includes the Indian Act and its 
predecessors, such as the Gradual Civilization Act and the Gradual Enfranchisement Act. 
Indigenous mixed-ancestry populations were specifically named in these laws, particularly in the 
sections that defined ‘Indian. Second, land cession treaties provide some perspective on the role 
of mixed race in Aboriginal policy. Aboriginal leaders often requested the inclusion of their 
‘Halfbreed cousins’ in the treaties. These requests were recorded in the transcriptions of the 
negotiations, and later reported by treaty commissioners in their reports and correspondence. 
However, unlike the US, these requests were often denied. Yet, individuals of mixed-ancestry 
were in fact included in treaties, suggesting their ambiguous place in Canadian Aboriginal 
policy. Finally, scrip is an important policy in the evolution of a mixed-race discourse. This 
policy, which extinguished Métis Aboriginal title, comprises an important aspect of a legal 
mixed-ancestry identity and identification. Ultimately, scrip served as a means to define 
‘Halfbreed’ as a legal category distinct from that of ‘Indian’ by excluding some Aboriginal 
people of mixed-descent from treaties. For treaty Indians who eventually took scrip, this process 
served as a means of quick enfranchisement. Consequently, the documents, comprised mostly of 
correspondence and orders-in-council, are rich depositories of an official discourse that reflects 
attempts to separate ‘race’ from ‘mixed race.  
To those familiar with the course of Native-Newcomer historiography in each or any of 
these three countries, this undertaking might seem too familiar a story. Much attention has been 
given to definitions of ‘Indian’ or ‘Aboriginal’ in Canadian, American, and Australian 
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historiography, and there are numerous histories on Aboriginal policy. Consequently, we have a 
fairly clear idea about how governments defined ’Indians’ and ‘Aboriginals,’ how those laws and 
policies evolved, and in some instances, the effects they had on individuals, communities, or 
particular demographic groups. For some, it seems this field is significantly saturated and to add 
further to it only serves to ‘beat a dead horse,’ as it were. 
But I believe there is more to be learned. What we know little about is how it is that the 
same laws and policies that sought to define ‘Indian’ also sought to define or distinguish those 
who were of mixed ancestry. And this becomes relevant when we see that in all three of these 
countries (as well as many others around the world), governments singled out people of mixed 
ancestry, albeit to varying degrees, in law and policy. At various times and places, they were 
permitted entry into programs or granted benefits designated specifically for Indians, or were 
denied access to these privileges. Undoubtedly, this has had lasting effects for those who are not 
officially recognized as Aboriginal. A closer examination of how mixed-ancestry populations 
have been targeted can not only tell us something about those affected individuals, but also 
contribute to broader understandings of colonialism, perceptions of race, and legal identity. Such 
an examination also acknowledges and uncovers a uniquely ‘mixed race’ discourse in law and 
policy that ran separately from a narrative about ‘Aboriginals. How we understand race and 
colonialism thus is presented from the different perspective of mixed race.  
Outline 
In uncovering this discourse, I begin with nineteenth-century debates about racial 
hybridity which demonstrated the ambivalence and ambiguity scientists felt towards those who 
were racially mixed. They presented a number of conflicting, contradictory, and illogical theories 
about racial mixing that emerged in popular thinking within a few short decades. I then move on 
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to demonstrate that the laws and policies of all three countries reflect the ambivalence and 
ambiguity of racial science. Specifically, I will show that definitions and attempts at definitions, 
either implicit or explicit, as well as the inclusion/exclusion of mixed-ancestry natives in 
Aboriginal policies (treaties or reservations, for instance) show that governments were 
attempting to maintain dominant ideologies based in racial dichotomies, an analysis which will 
rely on Said. I will argue that these attempts, failed as they were, resulted in confusion, 
ambivalence, and inconsistencies because colonialism produced hybridized populations, in 
Bhabha’s terms. Fundamentally, government policies demonstrated inherent contradictions that 
become evident only when we single out a mixed race discourse. 
This argument begins with a chapter on the historiography of Aboriginal policy and racial 
mixing, which presents both the contributions of and gaps in the existing literature. Next, 
Chapter Three introduces the empirical and theoretical framework of the dissertation, providing a 
background on racial science in the nineteenth century and the theories on racial mixing. It 
provides an overview of Aboriginal policy in each of the three countries. It also offers further 
discussion of how Said and Bhabha’s works contribute to an understanding of the contradictions 
of Aboriginal policy and the role that mixed-ancestry Natives played in it. 
The next three chapters respectively examine how in Canada, the US, and Australia, 
mixed-ancestry Natives were specifically targeted by policies, albeit in ambivalent ways. 
Chapter Four argues that Canadian policy demonstrated ambiguity towards mixed-ancestry 
Natives in treaty policy, the Indian Act, and scrip. Chapter Five argues that American policy 
demonstrated ambiguity towards mixed-ancestry Natives in allotment policy. And Chapter Six 
argues that Australian policy demonstrated ambiguity towards mixed-ancestry Natives through 
oscillating policies of assimilation and anti-miscegenation. In chapter Seven, a conclusion offers 
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some specific comparisons and broader themes that can be pulled out of this empirical evidence, 
providing it with some meaning. The dissertation ends with a final chapter that examines 
continuing discourses of mixed race in Aboriginal policies and some recent court decisions that 
suggest slowly changing attitudes about race, identity, and mixed-ancestry Natives. 
It is my contention that ambiguity and ambivalence mean something, and that they mean 
something more than indecision, inattention or apathy. Instead, I believe that ambiguity and 
ambivalence suggest significant shifts in or at least challenges to paradigmatic schemes of 
thought. They represent moments of tension where ideas clash with reality while their actors 
struggle to rectify the incompatibility of their worldviews with lived realities. In Aboriginal 
policy, ambiguity and ambivalence, and especially about those of mixed ancestry, also meant 
something. In the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries in Canada, the US, and Australia, 
they signified a number of things. First, they reflected a fundamental belief in race as biology, 
and that all humans could be divided into immutable categories based on phenotype: features 
such as skin colour, hair type, and nose shape. They reflected the belief that those physical 
characteristics had social and cultural implications. Second, they exposed a fundamental problem 
in the philosophy of race. Racial theories about mixing were not a singular unified idea. They 
were made up of numerous contested and debated hypotheses about the viability and desirability 
of racial mixing. Scientists vehemently debated these ideas, but never came to a consensus. 
Policy makers were thus ambiguous because racial scientists were ambiguous. They were unable 
to come up with a viable theory of racial mixing that was supported by actual evidence, yet they 
could not entirely abandon their notions about race as biology and its implications for society 
and culture. Finally, ambiguity and ambivalence reflected a growing realization among policy 
officials that the idea of race was failing in the wake of the reality of hybridity. Officials were 
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increasingly confronted with conflicting evidence of science, biology, and race as they played 
out in life, and the theory did not always align with the practice. While this did not put an end to 
racial ideology or the attempts to employ it, it impeded its success. Aboriginal policy could not 
succeed, not only for the pragmatic reasons with which we are already familiar, but because it 
was built on conflicting and unsustainable ideas. Those ideological conflicts and the tensions 
they produced are the subject of this dissertation. 
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Chapter 2 - Literature Review 
This is a dissertation on Aboriginal policy in three countries and how it specifically 
targeted people of mixed ancestry. There is a plethora of sources available on Aboriginal policy 
in Canada, the US, and Australia, yet there is little done in terms of how policy specifically 
affected mixed-ancestry Natives. There is an equally extensive body of literature on the history 
of interracial sexual relationships and colonialism, but less so on the product of that mixing. 
While not entirely ignored in the literature, the relationship between mixed-ancestry Natives and 
Aboriginal policy has assumed a role peripheral to what have been considered more visible or 
accessible topics. The problem is compounded by the specific focus of this dissertation: not only 
does it deal with a topic that has been little explored, it does so in a comparative fashion among 
three countries which exhibit enough difference to make such a comparison challenging. 
Furthermore, there has been little work on comparative Indigenous history – surprising, 
considering the numerous topics which appear to readily present themselves for comparison and 
the transnational nature of colonialism. Nonetheless, three broad areas of historiography provide 
the key areas to consider for a literature review: Aboriginal policy, mixed-ancestry Natives and 
miscegenation, and comparative Indigenous history.  
The place and meaning of contradiction and ambivalence, introduced in the first chapter, 
are central to the argument being presented in this dissertation. Thus far, little has been done to 
examine the causes of these contradictions. It has been largely accepted that the goal of policy 
was indeed assimilation; that is to say, we have taken the word of these historical actors. It has 
also been largely accepted (or at least, unchallenged) that the ambiguity and ambivalence 
displayed in the execution of this policy of assimilation is simply part of the operation of 
government. The discrepancy between the professed intentions of policy on the one hand and the 
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actual execution of those policies and their results on the other is viewed as a naturally occurring 
feature, without need for explanation, and often reduced to the kinds of behaviours that typify the 
bureaucratic machinery that is government. Academic interpretations have paid more attention to 
the empirical motivations of policy and its evolution, such as Aboriginal resistance and non-
compliance, lack of appropriate funds, national concerns, and settler demands. While all true, 
these explanations do little to decipher the inherent and fundamental contradiction of Aboriginal 
policies: assimilation required racial amalgamation, but racial thinking demanded segregation 
and the maintenance of racial boundaries.   
Nation, State, and Tribe 
This gap in the existing literature is in part explained by the evolution of historiography. 
Any genre becomes increasingly complex over time as one topic leads to further and deeper 
analysis; such is the case with Aboriginal history. It has a relatively short timeline, not emerging 
as a specific genre until the 1970s and 1980s. Historical literature written prior to this period 
tended to ignore the roles and contributions of Indigenous groups to national history and failed to 
provide critical examinations of colonialism or its legacy. The dominance of politics, economics, 
and ‘great men’ as historical subjects tended to preclude discussions about society, diversity, and 
the experiences of minorities and those who were oppressed by or disempowered through the 
institutions that maintained and perpetuated social, racial, and economic inequalities. A number 
of social and professional developments following World War II changed how historians 
conceptualized history and, consequently, how they chose their subjects.
1
 
                                                          
1
 It is widely accepted in Canadian and American historiography that the exposure to the Holocaust compelled 
national governments to rethink their treatment of minority populations and to re-examine the status and condition 
of Aboriginal peoples and policies towards them. This is less so the case in Australian historiography, though 
Aboriginal policy underwent a similar shift at the same time. See for instance, J.R. Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the 
Heavens, Rev. ed. (University of Toronto Press, 1991), 220. 
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These changes led to the first wave of Aboriginal histories, which exposed some of the 
underlying assumptions about colonialism. Academics began acknowledging how colonialism 
had been accompanied by those very oppressive and disempowering institutions, and how 
Indigenous peoples had been adversely affected by them. Historiography about Indigenous 
peoples and colonialism shifted accordingly, experiencing in a similar progression in Canada, the 
US, and Australia. The foundational first steps in the 1960s, 70s, and 80s were gradually 
followed by an expansion of the genre to incorporate deeper analyses and, especially recently, 
more regionally and locally nuanced ones. This genre has since grown exponentially and 
developed into a dense field filled with a range of research. While sharing these similarities, each 
country has developed its own tradition in regard to writing Aboriginal policy, though they might 
be considered trends rather than absolutes. The country-specific traditions are reflections of three 
interrelated factors: how Aboriginal affairs were organized in those countries, the jurisdiction of 
law, and how records are organized. In Canada, Aboriginal policy is generally written from a 
national perspective; in Australia, at the state level; and in the US, from a tribal one. These 
approaches have produced constructive and insightful histories, respectively contemplating 
national, regional, and local interpretations of race, identity, and the role of law and policy. 
However, they are approaches that do not place the broader transnational implications of 
colonialism, like race and racial mixing, at the centre. They do not allow for an examination of 
the common patterns inherent to colonialism that become evident with comparisons. Instead, 
they privilege difference over similarity. One of the goals of this dissertation is to examine the 
similarities and explore parallel transnational processes evidenced by the practice of Aboriginal 
policies. 
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Canada 
In Canada, the study of Aboriginal policy has focused on the federal level – a reflection 
of jurisdiction for Aboriginal matters. Indian Affairs was (and is) a federal responsibility, as set 
out in the 1867 Constitution Act. Thus laws and policies affecting Aboriginal people were 
generally developed at that level. The earlier foundational works reflect this organization. A few 
seminal articles, especially L.F.S. Upton’s “The Origins of Canadian Indian Policy” in 1973 
examined pre-Confederation Aboriginal policy under British colonial rule, establishing 1830 as a 
momentous shift in the relationship between Natives and Newcomers.
2
 A reader published in 
1982, As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows, might be considered to constitute the 
founding work on Aboriginal policy.
3
 Antoine Lussier and Ian Getty brought together a number 
of important articles which critically analyze the history of Aboriginal policy, including John L. 
Tobias’ important article, “Protection, Civilization, Assimilation.”4 This reader was followed by 
two equally important histories of policy, beginning with J.R. Miller’s Skyscrapers, originally 
published in 1989, a survey of Native-Newcomer relations.
5
 Although it is not the only survey in 
Canadian historiography, Miller’s work is singled out as the one that uses policy as a central 
organizing feature.
6
 This was followed by Noel Dyck’s What is the Indian Problem? a few years 
later, which focused more exclusively on the process of assimilation and its effects.
7
 At this 
                                                          
2
 L.F.S. Upton, “The Origins of Canadian Indian Policy,” Journal of Canadian Studies 8, no. 4 (1973): 51–60. 
3
 Ian L. Getty and Antoine S Lussier, eds., As Long as the Sun Shines and Water Flows: A Reader in Canadian 
Native Studies (University of British Columbia Press, 1983). 
4
 Other important readers followed shortly, such as F. L Barron and James B Waldram, eds., 1885 and After: Native 
Society in Transition (Regina, Sask: University of Regina, Canadian Plains Research Center, 1986); Robin Fisher 
and Kenneth Coates, eds., Out of the Background: Readings on Canadian Native History (Toronto: Copp Clark 
Pitman, 1988). 
5
 Miller, Skyscrapers Hide the Heavens. 
6
 See also Olive Patricia Dickason, Canada’s First Nations: A History of Founding Peoples from Earliest Times 
(University of Oklahoma Press, 1992); Arthur J. Ray, I Have Lived Here Since the World Began: An Illustrated 
History of Canada’s Native People (Lester Publishing, 1996). 
7
 Noel Dyck, What Is the Indian “Problem”: Tutelage and Resistance in Canadian Indian Administration (Institute 
of Social and Economic Research, Memorial University of Newfoundland, 1991). 
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stage, the attention was on the actions of officials and the effects of policy; consequently, the 
research focused largely on those individuals who fell under the official category of ‘Indian.  
These works and the many other histories of Aboriginal policy in Canada cover a vast 
and diverse range of topics. But one thing they share is their focus on what are now recognized 
as the more visible aspects of policy over the hidden ones. The immediate effects of certain 
aspects of the Indian Act on reserve populations are readily apparent – the loss of freedom for 
Aboriginal people with the institution of the reserve system, for instance. All of these works 
cover these aspects well, and have provided foundational building blocks for further analyses of 
policy. But what is less visible, and consequently, given less attention, are the more veiled 
effects of policy, such as the implicit ways that scrip represented uncertainty about mixed-race 
identities; or how the Indian Act slowly but gradually narrowed the category of ‘Indian,’ thus 
excluding people of mixed ancestry. Only very recently have historians begun to critically 
analyze the categories created by the bureaucratic processes that accompanied colonialism and 
explore the more covert ways that they defined and excluded individuals, especially those of 
mixed ancestry. Consequently, little attention has been given to how racial mixing influenced 
policy or how policy was applied to those individuals more directly. In part, this is the result of 
the availability of historical sources: exclusion from the written historical record has often 
resulted in exclusion from the historiography. But it is also a matter of emphasis. This 
dissertation seeks to give these aspects more attention by bringing them from the periphery to the 
centre. 
The lack of attention to mixed-ancestry Natives and policy is exacerbated by the 
cumulative effect that distinguished ‘Indian’ policy from ‘Métis’ policy. In Canada, the 
historiography can roughly be divided into two streams: those dealing with ‘Indian’ and those 
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dealing with ‘Métis.  Métis historiography has produced its own literature and is generally told 
separately from ‘Indian’ history; that is, the history of those Aboriginal peoples who were the 
recipients of federal policies.
8
 This is evidenced by the historiography on scrip, which almost 
exclusively discusses it as a Métis policy, mostly without providing a critical analysis of the 
individuals included in that category.
9
 These works were classified under the subject heading of 
Métis history, but they ignore what is a complex cultural identity oversimplified with its singular 
association with Canada’s Red River population, particularly at the expense of knowing and 
understanding other mixed-ancestry groups.
10
  Furthermore, historiographical discussions about 
the Métis have been conflated with those about mixed ancestry. Consequently, the idea of racial 
mixing is assumed within Métis history, Métis history is reduced to the fur trade and Red River, 
                                                          
8 This historiography comprises a long tradition that began with works by George F.G. Stanley in 1936, Marcel 
Giraud in 1945, and Joseph Kinsey Howard in 1965. The 1970s and 1980s witnessed a new surge in Métis 
historiography, a result of interest generated by the movement to have Riel posthumously pardoned and by the 
initiation of land claims by the Manitoba Métis Federation. Old topics, such as land claims, settlement, and rebellion 
were reconsidered, while new topics, including cultural, feminist, and community histories, were introduced. The 
works of Jennifer Brown and Sylvia Van Kirk in 1980 were particularly influential, both breaking new ground and 
opening new directions in Métis historiography. The five-volume Collected Writings of Louis Riel in 1985, edited by 
George Stanley, made a wealth of archival documents accessible to historians. The ‘scrip’ debate was a major factor 
in Métis historiography throughout the 1980s and early 1990s, although this debate focused primarily on the Red 
River Métis. Diane Payment and Nicole St-Onge have been equally significant contributors to western Métis 
historiography, expanding the boundaries of Métis historiography outside of Red River, and covering topics that 
include social, economic, religious, and material culture. More recent works, including those by Heather Devine and 
Brenda Macdougall, consider the centrality of family, kinship and community to Métis cultural identity. Indeed, 
there is a large body of Métis historiography. 
9
 Much of the literature on scrip engages a debate over the culpability of government in fraud and speculation. See 
especially D. N. Sprague, “Government Lawlessness in the Administration of Manitoba Land Claims, 1870-1887,” 
Manitoba Law Journal 10 (1980 1979): 415; Theresa A Ferguson and Joe Sawchuk, Metis Land Rights in Alberta: 
A Political History: The Handbook (Edmonton: Metis Association of Alberta, 1982); Thomas Flanagan, Metis 
Lands in Manitoba (Calgary: University of Calgary Press, 1991); Gerhard Ens, Homeland to Hinterland: The 
Changing Worlds of the Red River Metis in the Nineteenth Century (Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1996). 
10
 Scholars have often pointed to the dominance of works on the Red River Métis, or ‘Red River myopia,’ to the 
exclusion of Métis communities and populations in other areas. See Trudy Nicks and Kenneth Morgan, “Grand 
Cache: The Historic Development of an Indigenous Alberta Métis Population,” in The New Peoples: Being and 
Becoming Métis in North America, ed. Jacqueline Peterson and Jennifer S.H. Brown, 163-181 (Winnipeg: 
University of Manitoba Press, 1981); J.R. Miller, “From Riel to the Métis,” Canadian Historical Review 69, 1 
(1988); and Macdougall, 2006.  
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and both ignore the many mixed-ancestry individuals, both status and non-status, who are not 
Métis.
11
  
More recently, the traditions that have treated Métis and Indian policy separately have 
begun to change. While the application of critical race theory is not particularly prominent in 
Canadian historiography, a few works suggest a changing landscape in this regard. Heather 
Devine explores what can sometimes be considered a false divide between Indians and Métis in 
The People who Own Themselves.
12
 Through the examination of the history of one family, she 
demonstrates the problematic nature of government definitions that divide families, even siblings 
with the same parents, into two different legal categories. As many other studies on Aboriginal 
identity maintain, legal identities often do not correlate with the kinship ties that typically 
constitute Aboriginal identities. Another significant work is Bonita Lawrence’s “Real” Indians 
and Others, which offers a gender analysis of how the Indian Act has systematically attacked 
Aboriginal status, resulting in a process of urbanization where Natives are one of many 
multicultural subjects.
13
 Although she provides a history of this process, her main concern is with 
the contemporary identities of those urban Natives. Finally, Pamela Palmater’s recent Beyond 
Blood considers how federal policy as laid out in the Indian Act affects the identities of 
individuals, particularly those of mixed-ancestry who have been disconnected from their 
communities.
14
 Mixed ancestry constitutes grounds for losing or being denied government 
recognition, she concludes, but not for changing one’s identity as Aboriginal. Indeed, the 
discrepancy between status and band membership since its division in 1985 has been the subject 
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 See Jacqueline Peterson and Jennifer S.H. Brown, The New Peoples. An exception to the focus on Red River 
ethnogenesis is the more recent Ute Lischke and David T. McNab, Long Journey of a Forgotten People, The: Métis 
Identities and Family Histories (Wilfrid Laurier University Press, 2007). 
12
 Devine, The People Who Own Themselves. 
13
 Bonita Lawrence, “Real” Indians and Others: Mixed-Blood Urban Native Peoples and Indigenous Nationhood 
(Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2004). 
14
 Pamela Doris Palmater, Beyond Blood: Rethinking Indigenous Identity (Saskatoon: Purich Publishing, 2011). 
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of controversy. In any case, these works point to the beginnings of a trend where colonial and 
racial categories are more critically analyzed. 
They also point to a process of internationalizing historical methodologies. Lawrence’s 
work in particular indicated a shift in established historiographical trends that reflected the 
adoption of postcolonial theory and gender analysis into discussions about Native-Newcomer 
relations and Aboriginal policy. Works by Robert C. Young, Ann Laura Stoler, and Anne 
McClintock, to name a few, influenced how colonialism was written about in Canada. For 
instance, Adele Perry’s On the Edge of Empire combines race and gender in a post-colonial 
framework to analyse imperialism in BC between 1849 and 1871. She examines the unstable 
nature of identity, demonstrating that “racial categories are fictive and changing rather than real 
and stable.” 15  Her chapter on mixed-race relationships uncovers some of those previously 
unacknowledged histories, focusing on the important role that mixed-race relationships had on 
the colonial frontier in BC. However, like most studies that examine the intersection of race, sex, 
and colonialism, Perry focuses on the ‘mixing’ as opposed to the ‘mixed,’ or the process over the 
product. Although the focus on policy is integral to our understanding of Native-Newcomer 
relations, and has provided us with a framework in which to situate our understanding, it is now 
possible to move beyond and expand our approach to Aboriginal history. Renisa Mawani’s 
Colonial Proximities is one such example.
16
 She considers, not only the role of race and gender 
in the creation of colonial categories, but also how immigration contested and destabilized 
British ideals about social and racial mores. Canadian historiography is, then, incorporating some 
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 Adele Perry, On the Edge of Empire: Gender, Race, and the Making of British Columbia, 1849-1871 (Toronto: 
University of Toronto Press, 2001), 5. 
16
 Renisa Mawani, Colonial Proximities: Crossracial Encounters and Juridical Truths in British Columbia, 1871-
1921 (Vancouver: University of British Columbia Press, 2009). 
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of the trends in theory and method evolving outside of Canada to develop new critical 
approaches to Native-Newcomer history.  
The US 
The historiography of Native American policy in the US is comparatively vast, but a few 
trends stand out. Research tends to occur at the tribal level, undoubtedly a result of the way in 
which legislation was passed and archival documents are organized. In addition, the sheer 
volume of documentation often precludes the examination of policy from a national level. As 
Harold L. Ickes wrote in the introduction of Felix Cohen’s 1941 (and first) edition of the seminal 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, “Such, however, is the complexity of the body of Indian law, 
based upon more than 4000 treaties and statutes and upon thousands of judicial decisions and 
administrative rulings, rendered during a century and a half, that one can well understand the 
vast ignorance of the subject that prevails even in ordinarily well informed quarters.”17 The 
allotment policy, for instance, was set out with vague legislation of general application, but was 
instituted with an additional piece of legislation or a formal agreement for each specific tribe. 
Thus, American Indian law consists of both laws of general application and laws of specific 
tribal application. It was a system that produced a plethora of bills, resolutions, legislation, 
orders, and other legal instruments – both a blessing and a burden to historians.18 A few notable 
works have tackled the challenge of a comprehensive history of policy, including Francis Paul 
Prucha, who produced a number of volumes on the history of law and policy. His two-volume 
The Great Father published in 1984 is an unprecedented work in its length and breadth, and 
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 Harold L. Ickes, “Foreword” in 2005 edition, reprinted from 1941 edition, Felix S Cohen, Felix S. Cohen’s 
Handbook of Federal Indian Law, 2005 ed. (Charlottesville, Va: Mitchie, 1982), xxv. 
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 Native American law has indeed been made accessible by two collections: Charles J. Kappler, ed., Indian Affairs: 
Laws and Treaties. (Washington: Govt. Print. Off, 1903); Cohen, Handbook of Federal Indian Law. 
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provides an excellent account of almost every stage of Native affairs policy in the US.
19
 The 
same year, Frederick Hoxie’s A Final Promise offered an account of assimilation as a national 
policy. Both are considered important works in establishing a national framework for 
understanding the political relationship between Native Americans and the federal government. 
Those who have followed in the footsteps of these foundational works have tended to 
approach Native American policy in one of two ways: by focusing on one specific policy phase; 
or by focusing on one specific tribe (or sometimes, both).
20
 Of the former, a large number of the 
works deal with allotment. There is a wide store of literature on this subject which contributes 
significantly to understanding Native American policy as one fundamentally concerned with 
land. Greenwald’s Reconfiguring the Reservation provides a succinct historiography of allotment 
in the US and outlines some noteworthy trends.
21
 She identifies five key authors who have 
created what she argues has become the dominant narrative of dispossession: D.S. Otis, J.P. 
Kinney, Loring Benson Priest, Leonard Carlson, and Janet McDonnell.
22
 Collectively, she says, 
these authors represent a dispossession narrative which has created passive victims out of 
Indians, and “clouds our understanding” of the policy. One of the consequences, she argues, is 
that we focus on long-term effects over immediate implications. She points out that “scholars 
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 One example of this trend is, L. Susan Work, The Seminole Nation of Oklahoma: A Legal History (Norman: 
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already know quite a lot about the explicit intentions of the Dawes Act: Reformers proposed it as 
the centerpiece of a program designed to assimilate Indians into the American mainstream. But 
they have not thought as carefully about the Dawes Act’s implicit spacial agenda.”23 This agenda 
reflected Native resistance to colonizing efforts through allotment where tribes used the process 
to organize communities in accordance with their own customs and needs – not unlike the ways 
they resisted impositions on their identities. The same power struggles evident in this ‘spacial 
agenda’ and resistant to the appropriation of land can be considered in the resistance to the 
appropriation of identity. Indeed, this gap in the literature that Greenwald points out can be in 
part filled by the examination of race and authority to determine tribal membership. 
As Greenwald suggests, there is more to allotment than dispossession. It was also an 
exercise in other colonial processes that extended beyond land demands, such as the organization 
of ambiguous populations into clear racial-political categories. For instance, as both Melissa 
Meyers and Katherine Ellinhaus suggest in their studies of allotment among the Chippewa White 
Earth reservation in early twentieth-century Wisconsin, allotment policy demonstrated 
underlying ideologies of colonialism as well as intertribal tensions about ethnicity and identity.
24
 
Gary Zellar’s African Creeks offers the same kind of critical analysis of allotment among Creek 
constructions of categories in a racially ambiguous South.
25
 As these examples demonstrate, 
there is space for a more critical analysis of how and why membership on rolls was decided, 
what role race played in those decisions, and what degree of power tribal authorities and 
government officials had over this process. While it is well understood that land and its eventual 
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misappropriation were major factors in this process, the ideological and epistemological 
influences have not been equally considered. Consequently, we know less about what allotment 
says about people of mixed ancestry as part of the broader nineteenth- and twentieth-century 
racial discourse. 
These historiographical traditions also mean that any consideration of mixing is done at 
the tribal level. A few notable works demonstrate this point. Fay A. Yarborough examines a 
similar situation among the Cherokee in Race and the Cherokee Nation.
26
 She argues that 
throughout the nineteenth century, the Cherokee gradually adopted a stratified concept of race-
based citizenship as a three-tiered system based on biology – Cherokee at the top, followed by 
whites, then blacks. She claims that Cherokees identified more with whites and their level of 
social and economic power than with blacks and their lack of it, reflecting the influence of 
western ideas of race on Aboriginal constructions of human difference. Another example is 
Theda Perdue’s “Mixed Blood” Indians, in which she examines racial construction among those 
nations which occupied the south-east US, and looks at how ‘foreigners’ were adopted into 
native societies under various circumstances, such as inter-marriage, trade, capture, travel, 
exploration, or social freedom.
27
 Perdue focuses on how south-east tribes reacted to and 
incorporated ideas about race and racial mixing into their own kinship patterns, and how those 
policies changed their systems. However, much as Yarbrough concluded, race as biology did 
infiltrate Indigenous kinship systems.
28
 Works on the Lumbee identity also fit into broader 
discussions about race and identity, especially Malinda Lowrey’s Lumbee Indians in the Jim 
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Crow South.
29
 Like Zellar, Meyer, and Ellinghaus, Lowrey examines the racial complexities of 
changing and contested Native American identity, though she focuses on North Carolina. What 
emerges from these works, then, is that the idea of ‘mixed race’ had some, although varying, 
degrees of influence on Native American identity.   
 Likewise, a few works which examine the problems of identity in terms of federal 
policies, and especially tribal recognition, make a notable contribution to the larger topic under 
consideration in this study. Bruce Miller’s Invisible Indigenes examines how previously fluid 
identities among Indigenous groups on the Pacific Northwest have been ‘frozen’ by federal 
policies. He especially analyzes the federal recognition process in the US, but he considers how 
similar processes of federal recognition have been experienced throughout the world. The 
problems associated with official recognition are also examined by Eva Marie Garroutte in Real 
Indians.
30
 They both suggest that identity construction is equally complex among all Indigenous 
groups, and that the federal system is unable to cope with those complexities.
31
 But this is a 
small body of work, each of which focuses on a specific tribe.  
This is the case for the south-west, too. The American south-west is one of the most 
ambiguous and difficult regions to deal with in regard to Indigenous mixed-ancestry identity. 
Prior to 1848, Spain’s hold on the region ensured it followed some of the same patterns of 
intermarriage that other Latin American regions did. However, its shift to US territory following 
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the war meant the imposition of an entirely new legal tradition that undoubtedly influenced not 
only how people identified, but how they were identified by government officials. One example 
is Ramón A. Gutiérrez’s When Jesus Came, The Corn Mothers Went Away, where he traces the 
marriage customs of the Pueblo Indians and the Spanish up to 1846. Gutiérrez’s study of the 
Pueblos tells us from the start that all peoples are culturally mixed. The ‘Pueblos’ do not 
constitute a genetically pure culture with a long and timeless history; instead, “what we now 
recognize as discrete ethnic categories and tribal affiliations were in considerable flux during the 
sixteenth century.”32 Indeed, this could be said for any culture group in any century. 
In many respects, the US has a more advanced pool of literature relating to the issue of 
race and hybridity as Indigenous legal issues. Part of this has to do with the development of 
critical race studies, a genre of American origins.
 
This is even more so the case for the newly 
emerging critical mixed-race studies in the 1980s, which, as its name suggests, applies the tenets 
of critical race theory to mixed-race peoples.
33
 But this also has to do with the nature of official 
Native American identity in the US. Based in an explicit criterion of blood quantum, the racial 
character of a legal Native identity is more palpable. Critics of Native policy recognize and 
acknowledge this basis, and a wide array of publications has analyzed the contemporary 
implications of what is a historic process. For instance, a study by Robert E. Bieder, Science 
Encounters the Indian, provides a treatment of racial philosophy as it shaped colonial thinking 
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about Aboriginal people in nineteenth-century US.
34
 A counterpart does not exist for Canada. 
Thus, American literature has tended to more thoroughly analyze the role of race and racial 
mixing in Indigenous identity.  
While these are only a few among many works that examine the various facets of Native 
American federal policy history, they provide some general themes and trends that help explain 
why an examination of mixed-ancestry Natives from a federal perspective has been difficult. It 
has taken decades of work to begin to unpack the plethora of legal and policy documents that 
might allow for an exploration of connections between policy and identity at a deeper level. They 
also point to the complexity of identity politics and the challenges of attempting to explore this 
topic in a national and international context – a challenge felt more so in the American context. 
Australia  
At the same time that new fields of inquiry into Aboriginal history were unfolding in 
Canada and the US, C.D. Rowley and Henry Reynolds were tackling new territory in Australia. 
Rowley’s groundbreaking trilogy fundamentally altered the way Australians looked at their 
history and the role of Aboriginal people in it.
35
 Rowley’s research became the first 
comprehensive study of the history of Native-Newcomer relations in Australia, published in 
three volumes between 1970 and 1972. His 1967 essay, “Who is an Aboriginal? The Answer in 
1967,” was published as an appendix to the first of these volumes, has provided decades of 
discussion and analysis on race and identity in Australia. On its heels was Henry Reynolds’ 
work, a long and continuing line of publications which began with Aborigines and Settlers in 
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1972. It focused on the previously ignored legacy of violence of the Native-Newcomer 
relationship, while many of his other works went on to chronicle the legacy of Aboriginal 
policies. Both historians introduced Australia to a ‘new’ history of Native-Newcomer relations 
and ushered in an era of critical national historiography. 
Since that time, historians have produced a large store of literature on a vast array of 
Aboriginal issues. However, after these works, the trend has been to conduct research at the state 
or territory level.
36
 As in Canada and the US, this historiographical trend is a reflection of 
governmental jurisdiction. Until 1967, Aboriginal affairs was a state matter, after which it was 
centralized under the federal government. Thus, the historiography of Australia, much like that 
of the US, is burdened (or blessed, depending on one’s perspective) with a lack of cohesion. 
Historical analysis of the relationship between law, race, and identity is fragmented by state- or 
tribe-centered histories. This creates a more nuanced history that is appreciated at the local level, 
but comes at the expense of broader national perspectives where trends in law and colonialism 
might start to become visible.  
Each state or territory in Australia, then, has its own historiography.
37
 Anna Haebich’s 
For Their Own Good is an excellent examination of Aboriginal policy from 1900 to 1940 in 
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Western Australia.
38
 She examines the implications of increasing settler populations in Western 
Australia on Aboriginal lifeways, and explores the application and effects of policies in that 
state. Tony Austin has written a number of works on the Northern Territory, many of which have 
focused on Aboriginal policy organized around specific administrators. For instance, his 1997 
Never Trust a Government Man is organized around the administrations of the Chief Protectors 
who served between 1911 and 1939.
39
 Indeed, the biographical approach has been a popular 
method of analyzing Aboriginal policy history in Australia.
40
 This approach attends to the 
nuanced ways in which individuals can influence and execute policies and appreciates the 
localized nature of history. However, policy is then reduced to the creation of top administrators 
and their individual ideologies. While typically sympathetic to the harshness of policy and the 
implications it had for Aboriginal people, it has the effect of presenting those implications as 
exceptional – a result of a specific individual’s actions as opposed to a systemic and endemic 
process of colonialism. 
Australian historiography has a stronger tradition of considering race philosophy and 
critical race theory in its histories than either Canada or the US, likely a result of the more 
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explicit racial discourse of law and policy there. This is evidenced both by works that make race 
ideology their main focus, and by empirical histories that employ race as a theme for analyzing 
the history of specific policies.
41
 One noteworthy example is Henry Reynolds’ Nowhere 
People.
42
 Reynolds examines the attitudes and ideas behind Australian policies that targeted 
Aboriginal people of mixed ancestry, arguing that the result was the exclusion of mixed-race 
Aboriginal people from both Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal society. Another example is Tony 
Austin’s work on the Northern Territory, especially his I Can Picture the Old Home So Clearly, 
which focuses on the specific impetus that racial mixing had for policy in that territory. He 
argues elsewhere that “Aboriginal Departments in Australia were universally preoccupied with 
the ‘half-caste problem’.”43 Other works explore the ideologies behind the practice of race, or 
how those ideologies were executed in everyday life. Kay Anderson’s Race and the Crisis of 
Humanism examines European understandings of what it meant to be human in eighteenth-
century philosophy in terms of race and colonialism in Australia. Russell McGregor’s Imagined 
Destinies explores the racial science behind the ‘doomed race’ theory, the widely held 
assumption that Aboriginal people were gradually dying out at the start of the twentieth 
century.
44
 Finally, Warwick Anderson’s work has brought a deeper analysis to the workings of 
race ideologies in a specifically Australian context. The Cultivation of Whiteness is especially 
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significant in terms of understanding reactions to racial mixing in Australian history.
45
 There, 
Anderson explores the application of racial and biological theories in the context of an 
increasingly racialized Australia where mixing received considerable attention. Elsewhere, he 
discusses more specifically the topic of miscegenation, arguing that scholars were divided 
between a pro-miscegenation ‘oceanic approach’ that held that mixed races in the Pacific would 
produce a hardier stock, while others, mainly those with a nationalist agenda, maintained an anti-
miscegenetic sentiment.
46
 With their closer analysis of the relationship between European racial 
thinking and the practice of colonialism, these works set Australian historiography apart from 
scholarship in Canada and the US. 
Gender analysis and feminist studies have also had a greater influence on Australian 
Aboriginal historiography, likely a result of the emphasis on racial mixing throughout the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. Ann McGrath, Katherine Ellinghaus, Patricia 
Grimshaw, Fiona Paisley, and Victoria Haskins make up but a few of excellent historians who 
examine the intersection of race and sex in critical analyses of colonialism in Australia. 
Ellinghaus’s work on interracial marriage has emphasized the gendered relationships of race in 
colonialism and the role that the state played in mitigating (or attempting to mitigate) interracial 
relationships. Victoria Haskins work includes an examination of the gendered and racialized 
aspects of domestic labour and child removal. Ann McGrath’s Born in the Cattle examines the 
important gender and race aspects of rural labour.
47
 Her chapter, “Black Velvet,” is especially 
revealing of the sexual relationships between Aboriginal women and white men and speaks to 
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the complex ways in which these relations occurred.
48
 It also provides an excellent example of 
how gender and feminist studies have advanced the analysis and understanding of Aboriginal 
policies, where the relationship between gender, race, and colonialism were more overt than in 
Canada and the US. 
Finally, over the last few decades, a series of inquiries and debates raised awareness 
about the history of Aboriginal policy in Australia. The 1995 Human Rights inquiry into the 
policy of child removal in Australia, many of whom were mixed-ancestry, altered the landscape 
of public, academic, and political perspectives of Aboriginal history across Australia.
49
 The 
inquiry brought an increased awareness of the specific historical experiences of ‘mixed-race’ 
Aboriginal people and contributed to academic attention to racial mixing in Australia. It has also 
affected the interpretation of history in other ways. For instance, Aboriginal policy as an exercise 
of genocide has framed some of the literature on the topic.
50
 It has also placed the interpretation 
of race and history at the center of public and political debates. But more specifically for the 
purposes here, it has opened a space for the examination of ideas like racial mixing, blood 
quantum, and the legitimacy of Aboriginal identity, allowing for more complex and nuanced 
understandings of identity and its history. Either way, it has created a space to discuss the 
broader ideological context to a specific mixed-race Aboriginal policy and its legacy, and 
provides an opportunity to situate transnational themes into national contexts. 
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Mixed-ancestry Natives and ‘Miscegenation’ 
An equally important body of literature to the relationship between mixed-ancestry 
Natives and Aboriginal policy is the much smaller one on racial mixing. Seminal works by 
Sylvia Van Kirk, Jennifer Brown, Ann Laura Stoler, Anne McClintock, and Peggy Pascoe have 
all made significant contributions, even creating new fields of historical inquiry, through an 
examination of interracial sexual relationships.
51
 These works provide a sense of the intricate and 
even intimate constructions of gendered racialization that occurred in various colonial settings. 
But they have all been concerned with the nature, social meaning, and public reaction to those 
interracial relationships; that is, the process of ‘miscegenation.  They tell us less about the 
product of those relationships: the mixed-ancestry or mixed-race children. While we know that 
there were varying degrees of acceptability and rejection of interracial relationships, what of 
those children who resulted from those unions? Works on racial mixing and interracial sex do 
not always consider the importance of the nineteenth-century racial hierarchy in determining the 
impact these laws had on various populations, or the degree to which they were applied.
52
 As 
Pascoe noted, marriages among whites and Indians were often allowed despite laws saying 
otherwise – a degree of latitude generally not extended to Blacks. From the perspective of 
nineteenth-century racial thinking, Indians were a more ‘acceptable’ racial other on a scale where 
blacks were always the most vilified.  
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Comparative Indigenous History 
Finally, it is worth considering the state of comparative Indigenous history as a genre 
itself, separate from other categories considered here. There seems limitless potential for 
comparative examinations of colonialism and Indigenous history, but the challenges are 
significant. Comparative history requires knowledge and expertise in multiple fields, familiarity 
with numerous historiographical traditions, and an additional level of analysis: one must analyze 
the evidence historically and comparatively. Added to this is a problem of methodology. One of 
the most fundamental problems of comparative history is that it is a small body framed only 
loosely by an ill-defined methodological approach. Works which are categorized as comparative 
are often actually multi-regional. Readers are left to draw loose connections on their own from a 
collection of essays connected by broader themes rather than precise or specific comparisons. Of 
course, it is difficult to be too critical: finer comparisons are often precluded by the vastly 
different experiences and historical circumstances of colonialism in local, regional, or national 
contexts.  
While a number of good comparative histories have recently emerged in the literature,
53
 
relatively few examine racial mixing comparatively. A chapter by Vicki Luker compares the 
‘half-caste problem’ in Australia, New Zealand, and Western Samoa in the early twentieth 
century.
54
 She examines some of the differences in ‘miscegenation’ in these three countries. As 
Luker notes via her bibliography, most attempts to compare processes of racial mixing were 
early twentieth-century anthropological studies that uncritically employed the racialized attitudes 
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and assumptions of that era. This fact might account for an otherwise absent contemporary 
analysis: undoubtedly, most historians would be hesitant to align themselves with those attitudes. 
Likewise, a 2005 article by Victoria Freeman compares attitudes towards miscegenation in 
Canada, the United States, Australia, and New Zealand in the late nineteenth and early twentieth 
centuries.
55
  Freeman begins with four similar colonies, all British, in order to examine the 
differences in these attitudes. Katherine Ellinghaus compares interracial marriages in nineteenth-
century Australia and the United States.
56
 She uses the comparative method in order to isolate the 
relevance of class to interracial marriages and examine how power is gendered. She also reveals 
how differences in official attitudes towards assimilation resulted in a more segregated society in 
Australia. Patrick Wolfe compares discourses of miscegenation in Australia and the United 
States to consider the connection between territorial expropriation and assimilationist policies.
57
 
Ann Laura Stoler compares metissage in French Indochina and the Netherlands Indies in a 1992 
article.
58
 As these and other authors have demonstrated, a comparative approach to Indigenous 
history is not only feasible, but a worthwhile endeavour. 
There are many more works, relevant in theme and topic, that could be considered multi-
regional anthologies. Some of these focus on the ideas of empire, colonialism, and imperialism. 
Empire and Others, a collection edited by M.J. Daunton and Rick Halpern, brings together 
research on Aboriginal peoples, identity, and British colonizers. A collection edited by Diane 
Kirkby and Catharine Coleborne, Law, History, Colonialism, brings together essays which focus 
largely on law as a tool of colonialism. In a similar vein, Hamar Foster’s The Grand Experiment 
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examines the importance of law and legal culture in British settler societies.
59
 These works, and 
others that fit the genre, all present opportunities for comparisons on transnational themes of 
colonialism. They demonstrate the wide range of possibilities for comparative methodology and 
the potential it has for uncovering the hidden and systemic processes of colonialism. However, as 
with most anthologies, there is little opportunity for authors to directly contribute to a 
comparative analysis outside of an introduction often presented by its editors.  
A second set of multi-regional collections focuses on the intersecting themes of sex, race, 
and colonialism. Ruth Roach Pierson and Nupur Chaudhuri’s Nation, Empire, Colony brings 
together individually authored articles that examine those themes in multiple regions, including 
New Zealand, the US, West Africa, Mexico, Ireland, Iran, and India, to name a few.
60
 Martha 
Hoades’ Sex, Love, Race examines similar intersecting themes of sex, race, and colonialism for 
the US over a number of historical periods.
61
 Moving Subjects, edited by Tony Ballantyne and 
Antoinette Burton offers a collection of essays on similar themes. Like the subset of literature 
that has examined similar and intersecting themes, these works demonstrate the relevance of 
gender analysis and feminist theory for race and colonialism. They point to the many ways in 
which race is a gendered process, and how that process shaped colonialism in different and 
similar ways across the world. But, as with the anthologies on law and colonialism, those on race 
and gender are limited by a format that allows little opportunity for an explicit comparative 
analysis. 
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These latter works might more aptly fit under the heading of ‘transnational history. As 
historians Ann Curthoys and Marilyn Lake describe, transnational history is “the study of the 
ways in which past lives and events have been shaped by processes and relationships that have 
transcended the borders of nation states.”62  The more recent increase in popularity of fields that 
include transnational, border, and global studies has renewed interests in comparative history. As 
authors Lester and Dussart point out, “In recent years there have been numerous accounts of 
colonial relations, seeking to move beyond the core-periphery dichotomies of traditional imperial 
history by tracking the movement of people, ideas, capital and commodities across networks that 
connected the British imperial metropole and its colonies.”63 Research that is more accurately 
described as ‘transnational’ or ‘border studies’ differs in that it generally engages comparative 
analysis more directly. Lester and Dussart demonstrate this approach in examining Aboriginal 
‘protectorates’ as trajectories of transnational colonial histories. Tracing the protectorate as an 
idea which “travelled from Trinidad across the Caribbean, thence to Tasmania” and “refined in 
Britain ... with reference to the Cape Colony in South Africa, and was then imported to New 
South Wales in Australia, travelling finally to Aotearoa New Zealand.”64 In doing so, the authors 
demonstrate how imperialism and its ideas are both local and global – or, as they word it, that 
“British colonial culture and practices were the result of trajectories between vastly different 
colonized places.”65 While this dissertation does not specifically consider how the ideas about 
race and racial mixing moved from place to place, it does demonstrate those similar trajectories 
of policy in ‘vastly different places.’ 
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Conclusion 
This vast store of literature tells us much about the history of Native-Newcomer relations 
and of the role that race has played. But there are four major components missing that this 
dissertation seeks to address. First, the existing literature does not consider ways in which mixed-
ancestry Natives have been the targets of specific laws and policies. Second, it does not examine 
how an understanding of the roles of those groups can explain the contradictions of policy, 
especially the inherent tensions between policies of assimilation and segregation. Third, it does 
not consider how comparative examinations of Aboriginal policies can reveal answers to these 
questions. And finally, it largely does not consider how postcolonial and critical race theories can 
contribute to a better understanding of those groups and their roles in history. It is these 
components this dissertation seeks to address.  
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Chapter 3 - Science, Theory, and Practice: The “Problem” of Racial 
Mixing  
The census will, I think, reveal some startling facts in regard to the Indians. We have been under 
the impression for the last 25 years that the Indian has been increasing. That, I think, will appear 
not to be true for the last 10 years... The loss is mostly confined to the full bloods. Mixed bloods 
hold their own better, and are increasing in this land. The Indian people will not remain as a 
separate race among us.
1
 Senator Dawes, US Congress, 1890 
Persons of mixed white and red blood – commonly known as “breeds” – will be described by 
addition of the initial letters “f.b.” for French breed, “e.b.” for English breed, “s.b.” for Scotch 
breed, and “i.b.” for Irish breed. For example: “Cree f.b.” denotes that the person is racially a 
mixture of Cree and French; and “Chippewa s.b.” denotes that the person is Chippewa and Scotch. 
Other mixtures of Indians besides the four above specified are rare, and may be described by the 
letters “o.b.” for other breed. If several races are combined with the red, such as English and 
Scotch, Irish and French, or any others, they should also be described by the initials “o.b.”
 2
  1901 
Census Instructions, Canada 
Having travelled in the course of my investigations a distance of some 14,000 miles..., the 
conclusion is irresistible that the great problem confronting the community today is that of the 
half-caste. While it appears beyond doubt, from opinions expressed generally throughout the 
State, that the full-blooded aborigines are decreasing in number, it is very certain that the half-
castes are multiplying rapidly.
3
 Royal Commission on Aborigines, Western Australia, 1935 
 
As these quotes suggest, impressions about shifting racial demographics in the late 
nineteenth and early twentieth centuries occupied the consideration of a broad range of 
government officials. These records subtly reflected debates over Aboriginal assimilation and 
segregation, but they also reflected emerging scientific theories about human viability and how it 
connected to racial difference. The myth of the ‘dying Native’ was considered ‘common 
knowledge’ at the end of the nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, as indicated by the 
popularity of Herbert Spencer’s ‘survival of the fittest’ hypothesis – a kind of Darwinian natural 
selection for culture.
4
 This was not just an academic argument that developed in the course of 
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post-Enlightenment science (although that was certainly part of it), nor was it just a product of a 
few short-sighted officials. Instead, it was a widely held belief that was ingrained in the popular 
imagination.
5
 This belief accompanied colonialism throughout the world, and not entirely 
without cause. One of the major historical consequences of colonialism was depopulation: 
exposure to new diseases, warfare, and even deliberate policies of extermination resulted in 
population losses as high as 90 per cent.
6
 But this myth was also a convenient justification for the 
appropriation of Indigenous land. If Natives were a ‘vanishing race,’ as many believed, then they 
were not really being displaced. It was, in fact, considered the natural order of things: Natives 
would die out in the face of advancing civilization as a kind of ‘natural selection.’ 
The long-held myth that Aboriginal people were dying out was challenged only by the 
equally pervasive myth that racially mixed Aboriginal populations were increasing, and some 
felt, at an alarming rate. Whether there was an actual increase in numbers or just an increased 
notice of mixing, it was increasingly considered something to be identified, counted, monitored, 
and even deterred. Systematic observation and categorization were part of the post-
Enlightenment epistemologies where recording human difference was witnessed in population 
and demographic. As populations were increasingly categorized into races, debates over 
biological viability of miscegenation, or racial mixing, complicated this taxonomic approach: 
categories were made unstable by mixing, and scientists were at odds over its possible 
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implications.
7
 There would be no consensus, and between the middle of the nineteenth and the 
turn of the twentieth century, science demonstrated its ambivalence and ambiguity towards racial 
mixing. In turn, this was reflected in Aboriginal policies across Canada, the US, and Australia. 
Increasingly, mixed-ancestry Natives were identified in both subtle and overt ways in laws and 
policy that sought to eliminate what was perceived as racial ambiguity. 
However, the ways in which they were targeted varied. There was significant 
ambivalence and ambiguity when it came to defining, administering, codifying, and 
acknowledging individuals of mixed ancestry as ‘Aboriginal,’ at least in terms of official 
recognition. At varying times they were seen as models for the process of assimilation, 
representative of a transitional stage on the path to civilization. At others they served as foils to 
the hopes and dreams of proponents of civilization, described as the ‘worst of both races’ who 
only led the good but ignorant from progress along this path.
8
 They were both included in and 
excluded from legal definitions of Aboriginal, seemingly at random. Blood quantum rules and 
anti-miscegenation laws, both implicit and explicit, were as frequently transgressed, ignored, or 
exempted by government officials as they were created and revised. Definitions that were meant 
to clarify and fix the place of mixed-ancestry Natives as subjects of the state – either as regular 
citizens or as ‘Aboriginal’ by law – were in constant flux, and officials rarely agreed on how to 
make rules consistent. From this perspective, the ‘Native problem’ so long claimed the catalyst 
of policy might be better understood as the ‘problem of mixed-race.    
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The apparent contradictions of mixed-ancestry Native policy can in part be explained by 
the overarching Aboriginal policies themselves. Aboriginal policy, on the one hand, claimed 
assimilation as a goal, but on the other, produced a legacy of segregation. The segregation itself 
might take a variety of forms. It could mean an intentional policy, often under the guise of 
‘protection,’ whereby Aboriginals were placed onto isolated pieces of land to be guarded from 
‘unscrupulous whites’9  until they could fend for themselves; or it could be practiced more 
informally through social and economic exclusion, even after the legal mechanics of ‘distinct 
status’ were removed and the so-called assimilation had been achieved. Either way, Aboriginals 
were barred from participating in the dominant social and economic realms as equals (if they 
even chose to do so). Consequently, ‘assimilation’ never intended any meaningful kind of 
integration into the dominant society even where such policies were administered; instead, it 
meant a process of ‘de-Indianization,’ a kind of continued segregation and subordination 
whereby Aboriginal peoples were separated as a distinct socio-economic sector, often in specific 
geographic zones, but without the protection that legal status might offer.
10
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Mixed-ancestry Natives were at the heart of this contradiction. They played a significant 
role in the creation and development of Aboriginal policy in Canada, the US, and Australia, and 
for a few reasons. Most importantly, they served as a foil for definitions of ‘Native’ which were 
central to Aboriginal policies everywhere. Yet, legal definitions for ‘Native’ were notoriously 
vague and ambiguous. With little exception, they did not actually define who constituted 
membership or how that would be determined, and indeed, could not. The only option was to 
qualitatively describe when a person stopped being Native – a negative criterion that used racial 
mixing as a qualifier. It would constitute notions of ‘authenticity’ and ‘dilution,’ separating those 
who were considered ‘real’ Aboriginals from those who were not. Blood quantum rules and 
pedigrees thus served as cut-off points for official Aboriginality.
11
 Indeed, racial descent, 
explicitly or implicitly, became integral to definitions of ‘Native’ in all three countries under 
consideration here, even if they were not always or consistently observed. 
It is especially through attempts to create a definition for ‘Native’ that we begin to find 
meaning in the ambiguity and ambivalence. I posit that these inconsistencies represent 
ideological and intellectual debates and struggles over race in colonialism – both those 
experienced by individuals, including policy makers, and those experienced by academics and 
experts. I also maintain that this meaning becomes more apparent by examining policy responses 
to mixed-ancestry Natives. The ways in which colonial authorities dealt with those of mixed 
ancestry exposes a number of factors: the fallacy of the goal of assimilation, the problem of 
racial categories and thinking, and the ambiguity and ambivalence government officials felt 
about mixed-ancestry Natives. It reflects the racial theories that came out of post-Enlightenment 
science, particularly those that examined the so-called ‘problem’ of racial mixing. Significantly, 
this occurred in all three countries under consideration here, despite their vastly different 
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approaches and commitment to the apparent goal of assimilation, and despite their very different 
ways of attempting to administer mixed-ancestry Natives. Essentially, the contradictions of 
policy are illuminated by the ‘problem’ of mixed-race. Administrators were less confused about 
how to categorize ‘real’ Natives, the so-called pure bloods who led traditional lifestyles, than the 
‘mixed bloods’ who created the ambiguity and who presented a dilemma for administrators. 
Such ambiguities and ambivalences can be understood through three frameworks. The 
first provides an empirical overview of policy in each of the three countries – introduced here but 
discussed more fully over the next three chapters. The second outlines some of the major theories 
and debates about racial mixing among nineteenth-century scientists, highlighting the roots of 
ambiguity and ambivalence in policy as originating in the ambiguity and ambivalence amongst 
racial scientists regarding hybridity. The third explains how debates among postcolonial 
theorists, especially Edward Said and Homi Bhabha, and the gap between the concepts of 
‘orientalism’ and ‘hybridity’ as models to explain mixed race and the colonial experience can 
help us understand the contradictions that seem inherent in Aboriginal policy and its ambivalent 
discourse about mixed-ancestry Natives. Taken together, policies towards mixed-ancestry 
Natives, nineteenth-century racial science, and postcolonial theory can provide an explanation 
for the apparent contradictions and ambiguities laid out at the start of this chapter.  
Understanding Aboriginal Policy 
Structurally, Native departments, like any other federal department across British and 
former British colonies, were similar. They were all equipped with a minister, a deputy minister, 
and a staff of civil servants of varying status who carried out instructions, though perhaps not 
always with the intended direction of their superiors. The names and positions varied from 
country to country: in Canada, the Department of Indian Affairs was composed of a hierarchy 
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that moved from minister, deputy minister, inspector, and finally, to local Indian agent. The US 
had a similar structure in the Office of Indian Affairs (later, the Bureau of Indian Affairs), though 
its head was called a commissioner, followed by regional superintendents, and finally, local 
agents. Terminology differed most in Australia, where the department was usually called the 
Board for the Protection of Aborigines, its head, a Protector, and its local agents, local or district 
protectors.
12
 In all three, legislation provided the crux of policy directives, though the uniformity 
and consistency varied over time and place. Canadian policy was framed by one single piece of 
legislation, the Indian Act, in one form or another since 1850. Australia had similar legislation, 
though it was enacted at the state level, so policy could vary from state to state. In the US, no 
single piece of comparable legislation existed, but federal policy directives were frequently 
detailed in legislation at the start of each new policy phase, often marked by a new presidential 
regime. Thus, all three countries codified the administration of Native-Newcomer relations as a 
legal one, albeit with significant differences. 
Despite external structural differences, policy in all three countries was based on similar 
internal ideological premises. Policies were based on what could often be competing notions of 
access to land and humanitarian concerns. The former required the development of definitions 
for both citizen and Native; the latter positioned Aboriginal people as “problems” requiring 
“solutions.” This so-called problem was rarely articulated and could vary over time and place 
when it was. But, as the 1837 British House of Commons Select Committee on Aborigines 
emphasized, it was Aboriginals’ lack of participation in the capitalist economy that was 
particularly irksome for Britain.
13
 This economic difference served only to highlight cultural 
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differences that, for Europeans, were framed by racial ascription. Nevertheless, the ‘solution’ 
was remarkably similar: policies of assimilation involved education and religious instruction that 
would bring Aboriginal peoples into the folds of dominant culture. Such efforts would also serve 
to create a culturally homogenous nation – what many argue was a necessary aspect of 
nineteenth-century nation-building.  
These policies of assimilation were based on a similar set of binaries. First, policy was 
premised on a racial duality. Natives were viewed in opposition to Newcomers, often without 
acknowledging the ways in which they mixed or overlapped. This binary was premised on 
popular racial thinking that racial categories were (or should be) immutable and exclusive. 
Second, these policies were premised on two opposing principles: assimilation and segregation. 
Assimilation was based on a belief in stages of civilization, a theory which accompanied 
nineteenth-century racial thinking. According to this belief, Natives could be changed culturally 
and absorbed into mainstream, settler society. Segregation, on the other hand, was premised on a 
belief that Natives either could not be assimilated or could not be assimilated for some time to 
come. Consequently, they needed to be protected from the less desirable aspects of mainstream 
society. Any attempted or executed policy fit into one of these two models. Within these 
binaries, there was no place for those of mixed-race to officially exist, except temporarily as a 
transitional category while awaiting assimilation. Consequently, mixed-ancestry Natives were 
targeted for elimination – at least in as much as they constituted an official, permanent category. 
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Canada 
Canada’s Aboriginal policy was, first and foremost, rooted in a tradition that was based 
upon at least some cooperation. For the first few centuries of contact and colonialism, the fur 
trade was the defining (although not only) feature of the colonial relationship. This economic 
cooperation soon led to other alliances, particularly military ones. Britain’s territorial wars 
fought in North America required alliances with Indigenous groups whose interests in the land 
were important to their survival and cultural perseverance. Initially mutually beneficial, these 
Native-Newcomer relations were largely friendly and produced a variety of close and intimate 
relationships, personal, economic, and political.
14
 Together, economic and military alliances 
established a policy of negotiation and pacification, principles which were mostly adhered to in 
the form of treaty-making. Such a tradition resulted in a comparatively (though not completely) 
peaceful settler frontier as land surrenders were negotiated. 
This relationship changed in the nineteenth century. As both the fur trade’s importance 
(resources) and the need for military alliances declined, the spirit of partnership that had framed 
many of those earlier Native-Newcomer relationships changed. Increasing emphasis on 
settlement and nation-building coincided with emerging developments in scientific theories that 
sought both to explain human difference and justify white domination. As Canada entered 
Confederation, its policy increasingly became a bureaucratic one that was defined by the needs 
of the new nation, new settlers, and new goals. It was perhaps a combination of these factors that 
found ‘Indians’ constitutionally designated as a federal responsibility when Canada confederated 
in 1867.  
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These circumstances gave rise to the next phase, where settlement and nation-building 
supplanted the prior emphasis on supplying raw materials to Britain. The metropole-colony trade 
route gradually gave way to an increasingly independent Canada as Britain turned its attention 
elsewhere. This phase also ushered in an era of dispossession and coercive assimilation, largely 
reflecting a period of Aboriginal displacement as large expanses of land were exchanged for 
much smaller reserves and narrow privileges. In most of Canada, this was accomplished through 
the negotiation of treaties which would see the surrender of most of what is now Canada.  
This phase also witnessed the increasing bureaucratization of ‘being Indian.  The Indian 
Act, introduced during Canada’s coercive era, was a single, lengthy piece of legislation which 
functioned as the sole legal authority for relations between the state and Aboriginal peoples. It 
defined ‘Indian,’ set terms of reserves, and a host of other regulations. In practice, it governed 
almost every aspect of Aboriginal lives, and left a legacy of legalized subjugation. What is 
particularly relevant here is the manner in which it defined ‘Indian,’ and the impact that had on 
people of mixed ancestry, a topic of Chapter Four.  
The Indian Act also claimed control over lands reserved exclusively for Indian 
occupation and use. The impetus for reserves was setting aside land for the sole use and 
occupation of its original inhabitants. Land cession treaties created reserves, inalienable tracts of 
land reserved for the use of First Nation communities.
15
 In exchange for lands surrendered to 
Canada, bands identified small areas of land for their sole use. However, these reserved lands 
became sites of aggressive assimilation attempts within a very few short years. They also 
established a relationship between race and place: those who lived on reserves were deemed 
Indians by law, and subject to the Indian Act. Ultimately, reserves and identity were bound 
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together in Canadian law. Non-Indians could not, by law, reside on a reserve. Hence, since they 
served as the land base to Aboriginal communities, to be denied access to the reserve was to be 
physically severed from one’s community. In this way, reserves defined race – or as sociologist 
Sherene H. Razack puts it, “place becomes race through the law.”16 These geographical enclaves, 
then, became important markers in the designation and ascription of racial identity. Reserves, the 
Indian Act, and assimilation formed a trifecta that would provide the means by which such 
identities could be granted or denied.  
Scrip was another major aspect of Canadian policy that became an important means of 
racial ascription. A coupon redeemable for land or cash, it was the only policy designed to deal 
with Halfbreeds (a term used rather liberally and without distinction during the execution of this 
policy). Scrip is important, not just because it applied to the Métis, but because it was eventually 
granted to any person of mixed ancestry. It also became a legal instrument through which mixed-
ancestry Natives could be separated and excluded from the category of ‘Indian.  By taking scrip, 
a status Indian became ‘enfranchised,’ thus manipulating legal-racial categories for the purposes 
of eliminating ambiguity. To take scrip was to make a declaration that one was, in fact, not an 
Indian. Indeed, applicants were required to sign an affidavit to that effect. 
Early twentieth-century shifts in attitudes and priorities resulted in significant shifts in 
Aboriginal policy. The end of the scrip policy in 1921 meant the end of the federal government’s 
formal relationship with Métis and non-status Indians. The Indian Act also underwent major 
changes around the same time as protests from Indigenous groups across the country forced 
policy makers to rethink and remove some of the more restrictive clauses of the legislation, 
particularly those that criminalized cultural practice. But the precedents set by those earlier 
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policies had lasting implications for the legal identities of mixed-ancestry Natives. The specific 
ways in which these policies applied to those of mixed ancestry indicates how deeply entrenched 
ideas of race and mixed race were in policy-making. They also indicate how committed policy 
makers were to eliminating the ambiguity that mixed-ancestry Natives introduced to the 
framework of policy that was based on a dichotomy. These policies worked in concert, albeit 
unintentionally, to eliminate mixed-ancestry Natives as official Indians, or at least eliminate 
them as ambiguous ‘others.’ 
The United States 
Aboriginal policy in the US began with some of the same basic premises upon which 
Canadian policy was built. Parts of the US also experienced the cooperative relationships 
produced by the fur trade, though earlier settler demands for land could undermine those 
benefits. Prior to American independence, Aboriginal policy in the Thirteen Colonies operated 
under the same British laws that were in effect in what became Canada. After Independence, the 
US federal government played the primary role in managing relationships between Natives and 
Newcomers.
17
 A specifically American policy began with the ‘Trade and Intercourse’ acts, 
which were intended to protect Aboriginal people in trade and land deals. However, the extent 
and severity of the ‘land grab’ experienced in the US drastically shifted the course policy would 
take there. US policy placed far more emphasis on the idea of segregation as a means to avoid 
and resolve what were often land-centered Native-settler conflicts and used treaties as a method 
of achieving peaceful segregation. But ultimately, this approach failed: segregation was not a 
viable option amidst the extensive pressures of a settler population demanding more land, and it 
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was decidedly not peaceful. The protected status of reserved land was under constant threat, and 
public demands usually won out. 
As similar as Canadian and American policies might seem, two fundamental factors 
distinguished the US. First was the recognition of tribal sovereignty; second was the influence of 
a history of slavery and anti-miscegenation laws. The US government acknowledged tribal 
sovereignty over internal matters, until at least 1871 when the Indian Appropriation Act changed 
the Aboriginal-state relationship. But until then, internal matters, and especially identity and 
membership, were the decisions of tribal authorities, not government officials. The well-known 
1831 Cherokee Nation v. Georgia court ruling established this important legal principle in which 
tribes were dubbed “domestic dependent nations.”18 Tribal authority was further confirmed in the 
1832 case, Worcester v. Georgia, where the court ruled that “all the rights which belong to self 
government have been recognized as vested [in the tribes].” 19  These two rulings jointly 
confirmed the pre-existing nature of the relationship between tribes and the US federal 
government, where relations were conducted with an understanding of mutual political 
sovereignty.
20
 The legal recognition of tribal sovereignty had a significant effect in American 
Aboriginal policy: since recognized tribal authority included decisions about membership, 
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American law had no need to develop a comprehensive legal definition of ‘Indian.  These 
conditions would have implications for individuals of mixed ancestry. 
The second significant feature of US Aboriginal policy was the influence of slavery and 
the precedents it set for race laws: anti-miscegenation and blood quantum. While race laws 
originated with Black slavery, anti-miscegenation laws extended well beyond the black/white 
binary. They were also attempts to racially segregate Native and Asian populations from settler 
societies, especially in the west during the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries.
21
 Indeed, 
as late historian Peggy Pascoe states, “By the turn of the century, miscegenation laws served as a 
commonsense method of policing the racial borders of white supremacy.”22 However, works on 
anti-miscegenation laws do not always contemplate the importance of the nineteenth-century 
racial hierarchy in considering the impact these laws had on various populations.
23
 Laws were 
not evenly applied to all racial groups. As Pascoe notes, marriages among whites and Indians 
were often allowed despite laws saying otherwise – a degree of latitude not extended to Blacks. 
Officials saw Native Americans as more ‘civilized,’ and thus, were less likely to disallow those 
mixed marriages. 
As anti-miscegenation laws proved unenforceable, blood quantum was another way in 
which racial borders were monitored. Also originating in slavery, blood quantum, the 
mathematical formulation of racial status, came to be seen as the major qualifying criterion for 
Native American identity in the US. However, this should not be taken to the exclusion of its 
importance in other countries. Despite popular belief otherwise, the idea of descent as a factor in 
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legal Aboriginal identity is not entirely unique to the US. Both Canada and Australia employed 
similar policies, although definitions tended towards qualified rather than quantified 
measurements. Criteria like ‘ancestry’ and ‘descent’ in definitions, such as the Indian Act in 
Canada and the Native Title Act in Australia, produced the same end: the inclusion and exclusion 
of individuals from official Aboriginal status based on the perceived degree of racial purity. 
Nonetheless, in the US, blood quantum has been employed expressly and quantitatively in 
Native American policy, and continues to comprise the basis of legal identity.
24
 
Despite this importance, the extent of its application must not be overstated, nor should it 
be thought of consistently across time. The history of blood quantum has often been 
misrepresented by the application of post-1934 definition onto pre-1934 circumstances. 
Historically, the degree of blood required for official recognition has not remained stable. Not 
only did it change over time, but it also changed across areas of law. Criminal law and taxation, 
for instance, created one set of rules while allotment created others. Each of these definitions 
were applicable only to the specific circumstance for which they were created, and not until the 
1934 Wheeler-Howard act was a uniform criterion of blood quantum established.
25
 But, as 
Chapter Four will show, a less formal precursor to the strictly quantitative blood quantum of the 
twentieth century was a central feature to nineteenth-century racial designation and ascription in 
policies like allotment. 
Blood quantum, even if unevenly applied and not official sanctioned, proved particularly 
important after the 1870s. By then, attitudes about the best course of policy to pursue were 
changing. Both government officials and the public increasingly moved towards a consensus that 
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segregation, even temporary, was no longer possible. Public resentment over the reservation of 
what were seen as lands which should be made available to potential settlers was also increasing. 
Allotment, the subdivision of communal tribal lands into individual plots, became the proposed 
solution starting in 1887. But land demands were always tempered at least to some degree by 
humanitarian concerns, and the allotment policy demonstrated how Aboriginal policies were 
often a product of the convergence of philanthropic and economic goals. Humanitarian concerns 
demanded a policy that would relieve Indians of their ‘plight,’ and economic aims sought to free 
reservation lands for agricultural settlement and other purposes that suited the national economic 
interest, like railways, mining, and development.
26
 Allotment would meet the goals of both of 
these aims with rapid assimilation – considered the ‘humanitarian’ course of action for a ‘dying 
race.’ 
Like most Aboriginal policies, the goals and practice of the allotment policy were 
contradictory. Under this policy, individual tribal members would be granted land in severalty, 
and title would eventually be given after a period of ‘observation’ (usually 25 years). The surplus 
reservation land would be thrown open for sale and settlement, the proceeds from which would 
be divided among eligible tribal members. However, allotment was based on the presumption of 
‘competency’ – that is, that the Aboriginal applicant had reached a state of ‘civilization. This 
policy was at odds with anthropological theory of the day, which held that in order to be 
‘civilized,’ Indians had to pass through several stages. Allotment skipped these stages, 
immediately resulting in land ownership. In reality, the policy reflected a shaky compromise 
between those humanitarian concerns and settler demands to open land.
27
 But for the purposes 
here, it was also important in how it divided the ‘competent’ from the ‘incompetent’: according 
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to an inconsistently applied blood quanta rule. Allotment would prove to be intricately connected 
with the emergence of the idea of mixed race in the US, and how individuals of mixed ancestry 
would be identified by the state.
28
   
Allotment and an official policy of assimilation ended with the 1934 Howard-Wheeler 
Act, often referred to as the Indian Reorganization Act. The act was a response to the 1928 
Meriam Report, “The Problem of Indian Administration,” which exposed inadequacies of Indian 
policy and the deplorable conditions under which most Natives lived. This, according to its 
author, John Collier, was a clear result of previous policy. Collier, a “cultural pluralist who 
believed that Indian cultures had much to teach Americans and that they needed to be protected, 
preserved, and reinvigorated,” was soon after appointed commissioner of the BIA.29 It was then 
that he introduced the ‘Indian New Deal,’ a policy that purported self-determination and self-
government by organizing contemporary tribal governments. The policy also included 
improvements to education and the promotion of traditional crafts and arts. More importantly, it 
created a uniform definition for ‘Indian.  For the first time, ‘Indian’ was defined in a federal 
piece of legislation of general application – as one who lived on a reservation and was a tribal 
member. It also introduced for the first time a uniform blood quanta criterion, thus ending any 
debate over the identity of mixed-ancestry Natives – at least in federal law. 
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Australia  
Unlike the Canadian and American centralized federal systems, Australia’s Aboriginal 
policy was administered by individual states.
30
 The colonial government had authority over 
Aboriginals until a territory achieved statehood and took over its own administration. This meant 
that, at least to some degree, policy could vary greatly from state to state.
31
 But in reality, state 
policies were remarkably similar. This is explained, not only by the perhaps somewhat typical 
patterns that are part of the colonial experience, but by the informal practice of state governments 
consulting with each other on Aboriginal policy.
32
 While there was no formal mechanism for this 
sharing until the twentieth century, particularly when state officials began meeting at national 
Native Welfare conferences starting in 1937, the sharing of information that occurred before then 
ensured that policies exhibited enough consistency to warrant discussion on a national level. 
The phases witnessed in Canada and the US also frame the Australian historical 
experience. However, Australia differed in three fundamental ways. First, it experienced 
widespread settler violence during its contact phase. Settler land appropriations and misuse of 
water holes were high on the list of incursions which produced a cycle of attacks and retaliations 
resulting in a protracted conflict phase. Second, the economic partnerships which relied on 
Aboriginal goodwill, skills and labour that occurred in other parts of the world (such as with 
North America’s fur trade) occurred in Australia to a far lesser extent.33 Granted, there was 
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reliance on Aboriginal labour as the cattle, pearling, and fishing industries took hold, especially 
in the north.
34
 But the implications did not reach the same status to either the Australian 
economy or the demands on Aboriginal labour. For certain, reliance on Aboriginal labour did not 
ensure a mutually beneficial relationship, but it did shape the experience of colonialism and the 
later course of Aboriginal policy. Third, there were no military alliances between Natives and 
Newcomers, as there were in both Canada and the US. There was little competition for Australia 
among European nations during the early years of contact as had been the case in North 
America, where French, Spanish, Russian, and later, American interests competed with Britain 
for control over Aboriginal territories. Thus, the kinds of alliances that were forged in Canada 
and the US were absent in Australia. This provided yet another reason why early relations 
between Natives and Newcomers were poor. 
Newcomers to Australia generally did not recognize Aboriginal rights to the land. 
Perhaps because of a racial stratification that placed Aboriginal people in Australia as ‘blacks’ 
lower on the hierarchy than North American Aboriginals, perhaps the lack of apparent systematic 
agriculture, or perhaps because of the lack of an economic partnership that was witnessed in 
North America, land was taken based on the mistaken belief that it was not being used. Terra 
nullius, an international legal concept meaning ‘land belonging to no one,’ justified the 
appropriation of land and the settler violence that accompanied it. But this was not the only cause 
of the violence. Unlike other areas colonized by European powers, settlement in Australia did not 
occur gradually or in increments. In Canada, for instance, there were many decades, and even 
centuries, when Europeans visited, first seasonally, then gradually, permanently as traders. Only 
after relations were well-established between Natives and Newcomers were any real efforts made 
at European settlement. Consequently, colonialism occurred much more progressively in most 
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places in North America. But in Australia, there were no prior seasonal visits, save for a few 
areas where whaling occurred (such as Tasmania). The first permanent arrivals on Australian 
shores were settlers and convicts, who, save for a few individuals, had no need or desire to 
establish reciprocal relations with Aboriginal people. Contact in Australia, then, was precipitated 
solely for the purposes of colonization, not economy.
35
 
The varying experiences and different trajectories of colonization throughout history 
make periodization difficult. The initial violent period ended shortly after contact in pre-urban 
areas, such as around Perth, Sydney, Brisbane, and Melbourne where settlement occurred more 
rapidly. But it lasted well into the twentieth century in some regions where settlement occurred 
later, like northern and central Australia – a process not dissimilar from contact experiences and 
patterns in Canada’s north.36  Following the initial period of violence, the nature of contact 
between Aboriginal people and Newcomers came to be defined by systematic government 
administration. Academics often divide this period into three phases: protection, assimilation, 
and integration.
37
 In reality, there was more overlap than separation among them, as in the US. 
Protection and dispossession or assimilation and segregation were not always clearly discernible 
from each other. Moreover, approaches to Aboriginal policy were distinguished more by separate 
policies for ‘full bloods’ and ‘half-castes’ than they were by successive periods. Officials 
believed that ‘pure bloods,’ incapable of assimilation in the short term, should be segregated, 
while mixed-ancestry Natives should be assimilated. Beliefs about the association between 
‘civilization’ and blood quantum had a significant effect on the course of policy, and thus 
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complicate the orthodox understandings of how policy evolved. In any case, nothing nearing a 
consensus was achieved until around the 1940s.  
Aboriginal policy in Australia, then, was premised on a much different historical context 
and contact experience than what occurred in Canada and the US, but experienced the same dual 
policies of segregation and assimilation. In reality, there was little distinction in the attitudes 
underlying them. The 1837 British Committee on Aborigines which provided so much of the 
basis to Aboriginal policy in the colonies, itself recognized that the goal of protection was 
assimilation, which was to, “consider what measures ought to be adopted with regard to the 
Native Inhabitants of Countries where British Settlements are made, and to the neighbouring 
Tribes, in order to secure to them the due observance of Justice, and the protection of their 
Rights; to promote the spread of Civilization among them; and to lead them to the peaceful and 
voluntary reception of the Christian Religion.”
38 
With some exception, namely a brief period 
when some officials believed Aboriginals were dying out, the underlying intent of both phases 
was the assimilation of Indigenous peoples into the general population. How this would be 
achieved is what changed most notably over time. 
Policy in Australia was governed by state-level pieces of legislation, which would grant 
authority over Aboriginal people to a department typically called the Board of Protectors. The 
legislation, usually called protection acts, was similar in design and intent to the Canadian Indian 
Act, though Australia placed tighter restrictions on labour, marriage, and movement. These laws 
also designated reserved tracts of land, though not like the reserves of Canada or the US. Instead, 
they were government-run and -controlled rural enclaves where Natives were to be ‘protected’ 
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from whites while trained and educated for assimilation into the dominant society.
39
 Aboriginal 
people did not hold title or any exclusive usufructuary rights to these tracts, and they were 
gradually and eventually dissolved.  
States introduced their own protection acts at varying times between 1869 and 1911, but 
they shared particular themes. As was the case elsewhere, assimilation and segregation were 
evident in these acts. But unlike Canada and the US, Australia’s policy of assimilation through 
biological absorption was clearly and expressly stated in its legislation and policies. One of the 
most significant sections of the protection acts, for the purposes of mixed-race Aboriginal 
people, was in regard to definitions. The acts defined ‘Aboriginal,’ a definition which often 
included ‘half-castes’ or some indication of blood quantum. In addition, there was a clear 
gendered aspect to race that was not articulated in legislation in either Canada or the US. The age 
of minority, for instance, was lower for females than it was for males. As will be discussed in 
Chapter Six, the belief among administrators of ‘licentiousness’ among Aboriginal females, 
including the very young, provided an additional element to racial mixing in Australia. 
Another unique feature of Australian legislation was its administration of Aboriginal 
labour. Cheap or free by law, it was an integral aspect of the Australian economy, especially in 
the north or other remote areas where the cattle and pearling industries were the primary 
economic mainstays.
40
 However, it was also a significant ‘contact zone’: 41  both the private 
setting of domestic labour and the isolated nature of rural-industry labour meant unchecked 
opportunities for ‘miscegenation’ that exposed the competing goals of Aboriginal policy and 
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labour needs. Each individual had a contract with their employer which had received the consent 
of the state chief protector. These conditions only highlighted the fundamental contradictions of 
Aboriginal policy: labour conditions encouraged the very mixing that many administrators 
sought to eliminate through the regulation of Aboriginal people.  
Here was one of the ways in which mixed-ancestry Natives would be targeted in 
Australian policy. Aboriginal individuals of mixed ancestry were often removed from their 
Aboriginal homes and placed in government and mission-run educational institutions where they 
were  ‘trained’ to take their place in white society – most often as domestic labourers to white 
homes for females or agricultural and station labourers for males. The legacy left behind by this 
coercive policy has been the subject of much investigation, debate, and controversy in recent 
decades as the public, government officials, historians, and Aboriginal people themselves come 
to terms with the violence of their past. While the removal of Aboriginal children from their 
homes was a part of policy in Canada and the US,
42
 mixed-ancestry children were the specific 
focus in Australia – a factor that is unique to that country.  
Concerns about the rising numbers of mixed-ancestry Natives, as noted at the start of this 
chapter, were especially prevalent in Australia. Its policy of assimilation in terms of biological 
absorption emerged around the end of the nineteenth century as officials and the public became 
increasingly aware of mixed populations. As in Canada and the US, administrators were also 
gradually realizing that the ‘doomed race’ theory that had promoted apathy towards frontier 
violence was in fact, false. The apparent increase in the so-called ‘half-caste’ population was a 
cause for alarm for colonizers, for reasons discussed in Chapter Six, and had a major impact on 
the direction of policy. Officials, however, also took these changing demographics as proof that a 
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policy of biological absorption was not only possible, but could provide the answer to what they 
perceived as the ‘Native problem.  This policy was, for the most part, pursued aggressively, 
inhumanely, and without the consent of is subjects. Incentives and coercion were used to aid in 
this process of assimilation, which included not only the above mentioned removal of children, 
but also the legal ‘de-Indianization’ through the use of exemption certificates – a kind of 
enfranchisement that eliminated one’s legal status as an Aboriginal person, and accorded them 
all the rights of citizenship. In addition, reserves could be shut down: stores would be closed, 
services would be terminated, and building maintenance would cease. In short, the government-
created reserves that had become Aboriginal communities were officially abandoned.  
Officially, the policy of assimilation ended in 1967. A period of civil rights rallying 
culminated in a referendum that year whereby an overwhelming majority of Australians voted 
for constitutional changes that would address the legal discrimination Aboriginal Australians had 
faced. At that point, states revoked or drastically changed their protection acts, turning their 
attention to the socio-economic disparity that had emerged out of the policy of assimilation. As 
had been the case elsewhere, such policies had displaced and dispossessed uncountable numbers 
of mixed-race Aboriginal people. Exclusion from legal definitions and Aboriginal reserves and 
other communities had resulted in the separation of individuals from their communities. 
Racial Science 
Unravelling the meaning behind the contradictions in Aboriginal policies necessarily 
begins with an examination of the ideological influences that contributed to their make-up. As 
many historians have aptly pointed out, Aboriginal policies were formed around pragmatic 
concerns, such as the demands of settlers, budgetary considerations, and nation-building goals, to 
name a few. Humanitarian interests also played a significant role in government decisions about 
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Aboriginal affairs, although more so in Australia than in either Canada or the US. Nonetheless, 
underlying any motivation for Aboriginal policy were the ideological developments of the 
nineteenth century around race and science. Any consideration of Aboriginal policies, and of 
their colonialist context, must begin there.
43
     
The genealogy of race stems back centuries, but as a modern idea, it began during the 
Enlightenment.
44
 In the eighteenth century, the study of nature had gradually begun to include 
the study of humans. Enlightenment thinkers, influenced by the advent of reason, rationality, and 
scientific thinking as the dominant paradigms of knowledge, came to see humanity as part of the 
same systematic study of nature, from which modern science developed. By most accounts, 
racial thinking was thus a product of the Enlightenment and the scientific, rationalist approach to 
life and nature whereby all knowledge about the world could be organized into hierarchical 
classificatory systems.
45
 This taxonomic approach began with the premise that all life could be 
organized into a tiered system of types – a common notion in science today, but still a 
developing method in the eighteenth century.
46
 Revolutionized by Swedish botanist Carl 
Linnaeus, taxonomy extended to ideas of humans as classifiable.
47
 Gradually, racial categories 
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began to emerge, first as vague types, but by the end of the Enlightenment, as more definable 
hierarchical classifications based on visible biological factors, or ‘phenotype. The 
Enlightenment’s introduction of the scientific method as the paramount means of gathering 
evidence combined with Linnaeus’s taxonomic approach produced what seemed a verifiable, 
observable and valid explanation for human difference: race.
 
Although these approaches were 
highly contested, they survived those debates past the Enlightenment and came to form the basis 
of post-Enlightenment science.
48
 
Two significant changes took place in the mid-nineteenth century that made race as a so-
called biological fact a dominant paradigm in the study of human difference. First was a complex 
shift in the intellectual climate as race became more important in explaining human difference: 
experts were changing how they thought about race. Increasingly, race came to be viewed as a 
function of biology: what cultural geographer Kay Anderson calls the “biologisation” of race.49 
This shift was marked by Robert Knox’s 1850 publication, Races of Men, 50  and Charles 
Darwin’s On the Origin of Species shortly thereafter in 1859.51 Races of Men was the first 
comprehensive publication of the ideas about racial classification that had been developed over 
the previous half century and was considered the authority on race at the time. Darwin’s better-
known work introduced both evolution and natural selection, two concepts which would come to 
define racial science in ways that its author had likely not intended.
52
  Together, these two works 
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would clinch the already-growing idea that established race as both natural and hierarchical. In 
addition to these advancements in science, there was a decreasing emphasis on other ways of 
thinking about race. In pre-nineteenth-century racial thought, nation, class, and gender were seen 
as defining characteristics of race. But while race as biology was gaining ground, these other 
ways of thinking about race were losing it. Race was no longer solely tied to the nation of one’s 
birth or ancestor.
53
 Race as phenotype – visually distinguishable markers like skin colour or hair 
type – became the dominant view of race in the colonial world. 
Second was the professionalization of science, and along with it, the legitimization of the 
idea of race.
54
 What resulted was a coherent body of ideas that could be organized, even if 
loosely so, under the subcategory of racial science. While such ideas were wide and varied, they 
had, according to sociologist Ali Rattansi, four basic factors in common: first, humankind could 
be divided into categories; second, these categories were defined by physical attributes which 
served as racial markers; third, race was associated with social, cultural, and moral traits; and 
fourth, races could be stratified.
55
 The widespread acceptance among scientists of these basic 
‘facts’ about human difference and its connection to broader ideas in science, especially in the 
categorization of all life, coalesced within the larger discipline. As sociologist C. Matthew Snipp 
notes for the US, for instance, “By 1850...most scholars agreed that a racial hierarchy existed and 
that the hierarchy was destined by nature.”56  In turn, the study of race and culture became 
intertwined in new ways: the relationship between biology and character was formalized. Within 
                                                                                                                                                                                           
the history and theory of evolution, and Darwin’s specific impact, see Stephen Jay Gould, “The” Structure of 
Evolutionary Theory (Cambridge: Harvard University Press, 2002). 
53
 Rattansi, Racism, 51. 
54
 See, for instance, George Grantham, “The Institutionalization of Science in Europe, 1650-1850,” in Economic 
Evolution and Revolution in Historical Time, ed. Paul Webb Rhode, Joshua L. Rosenbloom, and David F. Weiman 
(Stanford: Stanford University Press, 2011), 51–85. 
55
 Rattansi, Racism, 31. 
56
 C. Matthew Snipp, “Racial Measurement in the American Census: Past Practices and Implications for the Future,” 
Annual Review of Sociology 29 (2003): 565. 
 83 
 
a few decades, this study of human difference began developing into social science – 
specifically, the practices of ethnology and anthropology.
57
 However, the acceptance of the idea 
and social meaning of race did not remain confined to academia: the apparent simplicity and 
logic of these ideas made them widespread among the public, too, and developed into the 
‘common sense of race’ that became so pervasive.58 Granted, the idea of race would always be 
contested and debated, but opposition did not preclude its rise to hegemony. Race, then, became 
common knowledge and common sense, moving from the realm of a few select and specialized 
academics to that of broader public knowledge. So, rather than a marked shift in belief and 
ideology, 1850 signalled a consolidation of the scattered ideas about human difference that 
already existed. 
‘Whiteness’ as the apex of this hierarchical structure was also part of this mid-nineteenth 
century science. Creating the idea of race was not only about creating a racial ‘other’; it was also 
about creating the ‘self. In terms of a budding racial science, that meant creating an increasingly 
exclusive definition of ‘white’ against which racial ‘others’ would serve as foil. As the 
nineteenth-century came to a close, ‘whiteness’ was fast becoming synonymous with 
‘European,’ and especially, western Europe in the context of a globally dominant western 
colonialism.
59
 ‘Other’ peoples, both those white and non-white, were marginalized as part of this 
process. But just as categories like ‘halfbreed’ or ‘mixed-blood’ were implied, imagined, 
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ambiguous, and unstable, so was ‘white. As Alfred J. López states it, “Whiteness is not, yet we 
continue for many reasons to act as though it is.”60 Indeed, the very instability of ‘white’ as a 
category representative of power, authority, and privilege would propel the machinery of racial 
construction as an effort to maintain that dominant position. Authority, always challenged and 
contested, would never be stable or permanent. 
Indeed, the ideas about race that developed in the nineteenth century were highly 
contested, ambiguous, and debated. The question of human origins was at the centre of conflict 
between Christian beliefs and the desire for political and economic domination. The difficulty 
was justifying white superiority while remaining true to Christian principles, especially the 
bible’s version of genesis. Two theories emerged: monogenism, the belief in a common origin, 
and polygenism, the belief in multiple origins. The prevailing belief among scientists 
demonstrated their Christian values: the bible supported the theory that all people were 
descended from Adam and Eve. Yet, European notions of superiority could not fully accept the 
Indian as truly equal, and common origins conflicted with observable human difference. So for 
Christians to balance their religious beliefs with their empirical evidence (and belief in cultural 
superiority), differences among races had to be explained by other means.  
Two popular explanations emerged: environmentalism and progress. The first argued that 
differences in environment had produced physical and intellectual differences over time. 
Agassiz, for instance, purported a theory of ‘racial geography’: that races (and all species, for 
that matter,) were identifiable by geographic zones. The combination of climate and the unique 
flora and fauna of each region produced unique human species, or races. For example, the Inuit 
were considered a separate race from the Indians of North America since they resided in the 
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Arctic – a different geographic zone.61 The second focused more on technological advancement, 
arguing that all humans must progress through a series of sequential stages of civilization. 
Aboriginal peoples, the argument went, were just in an earlier stage of development than 
Europeans. Lewis Henry Morgan, for instance, proposed a three-stage series, each with three 
further ‘subperiods,’ where civilization was measured by technology such as agricultural 
methods, metallurgy, and the development of tools.
62
 Either way, theories remedied the conflict 
between religious conviction and ethnocentrism: Aboriginal people were deemed inferior, but 
with the potential to progress. Until they reached that potential, social stratification would be 
considered as justified.
63
 
These ideas of race, progress, and the influence of the environment became the basis for 
Aboriginal policies in the British colonial world. By and large, the notion that all humans were 
on a linear path towards a Western notion of civilization laid the foundation for policies of 
assimilation that were premised on the potential for equality without having to actually grant it. 
The prevailing belief was that, while Aboriginal people could be ‘civilized’ to a certain extent, 
they could only be absorbed into the lower echelons of white society. Such beliefs were reflected 
in the implementation of Aboriginal policy, and indeed, resolved one of its inherent 
contradictions: Aboriginal people were schooled not to succeed in white society, but rather, 
barely subsist in it.
64
  
The culmination of the variety of the above ideas produced specific circumstances at 
mid-century. Increasing knowledge about the world and human difference coincided with the 
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height of settler colonialism and attempts to maintain political power and control over territory 
through the stratification of populations. Science, religion, and the emerging social sciences 
brought the so-called problems of race to the forefront. The correlation between the kinds of 
shifts in Aboriginal policy away from the goals of segregation, alliance, or the management of 
violence to the goals of assimilation and integration is not a matter of coincidence. Nor was the 
increasing awareness of the presence of mixed-ancestry Natives. The bureaucratization of state’s 
relationship with Aboriginal peoples, which entailed race-based policies of assimilation, the 
advent of post-Enlightenment racial science, and the need to designate mixed-ancestry Natives 
into existing legal categories is why the ‘problem’ of mixed race became an issue only after 
1850. 
Race and Hybridity 
If this was the ideological premise of Aboriginal policy, then racial mixing greatly 
complicated these already unstable ‘facts.  The common sense of race shaped public and official 
ideas of race: everyone belonged to a racial category, and those categories were socially and 
culturally significant. But there was no common sense of mixed race. In fact, mixed race defied 
the very idea of a common sense of race. Where ‘racial others’ were easily identifiable by sight, 
mixed-ancestry Natives were not. Even more so, mixed-ancestry Natives were not clearly 
categorizable, even when they were ‘identifiable. It seemed that who was mixed race should be 
obvious, but it was not. Instead, there seemed no logical way to fit them into the racial 
dichotomy created by colonialism. 
The problem lay with science itself. The debates about the viability of racial mixing that 
developed alongside broader theories of race were reflected in the unresolved debates policy 
makers had over the role of mixed-ancestry Natives in the national framework. Consequently, 
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racial mixing was a major preoccupation for both academics and policy makers. In part, the 
repeated but failed attempts of policy makers to find a consistent, workable definition for mixed-
ancestry Natives reflected the dilemma created by this challenge to common sense. Policy 
makers expressed anxiety about racial mixing, though not necessarily just because interracial 
unions were seen as a ‘sexual affront.’65 Instead, the anxiety was a reaction to the very existence 
of an epistemological ambiguity and uncertainty that challenged the world order informed by 
racial science. 
Aside from its philosophical implications, racial ambiguity was believed to have serious 
political implications, as many believed was evidenced by Latin America’s tumultuous history. 
Europeans equated the political upheavals of the independence era spanning from the end of the 
eighteenth to the middle of the nineteenth century with the presence of a large mixed-race 
population.
66
 Essentially, racial mixing was interpreted as the cause for political and economic 
instability – what Europeans and Americans looked upon as Latin America’s ‘backwardness.  
Spain’s losses in the Americas during the nineteenth century and the decades of instability they 
caused afterward served as a lesson for others with political and economic power to protect from 
rising creole powers.
67
 For Britain, its colonies, and the US, then, thwarting racial mixing was a 
kind of preventative measure or exercise in self preservation.  
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But hybridity was not uniformly or unanimously held to be negative. Like the broader 
field of the study of race, scientists fiercely debated the implications, meaning, and viability of 
racial mixing. Most of these debates were at least initially framed by two overarching 
considerations: fertility and species.
68
 In strictly biological terms, hybridity meant the successful 
production of fertile offspring by two separate species. Indeed, the fertility of offspring was used 
as a test to determine if the parents were separate species: infertile offspring meant they were 
separate species. If this were true, then biology would provide a justification for upholding social 
mores against miscegenation. Unsurprisingly, not everyone agreed. American scientist, Louis 
Agassiz, for instance, noted in an 1850 Christian Examiner article that the issue of separate 
species and fertile offspring need not be mutually exclusive. Evidence of productive 
miscegenation between the races did not need to indicate that races were the same species. In an 
infamously crude statement, he explained, “It is well known that the horse and ass produce 
mules, though they constitute distinct species.”69 Instead, he argued that the Bible told the story 
of the white race only; the rest were not descended from Adam and Eve. Of course, the ‘science’ 
was more a guise for the expression of personal prejudices. Nonetheless, it illustrated the 
important nature of the debate and its relevance to racial mixing: a difference in species could 
mean a difference in origins and thus, a justification for anti-miscegenation.  
By both theory and evidence, the debate should have been nullified. Given the 
overwhelming proof in the sheer number of mixed-race individuals, it seemed illogical to argue 
that racial mixing was not biologically sustainable. Even well past the middle of the nineteenth 
century, when the state of scientific knowledge should have forced dissenters to concede, some 
scientists continued the debate. Darwin’s work should have laid the matter to rest with his 
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conclusions on species and fertility. His theory in On the Origin of Species had in part posited 
that species as a way of dividing the natural world was neither stable nor absolute, but changed 
according to natural selection. In fact, he questioned the fundamental ways in which scientists 
defined ‘species,’ arguing that the lack of agreement on its definition made it difficult to utilize 
the concept with broad application.
70
 Additionally, and in contrast to many other scientists 
studying race and human difference, he argued that fertility was not the deciding criterion of 
species. He argued that “neither sterility nor fertility affords any clear distinction between 
species and varieties.” 71  There was too much variation of the fertility in ‘crossing’ among 
species, and too many other factors involved to conclude that the fertility of offspring defined 
species. He thus intended to put the whole matter to rest by questioning the relevance of the 
species debate altogether.
72
  
Either a product of personal prejudice, or perhaps a result of the initial suppression of 
Darwin’s work in Britain, the debate raged on.73 For instance, in the preface to French physician 
Paul Broca’s 1864 survey of human hybridity, C. Carter Blake, secretary to the Anthropological 
Society of London, claimed that, “We have been so often told, that all races of men have been 
demonstrably proved to be fertile inter se, that many have conceived that the laws regulating this 
presumed fertility are ascertained and fixed, beyond the reach of disproof, or even of doubt. The 
Author and Editor of the following pages are, however, of a different opinion; and are content to 
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wait for the accumulation of future facts.”74 Blake was presenting a popular hypothesis among 
those who opposed racial mixing: that ‘hybrids’ were actually producing children with ‘new 
stock’ – that is, so-called pure race individuals. According to this hypothesis, the viability of 
hybridity was never truly tested. Consequently, whether or not mixed race groups were 
producing fertile offspring over the long run remained, for many skeptics, an unanswered 
question. 
The debate about fertility was merely the surface of an underlying social question about 
the indicators of racial mixing. In some instances, hybridity was viewed as having positive 
consequences (for instance, that hybridity among white races resulted in an ‘enduring’ race, like 
those in Britain), while in others it produced degeneration (such as the peoples of Latin 
America). A spectrum of hypotheses emerged throughout the century which held every 
possibility, from the denial that people could mix at all, to the belief that all races could 
reproduce unimpeded. Historian Robert J.C. Young identifies five major arguments about racial 
mixing.
75
 First was the ‘polygenist species argument,’ which purported that racial mixing was 
biologically unsustainable. Any offspring would be infertile – if not immediately, then after a 
generation or two. A second and close argument was the ‘decomposition thesis,’ which held that 
fertile offspring could indeed be produced, but they would eventually revert to one of the parent 
types. Third was the amalgamation thesis, which argued that racial mixing could occur without 
obstacle or limit, and produced a new race. It was contrasted with a ‘negative’ version, which 
held that this limitless amalgamation would produce “raceless chaos.”  The final theory was 
based in the notion of ‘racial distance’: proximate races could reproduce, while distant ones 
(white and black) could not. For the most part, the theories were illogical, and produced 
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confusion and disagreement. They had little evidence for support, and could not be supported in 
terms of biology. Consequently, the debate about racial mixing quickly became a debate about 
the social and cultural merit of miscegenation. 
The continuing uncertainty over the viability of racial mixing would prove significant to 
Aboriginal policy towards mixed-ancestry Natives. The same impermanence that scientists saw 
in racial mixing was reflected in government policies. ‘Mixed race’ was not a permanent 
category and human hybridity was biologically unsustainable. Government administrators saw 
mixed-ancestry Natives as ‘temporary’ and believed that eventually and permanently, they 
belonged (or would belong) to one of two categories the colonial model proposed: Natives or 
Newcomers. However, as the following chapters illustrate, this was not always the role of those 
individuals, nor was it necessarily how they saw themselves. 
Each of these theories would prove influential among members of the public – including 
the very officials who created and applied Aboriginal policy. As specific examples in Canada, 
the US, and Australia would demonstrate throughout the latter part of the nineteenth century and 
the early part of the twentieth century, the debates about racial mixing produced by scientists 
were reproduced in Aboriginal policy. Policy-makers could not come to a consensus about the 
merits and viability of racial mixing. They could not create a stable definition of ‘mixed race.  
And they could never entirely decide what role mixed-ancestry Natives would occupy in 
Aboriginal policy, legal definitions, or members of their respective nations. 
Race as a Local Function 
If the ambivalence of the scientific community was not enough to contend with, the 
reality of racial demographics and cultural diversity complicated matters even more. Generally, 
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the racial hierarchy, stratified roughly from light to dark, put Aboriginal peoples somewhere in 
the middle.
 76
 As Winthrop Jordon explains for the US in White over Black,  
The Negro’s complexion seemed more important than the Indian’s not only because the 
Indian was less dark but because with the Indian attention was focused primarily on the 
question of origin. Indeed both in Europe and America white men belittled the 
importance of the Indian’s tawny complexion or used it merely as a foil for proving 
certain points about the Negro’s blackness... There was little dissent to the 
commonplace assertion that the Indians’ tawny color resulted wholly or in part from 
their custom of daubing themselves with bear grease, oils, or the like from a well-
stocked cabinet of natural cosmetics... White men seemed to want to sweep the problem 
of the Indian’s color under the rug. The question of the color of man was pre-eminently 
the question of the color of the Negro.
77
 
‘Black,’ then, served as a foil to ‘Native,’ as was especially the case in the US. The presence or 
absence of other ‘racial others’ changed this hierarchy and the relative position of Aboriginal 
people in national, regional, and local ways. In Canada and Australia, the vilified ‘racial others’ 
were immigrant Asian populations.
78
 In any case, ‘race’ must be understood as a local function 
as well as a transnational one. It changed from place to place, as well as over time. The status of 
particular groups was unstable and changing, and immigration and slavery had implications for 
public attitudes and official policies about Aboriginal peoples.  
The different ways in which race was identified in these three countries speaks to a 
comparative racial discourse. The point here is not to reinforce the notion of skin colour as race, 
or even to give validity to such rankings; rather, to point out that each of these countries has its 
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own racial context. The idea of race was constituted in local, regional, and national contexts. 
What ‘race’ meant among the Creek in south-east US is different than what it meant among the 
Pueblo in Arizona. And what it meant in northern Western Australia is different than what it 
meant in a broader Australian national context. How racial categories and boundaries are defined 
is in part shaped by local, regional, and national demographics: they are relational. Immigration 
and slavery played alongside colonialism, not only in the construction and importance of race, 
but in its specific national character and meaning. In consequence, the well-known racial 
hierarchy was complicated and altered by the specific demographics of each country. Hence, the 
placement of Aboriginal peoples on that scale varied. 
The development of the idea of race, then, was a complex matrix of both knowable and 
unknowable factors. It was not just a foreign concept applied to distant colonies: it was also 
constituted of local interpretations and national concerns. As one study on Aboriginal protection 
in the British Empire notes, ideas were not necessarily “imposed on the colonial periphery from a 
more humanitarian-inclined metropolitan centre. Rather, and we suggest much like other 
imperial projects, it was elaborated through the intersection of personal, discursive and textual 
trajectories that connected Britain to each of its colonial spaces and those colonial spaces to each 
other.”79 Indeed, the specific brands of ethnology that developed in colonies around the world, 
including what would become Canada, the US, and Australia, significantly altered the theories 
that came out of Europe, and especially Britain. The mixing that became increasingly 
disconcerting to administrators would only serve to further complicate it. 
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Theory: “Insights and Oversights”80 
If racial science can provide an ideological framework for understanding Aboriginal 
policy and how mixed-ancestry Natives fit into it, then postcolonialism can provide a conceptual 
basis for explaining it. Indeed, the complexity and contradictory nature of how race operated in 
the context of colonialism and, specifically, Aboriginal policy in Canada, the US, and Australia 
requires some theorizing. There is perhaps no other single theoretical conceptual framework that 
has done more for our understanding of colonialism and its functioning than Edward Said’s 
Orientalism.
81
 As one reviewer describes, “it is a book that is deeply critical of liberal humanism 
for masking a history of Western colonial dominion in the mythic figures of human progress, 
truth, and freedom.” 82  Among the several definitions and explanations Said ascribes to 
orientialism is that it is “a style of thought based upon an ontological and epistemological 
distinction made between ‘the Orient’ and (most of the time) ‘the Occident.’”83 Accordingly, 
there exists an epistemological framework essential to colonialism that polarizes east and west.  
Said was specifically referring to the ‘Near East’ when he conceptualized orientalism, 
but, by accident or design, it became one of the hallmarks of postcolonialism and understanding 
colonial actors. It was through the essential polarity that he set up as ‘occident/orient’ where he 
revealed what he saw as the true nature of colonialism: a power struggle won through an 
intellectual process. Colonialism was not just political domination: it was also ideological 
domination. He argued that the history of colonialism had been interpreted through a European 
cultural lens. The result was the production of Eurocentric ideologies about the world that 
became the dominant narrative. They justified colonialism, they justified European domination, 
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and they justified the subjugation of Indigenous peoples. Colonialism, then, produced binaries 
based in inequalities: those with power (political, social, economic, knowledge, legal), and those 
without. This divide was also racialized: those in power were ‘white’ and those not were 
‘coloured’ – Black, Native, or Asian. Orientalism has thus been interpreted in broader terms as a 
Western mode of thought which defines colonialism as the West’s domination over the rest of 
the world. This is a system of representations forced upon the ‘East’ by a set of references that 
deny it any history, culture or identity of its own, and that inscribe it within Western ideological 
constructs. 
There are evident parallels between Said’s interpretation and the ideas of racial science, 
unsurprising given that modern notions of race arose from colonialism. Like orientalism, the idea 
of race in post-Enlightenment science is also an epistemological creation designed to maintain 
binaries and inequality. Race provides a system of assessment for difference by evoking visible 
signs, from skin colour to religious practice, or hair type to material culture. Orientalism exposed 
the unspoken assumptions and premises upon which colonialism and the texts it left behind were 
based. Once this binary was exposed, it seemed evident everywhere. Yet, as Said has so aptly 
informed us, it is an imagined binary with real implications. This is, in fact, part of what Said 
argues: the imagined becomes reality over time. What we imagine, when we imagine it long 
enough, eventually manifests as a lived reality. The idea of the racial other, imagined as it might 
be, has resulted in some very real effects: laws that exclude, social mores that ostracize, cultural 
standards that subjugate. This very distinction – between ‘the orient’ and the occident,’ or here, 
‘native’ and ‘newcomer’ – was the very basis of Aboriginal policy. It drew a legal distinction 
between Natives and all other citizens, creating a racial binary that reflected and reproduced 
social, legal, and political categorizations.  
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Hybridity 
The mutability of colonial categories and the processes of hybridity that actually occur in 
colonialism challenge the idea of orientalism. Said’s critics argue that the binaries represented in 
orientalism are essentialized and do not reflect the complex realities of colonialism. Instead, 
colonialism is a process that instigates mixing, fluidity, and interchangeability. Moreover, they 
say, orientalism and its emphasis on western ideology undermine those who are colonized by 
reinforcing the epistemological dominance of the colonizer.  
Hybridity theory responds to these criticisms and provides a remedy to what are 
perceived as the shortcomings of Said’s Orientalism. Broadly, hybridity refers to mixing. In 
postcolonial theory, it is generally understood to refer to the mixed discourses that arise out of 
diasporas – that is, the displacements (cultural, political, geographic, or otherwise) that occurred 
during the colonial process.
84
 Hybridity theory views culture, action, identity, language, and 
event as having blurred boundaries, and recognizes the influences that categories have on each 
other, and indeed how categories always defy their own confines. It exposes the world as 
muddled, indefinable, and uncompartmentalized. It is ambiguous, it is unstable, it is elusive, and 
it dissolves difference. It posits the world, quite simply, as mixed: an opposition to 
Enlightenment-based Western epistemologies that privilege categories and hierarchy – and 
Said’s orientalism. 
Harvard literary theorist Homi Bhabha offers a useful, though infamously complicated, 
concept of hybridity. Perhaps the leading hybridity theorist, Bhabha posits hybridity is a process 
of identity-formation and cultural production in a colonial setting. It is a direct product of the 
relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. Hybridity in this context considers the 
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porous relationship between the colonizer and the colonized. It occurs in what he calls the 
“liminal space” which is generated by interaction between different cultures; it denies 
“primordial polarities” of identity – like those of orientalism – but maintains that there is 
difference.
85
 Hybridity in this context considers the porous relationship between the colonizer 
and the colonized – that these are not the clear-cut binaries we have typically understood them 
as. So, hybridity for Bhabha is a process of mixing, a product of mixing, and the space in which 
mixing happens. 
There are three central points to Bhabha’s complex idea of hybridity that are relevant to 
mixed-ancestry Natives and Aboriginal policy: identity, ambivalence, and periphery. Bhabha’s 
concept of identity is based in the notion of lived difference. Identity is a three-tiered process, he 
argues, that occurs in relation to something else. First, identity is ‘called into being’ (it is 
external); second, identity is dual in nature (it’s relational); and third, identity is production (it is 
a process). Bhabha says that the process of identification does not affirm a pre-existing identity; 
it is always the production of something new in relation to that which ‘calls it into being,’ in 
Bhabha’s terminology.86 Identity is formed out of the duality of rejection of externally imposed 
identities with the desire for our internally generated ones. We are not only what others make us, 
nor are we only what we see ourselves to be. We are a product of both. This is not to suggest that 
identities – in this case, of mixed-ancestry Natives – did not exist prior to the laws and policies 
that identify and target them; rather, that new identities are created and imposed. 
Another key concept to Bhabha’s hybridity is ambivalence. Ambivalence refers to the 
oscillation between acceptance and rejection, assimilation and segregation, or likeness and 
difference. It is not a single, uniform concept, but represents overlapping ideas. First, it 
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represents ambivalence toward the process of hybridity. In the context of racial mixing, 
opposition to miscegenation was actually an expression of the desire for it or attraction to it.
87
 
Second, ambivalence is expressed through what Bhabha calls ‘mimicry’ – that is, a failed attempt 
by colonizers to re-interpret the identity of the colonized. It is a failed attempt because 
colonialism is ambivalent and colonizers are ambivalent about the colonized. This ambivalence 
is represented in the oscillation between acceptance and rejection, assimilation and segregation, 
or likeness and difference. It is prevalent throughout both processes, as the impulses to attraction 
and rejection are constantly competing. What results is, as Bhabha states, a “recognizable other 
as a subject of a difference that is almost the same, but not quite.”88   
A third central aspect of Bhabha’s writings on hybridity is the relationship between what 
he refers to as the center and periphery – in Said’s terms, a representation of the Occident 
(centre) and the Orient (periphery), or the colonizer and the colonized. The ‘centre’ holds power 
and authority over the ‘periphery. But whereas Said views this relationship as an oppositional or 
binarized one, Bhabha envisions a continual and regenerative power struggle that is produced 
and reproduced dialogically. The periphery (or Orient) is not only defined by the center (or 
Occident):  the center is also defined by the periphery. In fact, the periphery plays a role in the 
definition of the centre because the centre is always defining itself in relation to the periphery. 
Herein lies a key concept for understanding the role of racial mixing in Aboriginal policy. Racial 
mixing, as the periphery, ultimately defines racialization, or the centre. In this case, the reified 
identities produced by colonialism (colonizer/colonized; Newcomer/Native) are defined in 
relation to the hybridized identities. Referring back to the notion that mixed race defies the 
common sense of race, I argue that it also defies the idea of racial categories. It provides an 
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oppositional force to the idea of racial categories, driving policy makers to produce and 
reproduce those very categories. Ultimately, this is evidenced in the process of attempting to 
place individuals of mixed ancestry into one of those two existing (and imagined) racial 
categories: Native and Newcomer (or Oriental and Occidental). 
What this means in empirical terms is a bit less complicated than what the above 
paragraphs might suggest. The practical application of Bhabha’s concept of hybridity to the ways 
in which mixed-ancestry Natives were targeted in Canada, the US, and Australia comes down to 
three key ideas. First is the external and relational aspects of identity – the ways in which policy 
and law that targeted mixed-ancestry Natives influenced the development of cultural identity. 
These are broadly accepted aspects of identity formation, but Bhabha’s specific interpretation 
posits it within the process of hybridity in colonialism, making it particularly poignant.
89
 The 
second is the use of ‘ambivalence’ to understanding the actions and decisions of officials about 
the role that mixed-ancestry Natives would occupy. It was they, not mixed-ancestry Natives 
themselves, who were ambivalent about the identity of mixed-ancestry Natives, and were so 
because of the poor fit of racial categories to actual people and cultures. Third is understanding 
mixed race as the periphery of official Aboriginal identity. From Bhabha’s perspective, the 
periphery defines the center: the very presence of mixed-ancestry Natives shaped ideas of 
aboriginality in law and policy. Indeed, in creating definitions of ‘Native’ and other Aboriginal 
policies, policy makers were often reacting to the presence of mixed-ancestry Natives. 
Mestizo Logics 
It is at this juncture that Jean-Loupe Amselle’s work can provide a bridge between two 
seemingly opposing theories. Amselle considers how the role of the state has crystallized 
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identity.
90
 His thesis is an anthropological critique meant to counteract essentialism: he argues 
that cultural identity is a continuum, and that pre-contact Indigenous cultural identities were 
subject to the same cultural interactions and influences that produced change after colonialism. 
Fundamentally, he argues that pre-colonial cultural identity was “characterized by fluidity;”91 but 
colonialism, taking its cue from anthropologists, crystallized cultural identity by placing tribes 
into rigid categories. He maintains that it is through the process of recording categories (a census 
is a good example) that cultural identity becomes frozen over long periods of time.
92
 This is what 
Amselle identifies as ‘ethnographic reason,’ or the application of anthropology. Ethnicity or 
culture thus becomes an anthropological and colonial invention that turns identity from a fluid 
process into a static category. ‘Mestizo logics’ is posited here as the alternative to ethnographic 
reason, where hybridity is understood as the normal cultural condition.  
As a critical anthropology, Amselle’s work provides a bridge between the view of state 
officials in constructing reified categories and the notion that identity is a fluid, continual 
process. If hybridity is the norm, then colonialism is the attempt to order fluid, changing, and 
mixing into categories with clear boundaries. He juxtaposes what Said describes as imagined and 
imposed identities against the reality of ‘originary syncretism’ – or in Bhabha’s terms, hybridity. 
Fundamentally, these two concepts function simultaneously in a colonial context: one imagined, 
and one lived. One can more readily see, then, how these concepts might further our 
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understanding of other histories of colonialism, such as the process of identity-formation and 
identity-imposition in Aboriginal policy. This is particularly important in how external forces 
(law and policy in the present study) created or influenced cultural identity. Undoubtedly, such is 
also true in Canada, the US, and Australia. Applied to what, for policy-makers, was the ‘problem 
of mixed race’ in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries, Amselle’s work helps unravel 
some of the complexities of creating identity through law, particularly for mixed-ancestry 
Natives by demonstrating how hybridity and orientalism operate simultaneously. 
Conclusion 
The common theme that emerges from the theory, practice, and science of hybridity is 
that of ambivalence. Bringing these three perspectives together illuminates the relationship 
between the contradictions of policy and the role of mixed-ancestry Natives. This understanding 
can be seen along three polarities. First, there is an obvious tension between the competing and 
oscillating goals of assimilation and segregation in Indian policy. The tension between 
assimilation and segregation is a reflection of the second tension: between hybridization and the 
maintenance of racial categories. The idea of race is undermined by the idea of mixed race, yet 
mixed race is what propels race. Third, these binaries can be examined by using Said’s idea of 
orientalism and Bhabha’s idea of hybridity. In postcolonial literature, these two ideas have been 
posited as binaries themselves. Repeatedly, scholars have pitted the two against each other, 
Bhabha as the ‘remedy’ to Said. However, I posit that both are actually true and can and should 
be used together to analyze the functioning of colonialism. Orientalism represents the desires of 
colonialism, while hybridity represents its reality. Furthermore, orientalism and hybridity also 
represent the conflicts in racial science. 
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These tensions played out in Aboriginal policy in important ways. It was here that the 
definitions based in racial classificatory systems were codified into law, that the struggles among 
race scientists to determine the nature of racial crossing was expressed, and that the inherent 
problems in the theories were exposed and undermined. But the shift from scientific theory to 
practice challenged race’s structural integrity. Race did not work, yet policy makers made every 
attempt to make it work. This produced struggle, ambivalence, and ambiguity – all of which fully 
emerged in the targeting of mixed-ancestry Natives. It is there, in the details of these policies that 
targeted mixed-ancestry Natives, where the next three chapters turn.  
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Chapter 4 - Mixed-Ancestry Natives in Canada: ‘Ordinary Citizens’ 
Upon the conclusion of Treaty Seven with the Blackfoot Confederacy in 1877, 
Lieutenant Governor Alexander Morris collected a history of his extensive dealings with western 
Indigenous peoples. As treaty commissioner between 1873 and 1876, Morris had negotiated 
several of the numbered treaties.
1
 More than most government administrators, Morris recognized 
distinctions among the Halfbreed populations of the Northwest, a territory which later became 
the prairie provinces. Indeed, he recognized ‘three classes’ of mixed-ancestry Natives: those who 
lived as whites, those who lived as Indians, and those who practiced a combination of those 
traditions. However, despite his acknowledgement of the diversity among mixed-ancestry 
Natives, he still demonstrated the ambiguity inherent in racializing them. In his 1880 report, he 
noted that 
The Half-breeds in the territories are of three classes – 1st, those who, as at St. Laurent, 
near Prince Albert, the Qu’Appelle Lakes and Edmonton, have their farms and homes; 
2
nd
, those who are entirely identified with the Indians, living with them, and speaking 
their language; 3
rd
, those who do not farm, but live after the habits of the Indians, by the 
pursuit of the buffalo and the chase.  
As to the first class, the question is an easy one. They will, of course, be recognized as 
possessors of the soil, and confirmed by the Government in their holdings, and will 
continue to make their living by farming and trading. 
The second class have been recognized as Indians, and have passed into the bands 
among whom they reside. 
The position of the third class is more difficult. The loss of the means of livelihood by 
the destruction of the buffalo, presses upon them, as upon our Indian tribes; and with 
regard to them I reported in 1876, and I have seen no reason to change my views.
2
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Morris was right in distinguishing these broad differences, but his views lacked an appreciation 
of how Indigenous peoples classified themselves, and the unimportance of race to those 
classifications. They also demonstrated the problem with his categories: how were the 
individuals of his third class any different from those of the second? In an earlier report, he 
called them “wandering Half-breeds of the plains, who are chiefly of French descent and live the 
life of the Indians.”3 But by attempting to combine lifestyle factors with biological ones, he 
would only add to the ambivalence of race. In collapsing categories like ‘Métis’ and ‘Halfbreed,’ 
Morris reproduced two of the most enduring myths about mixed-ancestry Natives in Canada: that 
mixed-ancestry Natives could easily be distinguished from Indians, and that mixed-ancestry 
Natives could be collapsed under one heading, ‘Half-breed.’ 
Indeed, in Canada, there has been notable confusion about terminology.
4
 This has had 
consequences for the writing and understanding of history. ‘Métis’ has become a term of general 
application, much as ‘Half-breed’ was in the nineteenth century, and has inadvertently misled us 
in terms of the diversity of mixed-ancestry Natives. It has also confused divisions and disguised 
connections among Indians, Métis, and Halfbreeds, compounded by continually changing legal 
definitions that have historically conflated ‘Métis’ and ‘mixed race,’ and confused self-ascription 
with imposed legal definition. Government administrators, those who documented and codified 
their lives and identities, rarely acknowledged the problems that accompanied those divisions, 
and did so even less towards the twentieth century. But the belief in race as a biological 
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construct, and especially the belief that racial mixing is only the sum of its parts, has allowed this 
fallacy to persist in both law and popular imagination.
5
  
 The history of the relationship between the Canadian state and mixed-ancestry Natives is 
more complex than what the literature suggests. Dialogue about mixed-ancestry Natives was 
implicit in laws and policies that dealt with Indians, with Métis, and with those Natives defined 
neither as Indian nor Métis.
6
 The distinctions applied to Indigenous groups by policy officials 
happened with little apparent clarity or design. Instead, the treatment and status of mixed-
ancestry Natives within Aboriginal policy was replete with ambiguity and contradiction. While 
not a concern prior to the mid-nineteenth century, racial mixing increasingly shaped law and 
policy by Confederation and more clearly by the 1870s. Implicitly, mixed-ancestry Natives 
became the targets of discrimination, albeit ambiguously at times. This was first evidenced by 
attempts to separate mixed-ancestry Natives in law from those classified as Indians, and then by 
denying them official recognition of their Aboriginality. These attempts were not always 
successful, in part because of Aboriginal kinship patterns, and in part because of the ambivalent 
nature of race ideology. But by the first decades of the twentieth century, Canada had succeeded 
in imposing a two-category system of legal identity: Indians or ‘ordinary citizens’ – a term that 
would be used frequently throughout the late nineteenth and early twentieth century to describe 
the alternative to ‘being Indian’ for those individuals of mixed ancestry. By force or choice, 
mixed-ancestry Natives, including the Métis, would have to fit into one or the other. 
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In practice, there were contradictions at every turn. Protocols were disregarded, and terms 
of eligibility for policies were often ignored. This was not merely a matter of lower level agents 
failing to comply with policy; it was a matter of internal and systemic contradictions in the 
make-up of those policies. Yet, despite the lack of design, intent, or consensus, these 
contradictory policies shared a surprisingly unified end: the elimination of racial ambiguity. This 
process entailed three steps: excluding mixed-ancestry Natives from the definition of ‘Indian,’ 
conflating ‘Métis’ and mixed ancestry Natives, and attempting to create a definition of mixed-
ancestry Natives as ‘Halfbreeds. This was evidenced in three main policy areas: the Indian Act, 
scrip, and treaties.  
Treaties 
If a treaty policy for mixed-ancestry Natives could be articulated, it was one of exclusion. 
Officials repeatedly denied requests by First Nations leaders to include their ‘Halfbreed cousins’ 
in treaty. As treaty commissioners like Alexander Morris and other government officials often 
reiterated during the years of treaty negotiations when faced with these requests, “the treaties 
were not for whites.”7 However, Halfbreeds were not considered white in a nineteenth-century 
social setting either. So, how were they categorized?  
A closer look at Canada’s treaty policy in regard to mixed-ancestry Natives, and even 
into Morris’ words, reveals an ambiguous answer to that question. Morris was wrong on two 
accounts. Not only were Halfbreeds not considered ‘white,’ they were also not wholly barred 
from treaties. Indeed, it was Canada’s stated policy to exclude Halfbreeds from treaties, but its 
practice did not align to the policy. Instead, Canada tended to exclude mixed-ancestry Natives as 
groups but not as individuals, and often acted in contradiction of even these vague guidelines. 
Instead of a clear-cut policy, the treatment of mixed-ancestry Natives in treaty policy emerged as 
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a pattern that developed over years of practice rather than as a pre-defined directive. 
Commissioners created ad hoc responses to requests by Aboriginal leaders to include mixed-
ancestry Natives. While ‘Halfbreeds’ were allowed into treaty on an individual basis under 
certain circumstances, they were more frequently denied inclusion as a group distinguishable 
from the First Nations. Between 1850 and 1921, Canada would use the treaty process as an 
attempt to eliminate racial ambiguity and draw clearer lines between Indians and mixed-ancestry 
Natives.  
  It did not start that way, though. In the negotiation of earlier treaties, the notion of 
‘racial purity’ was not a consideration for treaty commissioners or other government 
representatives who negotiated with Indigenous leaders, leaving the intricacies of membership at 
their discretion. The so-called peace and friendship treaties reflected the nature of Native-
Newcomer relations. Absent of the desire to control the Aboriginal population that would 
become evident beyond the 1850s, it was Aboriginal groups themselves who defined the 
parameters of their participation through the representation by their leaders. Indeed, these treaties 
make no mention of any limits placed on chiefs to determine who was considered a member. 
But, by 1850, as the relationship shifted to one of coercion, and as administrators began to take 
notice of blood quantum in other respects, they began to take note in the treaty process as well.
8
   
Evidence that race and racial purity would become a factor in the treaty policy first 
emerged in the 1850 Robinson Treaties. During treaty talks, requests by Anishnaabek leaders for 
the inclusion of their allied Halfbreed neighbours were denied. Such requests not only suggested 
existing kinship ties among Aboriginal peoples, but political alliances as well. Recent intrusions 
on their lands via mining had resulted in what would become a typical pattern of threat to Native 
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title and resource extraction from their lands.
9
 Having a stronger force in combining with the 
Métis undoubtedly strengthened their position. In any event, Aboriginal groups had their own 
established patterns of alliance and treaty traditions, most of which would be ignored over the 
next six or seven decades as land surrenders became one of the dominant aspects of Native 
policy and a key factor in Canadian economic development. 
The Robinson Treaties marked a new tradition in a number of ways. While they were part 
of an earlier practice that predates and is considered separate from the numbered treaties, they 
provided a template that would form the basis for the Prairie treaties starting in the 1870s.
10
 As 
would become part of the prairie formula, the Robinson treaties ceded large tracts of land for 
non-Native use, in this particular case, mining. They also resembled later treaties in another 
important way. One of the distinguishing features of the treaty policy in regard to mixed-ancestry 
Natives was the frequent attempts of chiefs to include Halfbreeds in the process. It was also a 
distinguishing feature of the treaty policy that commissioners frequently denied the inclusion of 
Halfbreeds as groups.  
The events of the 1850 Robinson Treaties also set a precedent for how mixed-ancestry 
Natives would be treated in this regard. The commissioner’s report noted that “The relations of 
the Indians and Halfbreeds have long been cordial; and in the negotiations as to these initial 
treaties, as in the subsequent ones, the claims of the Halfbreeds, to recognition, was urged by the 
Indians.”11 Moreover, the chiefs requested that Halfbreeds receive 100 acres of land each as their 
settlement. These requests were not granted, but many individuals of mixed ancestry joined in 
with some of the bands in those treaties. Nonetheless, the government’s view about ‘valid’ 
Native participants continued to be shaped by a belief in race and the immutable categories that 
                                                          
9
 Ibid., 113–114. 
10 Ibid. 
11
 Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians, 16. 
    
 
109 
 
defined it. Métis had to choose between being classed as ‘Indians’ if they wanted to participate in 
treaty, or be ‘ordinary citizens’ and not be included. 
This practice of exclusion would develop into a pattern across the prairies in the 
numbered treaties, and it would come despite the fairly consistent and repeated requests from 
Indians for the inclusion of Halfbreeds. Such was the case with Treaty Two in 1871 (Manitoba 
Post). As in the Robinson Treaties, mixed-ancestry Natives wanting to participate in the treaty 
process were given a choice. Morris explained to them that if they took treaty payments and 
stayed in treaty, they could not subsequently participate in scrip. Granted, budget-conscious 
administrators sought to prevent individuals receiving compensation twice, but there was more at 
work here.
12
 The choice between scrip and treaty would amount to a choice between identifying 
as Métis or identifying as Indian – a choice that reflected the polarized view of the Newcomers’ 
idea of race. This incident reflected not only the government’s view, but also Aboriginal ones. 
The Halfbreeds had clearly identified as Indians. Ultimately, in Treaty Two, individuals were 
given the choice of identity – as either Indians who took treaty, or as Halfbreeds who received 
scrip, the latter of which would then be regarded as ordinary citizens. The treaty process thus 
served as a means of dividing a hybrid population into two distinct and immutable categories. 
The North-West Angle Treaty, or Treaty Three, is even more revealing in this regard. In 
the 1873 the chiefs also wanted some Métis families included. One chief, for instance, asked that 
Halfbreeds “should be counted with us, and have their share of what you have promised. We 
wish you to accept our demands. It is the half-breeds that are actually living amongst us – those 
that are married to our women.”13 Morris gave a vague answer, but suggested that they had to 
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choose between being Indian and being a ‘white’ citizen. He continued, “they must be either 
white or Indian. If Indians, they get treaty money; if the Half-breeds call themselves whites, they 
get land.”14 His comments clearly represented the dual nature that framed the perceptions of 
culture differences held by many administrators, and suggested the ways in which government 
perspectives about identity differed from Indigenous ones. But they also represented the kind of 
ambivalence government administrators could demonstrate about the racially mixed. As noted at 
the start of this chapter, Morris clearly acknowledged the diversity of populations that existed 
among those classified more broadly as Halfbreeds. Yet, here, he insisted on imposing a racial 
binary that contradicted that diversity. Ultimately, Morris, like other government officials that 
would follow him, could not conceive of a space for identity that was more fluid. 
The matter did not end there. In 1875, the Métis of Rainy Lake and Rainy River became 
parties to that treaty. While historical interpretation has dismissed their inclusion as an 
anomaly,
15
 the situation actually demonstrates what might more accurately be described as the 
government’s ambivalent behaviour towards mixed-ancestry Natives. In this case, the Métis 
there were promised their own reserve and to be included in treaty just as Indian bands were.
16
 
They signed an agreement with J.S. Dennis in 1875, the surveyor general, that was to constitute 
an adhesion to Treaty 3. Apparently, it was never ratified. They were eventually absorbed into a 
near-by reserve, suggesting that their pre-existing ties constituted grounds for their inclusion. 
However, the government’s approach suggests that their belief that the Métis were distinct from 
the Indians remained. According to Deputy Minister of the Interior, E.A. Meredith, those Métis 
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families were allowed entry into treaty only because of the Métis men who were married to 
Indian women. While they allowed the inclusion of the Métis in this case, they did so with 
warning and condition. The Métis, they said, must choose between being ‘Indian’ and being 
‘white,’ and by entering treaty, they would be giving up their rights as Halfbreeds.17 They would 
also, according to Meredith, be giving up their rights of citizenship: they would lose their right to 
vote and to purchase property, and they would be taking on the status of legal minors. It is 
apparent, then, that the inclusion of mixed-ancestry Natives in treaties was not a recognition of 
their specific ethnicity, particularly as distinguishable from the First nations with which 
governments negotiated. Instead, it was a choice in identifying with only one of two available 
categories: Indian or ‘ordinary citizens.’18 
Aboriginal leaders also made appeals on behalf of the Métis in Treaty Four at Qu’Appelle 
in 1874. When Chiefs asked that Halfbreeds should be allowed to hunt, commissioners 
responded only that “the population in the North-West would be treated fairly and justly.”19 
Native leaders were rarely satisfied with such terse responses, and subtly pressed for 
clarification, as was the case in Treaty Four. The conversation continued: 
THE GAMBLER: “...Now when you have come here, you see sitting out there a 
mixture of half-breeds, Crees, Saulteaux and Stonies, all are one, and you were slow in 
taking the hand of a half-breed.” 
MORRIS: “...We have here Crees, Saulteaux, Assiniboines, and other Indians, they are 
all one, and we have another people, the Half-breeds, they are of your blood and my 
blood. The Queen cares for them ... and you may rest easy, you may leave the Half-
breeds in the hands of the Queen who will deal generously and justly with them.”20 
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Morris’ response not only demonstrated his exclusion of Halfbreeds from eligibility for treaty, 
but it also reflected well-entrenched beliefs in racial categorization. While the Crees, Saulteaux, 
and Assiniboines were lumped together as Indians, Halfbreeds were separated out by their mixed 
‘blood. Gradually, legal meaning was being assigned to perceived racial difference, even if it 
conflicted with kinship ties or self-ascription. 
The government’s distinction between Indians and Halfbreeds persisted as treaty 
commissioners moved west across the newly acquired Rupert’s Land. 21  During Treaty Six 
negotiations, Cree leader Mistawasis also made a bid on behalf of Halfbreeds. But his requests 
met with the same fate as those of Indian leaders in other treaty negotiations. On August 23
rd
, 
1876, when he requested that they be allowed to live on reserves, Morris answered: “I explained 
the distinction between the Half-breed people and the Indian Half-breeds who lived amongst the 
Indians as Indians, and said the Commissioners would consider the case of each of these last on 
its merits.”22 If anymore was said on the matter, Morris did not report it. Nor was there anything 
prior to this point to indicate that there was a distinction made based solely on mode of life, as 
opposed to blood quantum or descent. There was also no indication that anyone other than 
Morris adhered to this subdivision of Halfbreeds. If we are to take that report as the final word, 
Mistawasis then signed the treaty without pursuing the issue further. 
This may have been the end of Mistawasis’ vocalization on the matter, but it was not the 
last time such a request would be made. A few weeks later, on September 16
th
, Cree chief Red 
Pheasant brought up a similar issue. Morris reported that Red Pheasant “wished the claims of the 
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Half-breeds who had settled there before the Government came to be respected.”23 The Governor 
responded that, 
The Queen has been kind to the Half-breeds of Red River and has given them much 
land; we did not come as messengers to the Half-breeds, but to the Indians. I have heard 
some Half-breeds want to take lands at Red River and join the Indians here, but they 
cannot take with both hands. The Half-breeds of the North-West cannot come into the 
Treaty. The small class of Half-breeds who live as Indians and with the Indians, can be 
regarded as Indians by the Commissioners, who will judge each case on its own merits 
as it comes up, and will report their action to the Queen’s Councillors for their 
approval.
24
 
While Morris created a space, undefined as it was, for conditions under which a Halfbreed might 
be considered Indian, it was an exception to an otherwise assumed rule: Halfbreeds were not 
Indians. 
Morris deserves special attention here, as he provides an example of a detailed view of 
mixed-ancestry Natives and because he was an important treaty official. Specific articulations of 
racial ideas were uncommon; instead, they were usually unspoken and assumed. The record of 
his views on the racial landscape in Canada’s Northwest provides some insight into the more 
local ‘Prairie’ employment of race. He acknowledged a cultural complexity that contradicted the 
binary policy tried to superimpose on a complex Aboriginal population. In his comments, Morris 
clearly distinguished Halfbreeds from Crees, Saulteaux, and Assiniboines. But later in his report, 
he recognized that they were still separate from whites. They were, he said,   
the wandering Half-breeds of the plains, who are chiefly of French descent and live the 
life of the Indians. There are a few who are identified with the Indians, but there is a 
large class of Metis who live by the hunt of the buffalo, and have no settled homes. I 
think that a census of the numbers of these should be procured, and while I would not 
be disposed to recommend their being brought under the treaties, I would suggest that 
land should be assigned to them, and that on their settling down, if after an examination 
into their circumstances, it should be found necessary and expedient, some assistance 
should be given them to enable them to enter upon agricultural operations. 
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If the measures suggested by me are adopted, viz., effective regulations with regard to 
the buffalo, the Indians taught to cultivate the soil, and the erratic Half-breeds 
encouraged to settle down, I believe that the solution of all social questions of any 
present importance in the North-West Territories will have been arrived at.
25
 
Given the important role Morris played in the development of treaty policy, his views are 
especially significant. But his acknowledgement of this diversity was contravened by the actual 
treaty negotiations. Morris repeatedly and contradictorily insisted that ‘Halfbreeds were not 
whites’ and that they had a choice between treaty and scrip – a choice which really meant a 
choice in self-ascription.  
Morris also clearly envisioned mixed-ancestry Natives as cultural ambassadors – a view 
that enabled this continuing racial ambiguity that he and other officials sought to eliminate.
26
 The 
well-known commentary by then Governor General Lord Dufferin included in Morris’ treaty 
report captures this idea of the ‘cultural broker’ best: 
There is no doubt that a great deal of the good feeling thus subsisting between the red 
men and ourselves is due to the influence and interposition of that invaluable class of 
men the Half-breed settlers and pioneers of Manitoba, who, combining as they do the 
hardihood, the endurance and love of enterprise generated by the strain of Indian blood 
within their veins, with the civilization, the instruction, and the intellectual power 
derived from their fathers, have preached the Gospel of peace and good will, and mutual 
respect, with equally beneficent results to the Indian chieftain in his lodge and to the 
British settler in the shanty. They have been the ambassadors between the east and the 
west; the interpreters of civilization and its exigencies to the dwellers on the prairie as 
well as the exponents to the white men of the consideration justly due to the 
susceptibilities, the sensitive self-respect, the prejudices, the innate craving for justice, 
of the Indian race. In fact they have done for the colony what otherwise would have 
been left unaccomplished, and have introduced between the white population and the 
red man a traditional feeling of amity and friendship which but for them it might have 
been impossible to establish.
27
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Morris agreed with Dufferin. On the one hand, he acknowledged the important role that some 
mixed-ancestry Natives played in prairie peace-keeping; but he also perpetuated the widespread 
and popular myth that, as ‘racially mixed,’ mixed-ancestry Natives were stuck between ‘two 
worlds’ with no distinct cultural identity. He continued to force the same choice between two 
racial polarities: Indian and white. A third category was conceivable only as a temporary or 
transitional one. 
Indian Commissioner Wemyss M. Simpson also demonstrated some awareness of this 
complexity, although he forced the same kind of duality on the population in the end. While he 
recognized that mixed-ancestry Natives could and did live among Indians, he gave them the 
same ultimatum that would become the hallmark of Canadian Indian policy: a choice between 
‘Indian’ or ‘Halfbreed,’ the latter of which would come to mean ordinary citizen. As he noted in 
his report: 
During the payment of the several bands, it was found that in some, and most notably in 
the Indian settlement and Broken Head River Band – a number of those residing among 
the Indians, and calling themselves Indians, are in reality half-breeds, and entitled to 
share in the land grant under the provisions of the Manitoba Act. I was most particular, 
therefore, in causing it to be explained, generally and to individuals, that any person 
now elected to be classed with Indians and receiving the Indian pay and gratuity would, 
I believed, thereby forfeit his or her right to another grant as a half-breed, and in all 
cases where it was known that a man was a half-breed, the matter, as it affected himself 
and his children, was explained to him, and the choice given him to characterize 
himself. A very few only decided upon taking their grant as Half-breeds. The 
explanation of this apparent sacrifice is found in the fact that the mass of these persons 
have lived all their lives on the Indian Reserves (so called), and would rather receive 
such benefits as may accrue to them under the Indian Treaty than wait the realization of 
any value in their half-breed grant.
28
 
Simpson’s attitude reflected government concerns about the costs associated with extinguishing 
Aboriginal title, and especially a concern that Halfbreeds were in a position to receive benefits in 
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two ways. However, they also reflected the underlying assumptions about identity and racial 
mixing. This division of Halfbreeds and Indians, and especially the exclusion of Halfbreeds from 
the treaty process, contradicted Aboriginal understandings and formulations of their own 
identities as well as their relationships with Canada. Such perspectives were rarely 
acknowledged or recorded, though. 
The discrepancy between these understandings of identity was evident elsewhere, too. 
For instance, the mixed-ancestry Natives in Manitoba who were absent when treaties were 
negotiated protested their exclusion from the process, seeing themselves as a band equal to any 
other. Indian Commissioner I.W. Powell explained, “They wish to be acknowledged as special 
Bands, distinct from the Indian Bands which surround them, taking, at the same time, their share 
of the privilege granted the Indians, and claiming under the two heads of White and Indian 
descendants.”29 A similar situation was reported in the Treaty Four area, near Qu’Appelle, in 
1876 by acting treaty commissioner M.G. Dickieson. A number of Halfbreed groups approached 
Dickieson for annuity payment. When he questioned their band membership, they expressed a 
desire to create their own bands “distinct from the Indians.” Dickieson, perhaps not surprisingly, 
refused, absurdly quoting the Indian Act to them. The groups then claimed membership in 
existing bands, which Dickieson also rejected. He declared that “these persons have always been 
accounted Half-breeds, have never adopted the Indian habits or ways of life.”30  To be certain, 
how individuals ‘had always’ been classified would hardly matter seven years later when scrip 
commissioners and Indian agents withdrew thousands of Indians from treaty and re-classified 
them as Halfbreeds.  
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In the meantime, he used these previous classifications to justify maintaining dubiously 
constructed racial categories. Despite his final decision, he expressed ambiguity and ambivalence 
about the meaning and value of these more simplified and reified racial categories. Contrary to 
his decision that the Treaty Four Halfbreeds could not be counted as Indians, he acknowledged 
the diversity among people of mixed ancestry. He paraphrased Morris’s ‘three classes of Half-
breeds,’ but added a fourth class: 
The question as to who is or who is not an Indian is a difficult one to decide, many 
whose forefathers were Whites, follow the customs and habits of the Indians and have 
always been recognized as such... A second class have little to distinguish them from 
the former, but have not altogether followed the ways of the Indians. A third class again 
have followed the ways of the Whites more than those of the Indians, while others have 
followed the habits of Whites and have never been recognized, or accounted themselves 
as anything but Half-breeds.
31
 
As Dickieson himself admitted, there was little distinction among the so-called classes, and 
noted the inadequacies of the Indian Act to deal with problems of ambiguous classification, 
including the recognition of those ‘full bloods’ who had never belonged to any band. But this did 
not stop him from imposing his own ideas of identity onto a group of people who had no 
problems identifying themselves. By the terms of the Indian Act, those so called ‘full bloods’ 
were not Indians. He aptly pointed out that he had been forced to refuse entry to the siblings and 
even parents of those who were regarded as belonging to recognized bands.
32
 Expressing concern 
over the difficult position the law had placed him in, he felt that “wrong had been done last year 
in admitting those, or I was not doing right now in refusing to admit their relations into the 
Bands.” 33  Any discrepancy between the rules and the practice, then, was reduced to an 
administrative error. Dickieson’s observations should not be taken as altruistic or even 
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sympathetic; instead, his main concern was “not to degrade the White to the position of the 
savage.”34 Halfbreeds who were ‘too white’ should then not be considered either Indian or 
Halfbreed. 
But this was not necessarily what Halfbreeds themselves thought. Indeed, many saw 
themselves as Aboriginal, equal to Indians and deserving of the same benefits and treatment 
accorded by the government. This was not just a political statement about rights, though: it was a 
cultural one, too. Such was the case with the above-mentioned group Dickieson encountered. But 
this was not an anomalous case. Similar demands were echoed when Indigenous groups across 
the prairies were transitioning to a new lifestyle as the buffalo declined and settlers moved into 
the Northwest, disrupting animal migration patterns and hunting practices. In one of many 
petitions that would be made throughout the Northwest, Cypress Hills Halfbreeds requested a 
reserve, assistance in transitioning to agriculture, and education. They pointed not only to the 
decline in buffalo stocks, but also to a Northwest Territory ordinance which limited their hunting 
activities. Accordingly, the already-strained economy was further impeded.
35
 They saw 
themselves on the same footing as other Indians in the territory, many of whom lived similar 
lifestyles, and demanded the same treatment. Of course, not all mixed-ancestry Natives identified 
in this way, but it is significant that those who did were largely ignored by an ambivalent 
government. 
Indian Act 
Just as treaties became more exclusive, so did legislation. Efforts to distinguish 
Halfbreeds and Indians became part of the laws that applied to Aboriginal people as the attempt 
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to eliminate racial ambiguity continued. As with treaties, there was a discernible shift in attitudes 
evidenced by the chronology of legislative changes from 1850 on. Ideas about racial categories 
and racial mixing became codified as legal definitions for cultural groups. The process began 
slowly in the pre-Confederation period, but was clarified in the few years following 
Confederation and the consolidation of the Indian Act. Between 1876 and 1884 –the passing of 
the first Indian Act and a major revision of the act – two distinct legal categories were created: 
‘Indian’ and ‘Halfbreed. These legal categories would not always coincide with Aboriginal 
kinship systems and rules of membership, and applying them would prove to be problematic. 
These definitions ultimately served to highlight the contrast between how government officials 
and Aboriginal people constructed identities. They also exposed the contradictions of the idea of 
race and the ways in which Aboriginal policy reflected those contradictions. They nonetheless 
remained as major determinants of eligibility in Aboriginal policy well into the twentieth 
century. 
Five acts preceded the first consolidated Indian Act in 1876 and formed the basis for 
these definitions. The first definitions were laid out in 1850. Two almost identical acts, one each 
for Upper and Lower Canada, established a precedent for defining Aboriginal people in law. 
While not explicitly a blood quantum criterion, the definition assumed a biological definition 
through ‘blood. They defined four conditions of status: first, those who were “of Indian blood;” 
second, were married to or descended from an Indian; third, resided among Indians and whose 
parent was a member of that tribe, or entitled to be; and finally, adopted children.
36
 This initial 
definition, then, was based more in Aboriginal ideas of identity than it was in racial ones. 
Subsequent acts in 1851, 1857, 1868, and 1869 used this definition as its basis, but some 
amendments shifted the focus of identity construction. First, the 1851 amendment excluded non-
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Indian men married to Indian women, undermining Aboriginal kinship rules and privileging 
European gender and descent rules.
37
  
Second, and more significantly, the 1869 Act included two further provisions that would 
have a specific effect on mixed ancestry Natives. First, it introduced for the first time in law a 
blood quantum rule. Section four read: “In the division among the members of any tribe, band, or 
body of Indians, of any annuity money, interest money or rents, no person of less than one-fourth 
Indian blood, born after the passing of this Act, shall be deemed entitled to share in any annuity, 
interest or rents, after a certificate to that effect is given by Chief or Chiefs of the band.”38 Thus, 
inheritance laws became restricted by blood quantum, which would effectively exclude certain 
mixed ancestry Native populations.  It also added a patrilineal descent rule to status: children of 
men and women from different tribes would “belong to their father’s tribe only.”39 These early 
acts laid the foundation for creating a definition with the purpose of eliminating specific 
individuals. While these acts, their provisions, and their implications are well known in 
historiography, they are generally not considered for the effects they had on those populations 
who gradually and eventually would be excluded from being considered ‘Indian.’40 Academics 
instead have tended to focus on the populations that it included. Instead of just representing the 
beginnings of an era of control over ‘Indians,’ it also represented the beginning of an era when 
racial classification would direct Native policy for the next century, and the selection process in 
that system would see the exclusion of many mixed-ancestry Natives from the official discourse. 
The restrictions placed on identity that would become one of the hallmarks of the Indian 
Act were introduced in 1876 – the first real Indian Act. Various clauses in section two laid out 
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explicit definitions: “The term “Indian means - First. Any male person of Indian blood reputed to 
belong to a particular band; Second. Any child of such person; Third. Any woman who is or was 
lawfully married to such person.”41 So began the process of exclusion: the basic premise to this 
definition that was seen in 1850 was the same, but there was one important difference. In 1850, 
one would be considered Indian if either parent was an Indian. But in 1876, one was only 
considered Indian if one’s father was considered an Indian. Maternal descent was no longer 
considered a valid source of Indian identity.  
In a manner consistent with the ambivalent practices that came to characterize Indian 
policy, these laws were frequently not enforced. The treaty policy combined with legislative 
initiatives under the Indian Act to produce an umbrella policy of exclusion of mixed ancestry 
Natives; yet practice continued to defy these objectives. Nowhere was that more evident than on 
reserves, where mixed-ancestry Natives continued to be identified by Indian agents as reserve 
residents and status Indians. Numerous examples verify this point. The superintendent visiting 
the Thessalon River Reserve in Ontario reported in 1874 that “owing to intermarriage with the 
whites, about twenty Halfbreeds claim to belong to the Band.”42 Indian Commissioner I.W. 
Powell noted in 1875 that more than half of the 1943 members of the St. Peter’s Band were 
‘Halfbreeds.’43 Bands were not the racially pure communities that officials were attempting to 
create, but little if any effort was made to remove those who did not conform to this imagined 
idea of society. 
In British Columbia, the concern was a bit different. Indian Commissioner James Lenihan 
viewed Halfbreeds on reserves there as the ‘unfortunate by-product’ of the actions of 
unscrupulous white men. Mixed-ancestry Natives had become a social burden, in his view, 
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suggesting that “they do a large amount of mischief” and that “some legal provision should be 
made which would secure the offspring of whitemen cohabitating with Indian women from being 
thrown upon society as paupers, in case of the death of such male parents, or in case of the 
abandonment of them by such male parents after a certain lapse of time.”44 The focus of attention 
was on the immorality of racial mixing, and, as would also be the case in Australia, the 
disruption to what were already very tentative Victorian family models and social categories in 
an unstable frontier environment. As scholar Renisa Mawani suggests, this interracial mixing 
was a threat to “respectable white masculinity” and the future of the ‘white race.’45 
The emphasis on paternal descent did not coincide with cultural identity among many 
First Nations, nor did it coincide with racial identification in standard Canadian census practice. 
Indigenous groups each had their own standards for cultural identification, many of them 
matrilineal. However, it was generally more complex than that. For instance, even though the 
dominant descent rule among the North West Coast Tlingit is along matrilineal lines, that does 
not preclude an important relationship with patrilineal lines: “Children are born into their 
mother’s moiety, clan, and house rather than their father’s. Although they are not members of 
their father’s clan, they maintain a special relationship with his clan. Through his or her birth into 
a clan and house, an infant has all the rights to land and property held by the clan. The child does 
not inherit privileges, rights, or property as under American law, but is entitled to these rights 
through his or her membership in a clan.”46 So, unlike descent rules in European-based societies, 
they did not determine a child’s entire formal status, identity, or even rights to property. 
However, according to scholar Robert A. Innes, descent rules do not entirely capture the 
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complexity of identity formation.
47
 His examination of kinship patterns in the Cowessess Band in 
Saskatchewan demonstrates that identity is not necessarily determined by ‘ethnicity’ or ‘race. In 
fact, band identity can be ‘multicultural’ and does not require cultural uniformity. In the case of 
Cowessess, he continues, it was the similar practices of kinship rules that allowed for separate 
groups to co-exist as one band. Thus, the ways in which western-based racial ascription clashed 
with Indigenous-based systems of identity formation were complicated and layered. 
A major revision to the Indian Act in 1951 emphasized this difference, creating what has 
become known as the ‘double mother’ rule. Ironically, this new Act was intended to reflect what 
was viewed as the ‘toppling of racism,’ a shift prompted by the post-WWII era, the rise of 
anthropology and the popularization of ‘cultural relativism.’ 48  Instead of reflecting these 
principles, the new Act sought to eliminate the number of Indians eligible for status by using 
marriage as a form of assimilation. It did not have the intended effects where status was 
concerned, though, most likely because the Act only attempted to remove the coercive methods 
of assimilation, not the goal of assimilation itself. This new act further amended an already-
existing discrimination in how status could be transferred to mixed ancestry children. While 
previous acts had barred women who married non-Indian men and their children from being 
counted as ‘Indian’ according to the Act, the 1951 changes added a narrower blood quantum. 
Under the new provisions, certain individuals whose mother and paternal grandmother were not 
Indian could not be considered Indian themselves.
49
 Gender was increasingly invoked in racial 
ascription often in contradiction of cultural practices. 
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Scrip 
  While the Indian Act was a significant contributor to mixed-race discourse in Canada, 
scrip was the major component. Scrip, a policy intended to extinguish the native title of mixed-
ancestry Natives, demonstrated the ambivalence and ambiguity evidenced during other 
Aboriginal policies. One of the most significant hallmarks of the scrip policy was how it 
collapsed all mixed-ancestry Natives, Métis and Halfbreeds, into one category. If ever there was 
any acknowledgement of the social and cultural variety of mixed-ancestry Natives, this 
delineation would quickly be lost among those in Ottawa by the 1880s. Part of the reason for this 
lay in the purpose of this policy. Scrip began as an initiative to satisfy the claims of the Red 
River Métis – a specific and distinct cultural and political group – but it quickly expanded as the 
sole means by which Canada would extinguish the title of all Natives of mixed ancestry in the 
prairie west. It became part of an impetus to pacify what was perceived as a potentially violent 
Aboriginal west in order to make way for white settlement. By extending the terms of eligibility 
to those who were biologically ‘Halfbreeds,’ and conflating all mixed-ancestry Natives under the 
term ‘Halfbreed,’ Canada effectively extinguished any outstanding claims to title that might have 
remained from a treaty policy that had officially excluded Halfbreeds. In this way, the title of all 
Aboriginal peoples, Indian and Halfbreed, would be extinguished. 
The scrip policy would do more, though. It also blurred the cultural boundaries of groups 
who, otherwise unrelated, became conflated under one heading. The major step in this process 
occurred in an attempt to define the term in regard to eligibility for scrip. Scrip was first used in 
Manitoba, where it provided a means to fulfill the terms of the 1870 Manitoba Act – the outcome 
of negotiations between the Manitoba Métis and Ottawa following the 1870 Red River 
Resistance. The well-known causes of the Resistance can largely be attributed to grievances 
concerning land title and political representation, beginning with the transfer to Rupert’s Land to 
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Canada without consultation with the Métis. Concerned that their occupation of the land would 
not be recognized, they petitioned Ottawa. Without a forthcoming or expedient response from 
the federal government, the Métis declared a provisional government, finally producing an 
incentive for the federal government to enter into negotiations. In the spring of 1870, Alfred 
Scott, Bishop Taché, and Judge Black set off for Ottawa as the Western representatives, 
returning with the terms of what became the Manitoba Act. Among these terms included the 
foundations for extinguishing Métis Aboriginal title in Manitoba and established who was 
eligible to participate in the land grant. However, it did not identify a process for distributing the 
land. Instead, a series of orders-in-council issued over the next few years determined how 1.4 
million acres of land would be distributed.
50
 
Initially, administrators made no attempt to define ‘Halfbreed’ in framing eligibility for 
scrip.
51
 Identity, and accordingly, eligibility, was determined by an affidavit made by the 
applicant, and signed by two witnesses who attested to the applicant’s identity as a Halfbreed and 
resident in the Northwest. Outside of a geographical association, there was little need to define 
the term. Eligibility for scrip applied to a very specific group of people in a small, defined 
territory: Manitoba in 1870 comprised a small portion of its current size. Its population of 12,000 
consisted largely of Métis, who constituted the vast majority at almost 10,000.
52
 From that 
perspective, there was little need to expand on that for the policy. As had been the case during 
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treaty negotiations, decisions were largely left to the individuals themselves. However, 
commissioners increasingly expressed concerns about the validity of this process, and insisted on 
having greater authority in accepting or rejecting an applicant’s self-ascription. This was 
especially so when scrip was extended in 1885 into the Northwest Territory as the means of 
dealing with Native petitions there. Administrators ran into issues surrounding eligibility that 
they had not encountered in Manitoba. In the Northwest, it was less clear who was eligible for 
scrip. 
Contrary to standard practice in Canadian Aboriginal policy, creating an official 
definition of ‘Halfbreed’ was an inclusive rather than exclusive policy. Unlike the Indian Act, 
which since 1850 increasingly restricted the definition of Indian, the scrip policy did not. In fact, 
the initial instructions did not give any definition, specific or otherwise, to identify Halfbreeds. 
The only criteria for eligibility in the official instructions were occupancy and residency 
requirements: that is, only those resident in the territories prior to the date of the transfer of 
Rupert’s Land to Canada were eligible to make a claim.53 As the initial instructions detailed, 
The claimant is required to furnish to the commission evidence on the following points 
– such evidence to be in each case by affidavit of the claimant to be made before the 
commission and substantiated by the affidavits, sworn as aforesaid, of two reliable and 
disinterested witnesses personally cognizant of the facts – (a) that he is a half breed 
head of a family resident in the North West Territories previous to the 15
th
 day of July 
1870, or (b) that he is a child of a half breed head of a family resident in the North West 
Territories previous to the 15
th
 day of July 1870, and born before that date.
54
 
There was noticeable ambiguity in these definitions: they did not actually define anyone. Instead, 
there was an inherent assumption about precisely who that meant. Here was a classic case of the 
unspoken assumptions of race. But it was also a case of mixed race defying race: when 
administrators attempted to write definitions that articulated the difference between Halfbreeds 
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and Indians, or even Halfbreeds and whites, they were unable to. This not only reflected 
problems in the scrip policy, it also reflected problems in racial science as a whole. 
It was not until later that year that it became clearer what administrators were ‘assuming’ 
when they used the term. A new order-in-council added that ‘Halfbreed’ could now also include 
children born of “pure Indian and White parents”.55 So, not only did the definition of ‘Halfbreed’ 
include those born of ‘Halfbreed’ parents, but also those of mixed ancestry born to parents of 
different ‘racial’ categories. These unstable definitions continued to evolve in reference to the 
context of policy, but also in reference to the context of ‘pure’ racial categories. To 
administrators, then, mixed-ancestry Natives, as a product of mixed unions, were the same as 
those people of dual origins who had over many generations, developed distinct cultures and 
communities.  
The issues regarding gender and descent that arose in the earlier stages of the Indian Act 
also emerged in the scrip policy. How a married woman’s status was affected by her husband’s 
posed complications for administrators. In a similar vein, there was an inconsistency in how 
Aboriginal descent for the purposes of legal claims were viewed. The Indian Act had designated 
patrilineal descent as the guiding rule for Indians. But for Halfbreeds, descent could be traced 
along either paternal or maternal lines. As scrip commissioner J.A.J. McKenna pointed out years 
later, “It has been the custom to recognize Halfbreed rights coming from the mother as well as 
the father; and consequently claims have been allowed of children who were the offspring of 
mothers of part Indian blood married to husbands of exclusively white blood.”56 This explanation 
demonstrated the ambivalence of descent rules, where scrip allowed entitlement through 
maternal or paternal lines, but the Indian Act traced descent only through fathers. But this 
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inconsistency also supports the contention that definitions of ‘Indian’ were increasingly exclusive 
while definitions of ‘Halfbreed’ were increasingly inclusive. It was easier to prove belonging to 
the latter which, not coincidentally, was the group who would lose official recognition as 
Aboriginal by taking scrip. 
The impetus to include was not solely one of administrators. Native opinions throughout 
the Northwest played an important role in shaping the direction of government policy. A series 
of petitions from communities throughout the region was effective in convincing the government 
to expand its scrip policy from Manitoba into the rest of the west. These began as early as 1880, 
when Halfbreed residents of Edmonton sent a petition to Ottawa demanding the same treatment 
as those resident in Manitoba – that is, the proper recognition of their title through the issuance 
of scrip.
57
 Others followed from Cypress Hills, Qu’Appelle, Prince Albert, St. Laurent, and other 
communities in Manitoba and the North West not included in the original Manitoba scrip area. 
Although the exact requests varied from community to community, they were consistent in the 
recognition of their title, and usually in requesting assistance for the economic transition with 
which so many Native residents were contending. This is not to suggest, however, that the Métis 
or other mixed-ancestry Natives were complicit with policies of assimilation or exclusion; but 
rather, that policies and their application were not at the sole discretion of government officials. 
And it was in part because of these petitions that Canada initiated the North West scrip 
commissions in 1885. However, this was not the response of an altruistic government responsive 
to Native demands. Scrip was a process of assimilation, not the recognition of a cultural or racial 
category to whom Aboriginal title was accorded. Instead, it served a multitude of government 
directives. It worked in concert with their policy of Indian ‘exclusion’ and their purported goals 
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of assimilation. Transitioning Natives from the category of ‘Indian’ to that of ‘Halfbreed’ offered 
what was seen as a comparatively smooth conversion to ‘ordinary citizens. It functioned as a 
process of voluntary enfranchisement, as had been attempted earlier, but worked more efficiently 
and effectively. It would also conveniently end the government’s fiduciary duty and financial 
obligation to thousands of Natives. Scrip formally extinguished Aboriginal title, as detailed in 
the Dominion Lands Act, whether or not applicants realized it. Finally, the scrip policy served as 
a process of identifying mixed-ancestry Natives and eliminating their status, official or 
otherwise, as Aboriginal. They became unambiguous ‘ordinary citizens.’ 
The latter of these aims became evident in the years between 1885 and 1887 when 
numerous treaty withdrawals were made so that Indians could apply for scrip. On the eve of the 
scrip commission in 1885, Deputy Minister of the Interior A.M. Burgess wrote in his instructions 
to the scrip commissioners that “care should be taken to give Treaty Indians distinctly to 
understand that they are not eligible to be enumerated as half-breeds.”58 This was significant for 
a number of reasons. First, it suggested that either officials were already fielding inquiries, or 
they anticipated them. Second, and more importantly, it articulated an existing government 
perspective that there was a clear divide, legal or otherwise, between treaty Indians and 
Halfbreeds. But Burgess’ initial instructions to exclude Treaty Indians from scrip would not 
survive the year, and he would very soon contradict his own words. In fact, by the following 
year, the scrip commissioners were allowing a number of Indians to withdraw from treaty to take 
scrip. In short, over the course of one year, the department’s policy changed drastically. Treaty 
Indians seeking to be discharged so that they could apply for scrip were required to demonstrate 
two things: first, a certain ‘degree of civilization,’ which meant not living an ‘Indian mode of 
life’; and second, that they could support themselves. It was much easier administratively for 
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Indian Affairs to withdraw an Indian to take scrip than to enfranchise him: unlike the 
enfranchisement policy, scrip grantees did not require monitoring or follow-up, nor were there 
clearly defined criteria to meet first. Nonetheless, the concept represented the same idea: 
individual allotment in exchange for the extinguishment of Aboriginal rights and title. 
Burgess’s instructions had, in fact, contradicted the 1884 Indian Act which made 
provisions for Indians to withdraw to take scrip. Prior to the 1884 act, the only clause dealing 
with overlap or transition between the two categories was in the 1880 Act: 
No half-breed in Manitoba who has shared in the distribution of half-breed lands shall 
be accounted an Indian; and no half-breed head of a family (except the widow of an 
Indian or a half-breed who has already been admitted into treaty) shall, unless under 
very special circumstances, to be determined by the Superintendent General or his 
agent, be accounted an Indian, or entitled to be admitted into any Indian treaty; and any 
half-breed who may have been admitted into a treaty shall be allowed to withdraw 
therefrom on refunding all annuity money received by him or her under the said treaty, 
or suffering a corresponding reduction in the quantity of any land, or scrip, which such 
half-breed, as such, may be entitled to receive from the Government.
59
 
But in 1884, a minor amendment was made so that treaty Indians were no longer required to 
refund their annuity money; instead, they only had to sign a letter to withdraw from treaty.
60
 As 
John A. Macdonald, then prime minister and Superintendent of Indian Affairs, noted, “It has 
been represented to the Department that it is desirable that half-breeds who are able and willing 
to support themselves should be allowed to give up their treaty relations with the Government, 
and by taking away the annuity, as provided in the old Act, the Government considered it was a 
bar to enterprise, for the half-breed would not have the same inducement to becoming self-
supporting if obliged to give up his annuity.”61 This change would, Indian Affairs hoped, provide 
an incentive to withdraw.  
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Scrip quickly became a substitute for an ineffective Indian policy of assimilation. 
Although the Indian Act did not explicitly permit it, the Indian Department withdrew Indians to 
take scrip, even though the Department of Interior said they would not deal with treaty Indians. 
For instance, in June 1885, Indian Agent William Anderson of the Edmonton district authorized 
the discharge of 202 treaty Indians so that they could take scrip.
62
 In early 1886, Hayter Reed, 
Assistant Indian Commissioner, asked scrip commissioner Roger Goulet when the scrip 
commission would be arriving at Lac la Biche, since “quite a number of Indians have received 
their discharge from Treaty under the belief that their claims would be attended to at an early 
date.”63 When the Commissioners arrived later that year, they withdrew 89 Indians from treaty.64 
There was clearly a disjuncture between Ottawa’s official policy and how it was executed on the 
ground. Not only did these actions contradict the Interior’s stated policy on treaty Indians 
applying for scrip, but it also conflicted with the Department of Justice’s interpretation of the 
Act. In a letter to Deputy Superintendent General Lawrence Vankoughnet, Deputy Minister of 
Justice George Burbridge stated that “the intention of the Act is to exclude half-breeds in 
Manitoba who have shared in the distribution of half-breed lands as being accounted as 
Indians.”65 The intended aim of the Indian Act, then, was not to make provisions for treaty 
Indians to take scrip; rather, it was to prohibit scrip grantees from entering treaty. There was no 
legal condition, then, for a treaty Indian to withdraw to take scrip. 
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There were, of course, pragmatic reasons for this policy of treaty withdrawal to take 
scrip. Undoubtedly, some found it beneficial economically. There were other benefits to no 
longer being considered Indian. The post-rebellion atmosphere after 1885 made it increasingly 
difficult to be Aboriginal, especially in the prairies.
66
 Hayter Reed, Assistant Commissioner in 
the Northwest at the time, made a series of recommendations designed to stifle Indian 
independence, hoping to eliminate any possibility of future outbreaks. DIA officials believed that 
one means of achieving this end was to separate Indians from ‘Halfbreeds. In that memorandum, 
Reed recommended that 
All half-breeds, members of rebel bands, although not shown to have taken any active 
part in the rebellion, should have their names erased from the paysheets, &, if this 
suggestion is not approved of, by directing that all [half-breeds] belonging to any bands 
should reside on the Reserves, most of these half-breeds would desire to be released 
from the terms of the Treaty. It is desirable however that the connection between such 
people & the Indians be entirely severed as it is never productive of aught but bad 
results.
67
 
Both Edgar Dewdney, Indian Commissioner of the North-West Territories, and Macdonald 
approved this policy; the increased number of treaty withdrawals from 192 in 1885 to 602 in 
1886 for the purposes of taking scrip over the next year was a demonstration of this approval. 
But there was far more to this confused policy. It also represented a critical juncture in 
Aboriginal policy and racial thinking in Canada. Introduced strictly as a Métis policy in 
Manitoba, the scrip policy became part of a broader nineteenth-century federal Indian policy 
when it moved into the North-West in 1885. Scrip incorporated already legally defined ‘Indians’ 
into its jurisdiction, thus permanently altering their formal relationship with Canada and 
minimizing the Crown’s legal obligations to them and their descendants. Evidently, this policy of 
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withdrawing treaty Indians for scrip was not a planned, formal aspect of either the scrip policy or 
Aboriginal policy. There were no clear guidelines governing treaty withdrawals, and Indian 
Agents were often uncertain about the proper course of action. In 1885, for example, Indian 
Agent Anderson asked for clarification, even after he had begun withdrawing Indians from 
treaty: “You will advise me how to act in the case of Treaty Halfbreeds who have withdrawn 
from the Treaty, and have left their families – or as the case may be, a part of their families in the 
Treaty. Are the families entitled to the land and improvements on the Reserve for the use of said 
family, also all the other privileges of Treaty Indians.”68 Similar concerns were expressed by the 
Peace Hills Indian agent, who was unclear about the distinction between treaty ‘Halfbreeds’ and 
Indians.
69
 The point is not so much that officials were unsure about policy, or had even made an 
error in not correlating a scrip policy under the Department of the Interior with Indian policy 
under the Department of Indian Affairs. Rather, the point is the nature of the ambiguity. It is of 
little surprise that there might be a lack of correlation among departments; it is of greater interest 
that the contradiction reflected uncertainty about how mixed-ancestry Natives would be 
categorized. 
The confusion felt by officials was reflected in their requests for legal opinions from the 
Department of Justice. The Department of the Interior first sought out the Department of 
Justice’s interpretation on treaty withdrawals in December 1885, after agents had already granted 
192 discharges to treaty Indians so they could apply for scrip. Burgess wrote Deputy Minister 
Burbridge asking if “those Half-breeds who have withdrawn from the Indian Treaty … are 
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entitled to participate in the grant to Half-Breeds” – a question asked six months after the fact.70 
Burbridge responded that Halfbreeds could, indeed, be considered eligible for scrip at the 
Minister of the Interior’s discretion.71 However, he also noted, 
That if the Half-breed woman who ceases to be an Indian because her husband, an [sic] 
halfbreed, on withdrawing from the Treaty ceases to be an Indian, is to be held entitled 
to share in the annuities, interest, moneys or rents of the bands or to have the same 
commuted, and also to have land or scrip as a halfbreed, she will be in a better position 
than an Indian woman married to a half-breed would be under the same circumstances, 
and that as a matter of fact the Indian title would in effect be twice extinguished.
72
 
This would in fact be the case for both Aboriginal men and women who were previously in 
treaty and then withdrew to take scrip.  
By the commission’s next sitting in 1886, the changes in policy regulating Indian 
withdrawals from treaty to accept scrip had been formalized. Contrary to the terms of the 1885 
Commission, in 1886 Burgess instructed Goulet to give scrip to those who had withdrawn from 
treaty. It was not until this point, then, that accepting applications from Indians who had 
withdrawn from treaty was officially recognized as part of the scrip policy. In fact, in 1886 and 
1887, most of the scrip applicants were treaty Indians who had withdrawn.  
The formalization of this policy allowing treaty discharges to take scrip met with some 
opposition from within the Department of Indian Affairs. T.P. Wadsworth, Inspector of Indian 
Farms and Agencies in the NWT, wrote the Indian Commissioner warning him of the great 
number of withdrawals that were being authorized. Wadsworth was of the opinion that such 
withdrawals were being granted haphazardly and far exceeded the Department’s initial 
projections.
73
 Dewdney questioned the validity of the process, noting that many withdrawals 
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were being granted to Indians who had “always followed an Indian mode of life. They have 
never been regarded as being anything but Indians, and it was not to be expected that they would 
ever claim to be anything else; nor, it is thought, was it the intent of Parliament that legislation 
enacted for half-breeds should extend to them.”74  His concern, in an attitude typical of the 
misguided sense of paternalism apparent in Indian Affairs at the time, was that such individuals 
would be throwing away their years of hard labour on their reserves in order to obtain “a few 
days of comparative prosperity, to be obtained from the sale of their scrip.” 75  Granting 
withdrawals without discretion, he believed, would result in a population of destitute Indians for 
whom the government would become responsible again sometime in the near future – or even 
worse, that they would “participate surreptitiously in the rations of such as are fed [treaty 
Indians], impoverishing them by doing so.”76 Even more importantly, he understood that the 
Indian Act did not make provision for withdrawing Indians so they could apply for scrip. 
However, Wadsworth’s objection signified more than one official’s concern with the 
projected failure of the policy of withdrawal. It demonstrated the underlying ambiguity about the 
policy of assimilation. If Natives were, in fact, to be assimilated, it made little sense to thwart the 
only process which had done so swiftly and successfully. This is poignant considering that 
Wadsworth and Dewdney were not alone in their objections. Lawrence Vankoughnet, Bishop 
Grandin, and Goulet, for instance – all key figures in late-nineteenth-century Aboriginal policy – 
expressed their objections. And they all expressed the same sentiment: those leading an ‘Indian 
mode of life’ should not be allowed to withdraw from treaty and take scrip. 77  Instead, 
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assimilation was not the only goal here: officials still oscillated between desires to maintain 
racial segregation and the pressures to assimilate, regardless of the reasons behind it. 
By the end of July 1886, Indian Affairs responded. It conceded that those leading an 
“Indian mode of life” should not be allowed to withdraw from treaty and that Wadsworth would 
accompany the Commission in an advisory capacity to help ascertain who fit that description. 
Until that point, no consensus had been reached for what constituted an ‘Indian mode of life. 
Given that this seemed to be a major criterion that distinguished Métis from Indians in 
government eyes, this was no small matter. In 1886, Wadsworth attempted to resolve this 
problem. He recommended a guideline for assessing withdrawal applications:  first, agents 
should not grant withdrawals to those who still hunted for a living; and second, applicants would 
have to prove they were a ‘Halfbreed.’78 This did little to solve the problem:  hunting alone did 
not distinguish an ‘Indian’ from a ‘Halfbreed’; it was a subsistence economic activity pursued by 
both groups. And ‘proving’ heritage only required finding a friend or family member to swear on 
the applicant’s behalf. Since widespread racial mixing meant many Indians had European 
ancestors, this was hardly an effective test. This undoubtedly left manoeuvring room for an 
applicant in choosing a legal identity. 
Along with his recommendations for treaty withdrawals, Wadsworth drew up a list of 
seventeen questions similar to those asked on the scrip application. Applicants were asked 
questions such as whether they had received rations under treaty, what possessions they owned, 
and how they expected to make a living if withdrawn from treaty. These questions were clearly 
designed to assess the applicant’s financial viability – not to determine their cultural identity. 
Indeed, Wadsworth was more concerned about whether individuals would create a financial 
burden on the Department. After satisfactory answers were received, a ‘withdrawal declaration’ 
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had to be signed. The full declaration read: “I hereby forfeit all Indian rights. I agree to leave the 
reserve, to give up any house and all other improvements which I may have on the reserve 
without compensation, also any cattle or any implements received by one as an individual or as a 
member of the Band.” 79  Never printed as an official form, Wadsworth’s draft declaration 
ultimately served as the legal document that withdrew an Indian from treaty. This was, in fact, 
what the agent used as a treaty withdrawal agreement for the remainder of the North-West scrip 
commissions – a hand-written note signed by the Indian agent. This is a curious contrast to the 
three-page application, formal affidavit, and witness declaration (all pre-printed forms) required 
to apply for scrip. It was also a stark contrast to the enfranchisement process, which required 
applicants to meet literacy, moral, and financial criteria. Even then, enfranchisement was granted 
only after a successful three-year probationary period.
80
    
The criteria to approve a withdrawal required a judgement too subjective to constitute a 
uniform policy, and as such, there was disagreement among the Indian Agents, the scrip 
commissioners, and Wadsworth over who should and should not be granted a discharge.
81
 
Wadsworth tended to grant discharges cautiously. However, the commissioners and the Indian 
agents more readily allowed treaty withdrawals. For instance, Goulet recommended withdrawals 
for treaty Indians who were considered “stragglers” – those who did not permanently reside on 
their designated reserve according to the Department.
82
 Either way, the debates over who should 
be withdrawn and who should not were really debates over racial ascription: who was Indian and 
who was Halfbreed. The difficulties commissioners and other officials had in deciding where to 
place mixed-ancestry Natives for the purposes of this policy were indicative of the ambiguity 
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that accompanied racial mixing everywhere. There was never an explicit set of criteria – legal, 
administrative, or otherwise – developed that would guide officials, nor could there be. Mixed-
ancestry Natives could not fit neatly into a racial binary, no matter what their ‘mode of life’ 
might be. 
Again, the government was not alone in directing this policy. Aboriginal people 
continued to live in accordance with their own cultural practices of identity formation. This 
became evident when, upon receiving a treaty withdrawal and scrip, individual Natives 
previously associated with a particular reserve continued to remain there, or tried to return after 
leaving treaty. But the permeability of the racial boundary that allowed treaty Indians to become 
scrip Halfbreeds did not always remain so. In several cases, there was no returning. One example 
demonstrates this point. A man, Thomas Bear, who was a Halfbreed in treaty in the Pas Agency 
in Manitoba and teacher at the Indian school, had withdrawn from treaty expecting to receive 
scrip. He did not, even though his sister did. He requested to be allowed to re-enter treaty, but the 
inspector would not allow it, “as he is quite able to support himself, and family, as a white man, 
and is inteligent [sic] enough to intitle [sic] him to all the privelages [sic] of a Canadian 
citizen.”83 From the government’s standpoint, Thomas Bear had successfully achieved the kind 
of transition to ‘ordinary citizen’ that they had hoped for. There was no reason for them to allow 
him to return to the reserve. The racial boundary had been clearly demonstrated, in this case, by 
attaining a standard of economic independence. 
By the time treaties were negotiated in the northern regions at the turn of the century, 
administrators demonstrated less concern with the struggle over racial ascription that had 
occupied them so much throughout the 1870s and 1880s. The evidence was increasingly difficult 
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to ignore: the boundary between Indian and Halfbreed had become permeable to the point of 
being meaningless. This was reflected in a new policy that saw scrip and treaty commissions 
acting in conjunction, thus avoiding the kinds of problems that plagued administrators in the 
1880s. Treaties Eight, Ten and Eleven in 1899, 1906, and 1921 respectively became intertwined 
with the scrip process. Scrip commissioners accompanied treaty commissioners and awarded 
scrip coupons on-site, or later in Treaty Ten, after receiving approval from the Minster of the 
Interior. 
Thus, a major change in perspective became evident by the 1890s. There was in many 
ways a reduction in the emphasis on ‘blood. Administrators began to look at status, either Indian 
or Halfbreed, as one defined by the nature of an individual’s relationship with the state. For 
instance, McKenna noted that: 
It has been the custom to recognize proof of part white blood and a discharge from 
Indian treaty, as constituting a right to scrip. I have taken it that every one, irrespective 
of the proportion of Indian blood which he may have, who enters treaty becomes an 
Indian in the eye of the law, and should, therefore, be treated as an Indian both by the 
Department of the Interior and the Department of Indian Affairs; and that when he is 
discharged from treaty he becomes an ordinary citizen of the country, having no claims 
as an aborignee [sic], all such claims having been extinguished by his accepting the 
benefits of an Indian Treaty up to the date at which he voluntarily surrendered them.
84
 
Those who were in treaty, then, were to be deemed Indians no matter what their ancestry. 
Increasingly, administrators were distinguishing between legal and racial designations. One did 
not necessarily equal the other. 
Despite the changing attitudes, the ambivalence about race continued and was reflected in 
a debate over ‘blood’ and lifestyle. McKenna noted in a 1901 letter to Clifford Sifton, then 
Minister of Interior and Superintendent General of Indian Affairs, that “if we make an admixture 
of white blood a ground of discharging and giving scrip, it will be hard to close the issue of scrip 
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for the great majority of those in treaty have white blood.”85 Contrarily, Indian Inspector Henry 
A. Conroy used a lifestyle criterion to grant scrip in 1905 to an applicant who, he stated never 
lived the “Indian life”.86 Yet, in 1909, he granted an applicant scrip even though he “lives the 
Indian mode of life.”87 In the latter case, he said that “the evidence shows that he is a halfbreed 
and entitled to scrip.” Neither the “evidence” nor the “Indian mode of life” was defined – a 
difficult, if not impossible, task. As McKenna noted in a letter to Sifton in 1903, “it is difficult to 
draw any line between the modes of life”.88 Yet, he referred to one particular treaty Indian as “a 
man one would never think of classing as an Indian.”89 ‘Mode of life,’ a vague and undefined 
descriptor for race, had been frequently employed and manipulated throughout the duration of 
the scrip policy in an attempt to negotiate the uncertainties of racial boundaries that policy 
necessitated. However, it ultimately confused the process of racial categorization and exposed 
the problematic nature of the process itself. 
The ambiguity of racial classifications and attempts to draw a line between ‘Indians’ and 
‘Halfbreeds’ demanded the department’s continual review of individual cases that perplexed 
decision-makers and exposed the underlying problems of racial classification. One particular 
case in 1903 exemplifies the point. Marie Rose Paul of Lesser Slave Lake applied for scrip. She 
identified herself as a Halfbreed to the commission, was married to a Halfbreed, but her father 
was a treaty Indian, though she never had taken that status. McKenna’s response was that “I 
cannot see how we can advisedly do otherwise than concur in Mr. Conroy’s classification of her 
and give her the benefit of the settlement as a Halfbreed.”90 Yet, according to the rules of the 
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Indian Act, she should have been classified as a status Indian. In this and similar ways, racial 
production and reproduction were ongoing processes in the context of Canadian colonialism. 
Also by the turn of the century, administrators had more clearly defined the legal status of 
Halfbreeds, even if they continued to struggle with the contradictions of race. From a legal 
standpoint, as McKenna noted in 1902, “when the Halfbreed title is extinguished, the Halfbreed 
family takes the status of ordinary citizens of the country.”91 Yet, as the twentieth century would 
demonstrate, they never really took their place as ‘ordinary citizens of the country,’ and instead, 
continued to battle various, even if subtle, forms of discrimination that would force the 
suppression of their Native identity. As with the recognition by census officials and Indian 
Affairs administrators, by the same period race became employed as a legal status. This, 
however, did little to cover the fact that administrators could do nothing to resolve the 
contradiction between a social reality that excluded mixed-ancestry Natives from the dominant 
culture, and an opposing legal reality which excluded them from being Indian. 
The relationship between Aboriginal title and Aboriginal status further demonstrates the 
problems of becoming ‘ordinary citizens. For Indians, their status is not tied to the 
extinguishment of their title: officially, they continued to be Indians after their title was 
extinguished, usually by treaty. Halfbreeds, on the other hand, lost their legal status upon the 
extinguishment of their title, achieved through scrip. Yet, the extinguishment of native title 
required administrators to affirm that they were native (Native title cannot be extinguished if one 
is not Native). As John R. Hall, secretary, noted in 1898, “It is solely because of his Indian blood 
that the right of the half-breed arises; but for this he would have no claim to be recognised. The 
Indian gives up his right for the benefits assured him by Treaty. If the Half-breed goes into 
Treaty he then loses his status as a Half-breed, becomes an Indian and has his claim satisfied in 
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that way. If he does not accept Treaty, his right – because of his Indian blood – is satisfied by an 
issue of scrip.”92  If Hall was aware of the contradiction, he did not flinch. Administrators 
staunchly defended their ideas of race, despite their ambiguity, with legal arguments that usually 
complicated already inconsistent definitions. The process of de-Indianization took place in 
Canada as part of this process that sought to separate racially ambiguous subjections from the 
‘clear’ category of Indian. Once that separation was complete, and once the racially ambiguous 
subjects were identified and defined as ‘Halfbreeds,’ policy created circumstances by which 
these mixed-ancestry Natives would no longer be Natives in an official capacity.
93
 
The division of mixed-ancestry Natives from ‘Indians’ has been a persistent one. If racial 
ambiguity was not enough to make the situation impossible, administrators were also juggling 
competing and contradictory concerns. They had to deal with the legal implications of their 
actions, not to mention the disparity between the objectives and directives of the department of 
Interior with the Department of Indian Affairs. Definitions of Halfbreed changed in accordance 
with personal views, policy and legal obligations, and regionally as different lifestyles altered 
views on racial classification. Miscommunications and disagreements between higher and lower 
officials also meant that government intentions were not always carried out to their fullest extent, 
if at all. 
Conclusion 
There is little consistency that can be drawn from Indian policy and its specific treatment 
of mixed ancestry Natives. However, a pattern does emerge in examining the official national 
discourse of mixed race over a longer period of time. Between the first Indian Act predecessor in 
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1850 and the end of scrip in 1921, the cumulative discourse about mixed-ancestry Natives 
suggests that a goal of Aboriginal policy was to separate and redefine mixed-ancestry Natives in 
line with the ‘colonizer’s model of the world,’ to use the words of anthropologist and geographer 
J.M. Blaut.
94
  On this point, administrators in Canada were most consistent, even if they 
oscillated between categorizing mixed-ancestry Natives as ‘white’ and as ‘Indian. But even more 
so, this process exemplified a commitment to continuing segregation, even if that operated 
simultaneously with and in contrast to stated goals of assimilation. Canada was not necessarily 
always trying to eliminate Indians: it was trying to eliminate racial ambiguity. Some policy 
makers could conceive of an ethnic category that did not constitute one of those two sides of the 
racial binary but they could not recognize mixed-ancestry Natives as anything more than a 
transitional category between two ‘real’ and permanent ones. Certainly, policy expressed 
ambiguity and, over time, demonstrated a fundamental incompatibility of a fluid and varied 
population of mixed-ancestry Natives that would not fit neatly into racially determined 
categories, no matter how hard administrators tried.  
In contemporary Canada, there is a clear divide between ‘Indian’ and ‘Métis’ in both a 
cultural and a legal context. Legislation, the courts, and even the constitution have clarified this 
division and, since the 1880s, the Indian Act has prohibited individuals legally identifying as 
both. Aboriginal political organizations observe this division as well. However, while naturalized 
in a contemporary context, it is a relatively recent phenomenon and one that has been 
intentionally imposed through law. While Métis and First Nations have always been culturally 
distinct in some sense, this was not the case for all mixed-ancestry Natives, and this was not the 
case for legal identities. In fact, it has been through Aboriginal policies that this division has 
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been made. Tracing the evolution of how this division occurred in law allows us to evidence the 
discourse on racial mixing and hybridity throughout the kinds of laws and policies we thought 
we knew so well as ‘Indian’ policy. 
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Chapter 5 - US: Measuring Blood 
On the morning of May 5
th
 in 1910, Osage Council Secretary Harry Kohpay stood in 
front of the House Committee on Enrollment during the initial phases of the Osage allotment 
hearings. The committee had been debating the addition of some 37 people to the Osage roll, an 
investigation which had been going on intermittently since 1896. The Osage council objected to 
these additions, and Kohpay along with other members of the tribal council were invited to 
present their case. Kohpay expressed his disapproval over the government’s attempt to decide 
tribal membership: 
It is amusing to see and hear the arguments made before the Indian committees of both 
Houses of Congress, by the attorneys, ex-Indian agents, ex-government doctors, etc., 
representing the applications; their untiring efforts to unearth something to convince 
you gentlemen that they know who belong on the Osage rolls, because of their 
knowledge of the records and using the knowledge of the Indians that they have gained 
while they were in the service pretending to protect the interests of such Indians.
1
 
The issue here was membership – especially the membership of mixed-ancestry Natives. As was 
common practice during the allotment era, officials created a roll for the purposes of verifying 
eligibility for allotment: those on the roll were eligible for an allotment (and thus, federally 
recognized Indians); those not, were ineligible. This system was intended to simplify the 
allotment process, to help protect against fraud, and to ensure a fair standard was in place –
principles which were just as quickly transgressed as they were conceived – since so much was 
at stake. The value of land had continued to increase and the prospect of fraud and speculation, 
with it.
2
 Reservation allotments had been particularly susceptible as individuals outside of the 
tribal community made claims on tribal lands to which they were not entitled. Tribal councils 
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raised formal objections to what they believed were the mistaken, and sometimes even 
fraudulent, inclusion of individuals who were not part of the tribe. In almost all cases, the 
contested individuals were of mixed ancestry. This is precisely what had happened with the 
Osage, and why Kohpay stood in front of the committee.  
 But the Osage, as Kohpay went on to explain, had (and have) their own system for 
identifying members, one which would allow them to recognize each other even after years of 
separation. The Osage system of identity was based on a bifurcated community: two villages, 
each with seven subdivisions or ‘lodges. Children were named in accordance to the village and 
lodge in which they were born. All male children of each lodge were named from a limited set of 
names, as were females. Thus, there were only twenty-eight groups of birth names for the entire 
community.
3
 Accordingly, individuals could confirm their rightful membership in the Osage 
community by simply recalling their birth names. As Kohpay explained to the committee, this 
system served as the real proof of Osage membership: not blood quantum, and not appearance on 
tribal rolls or in other government documents.
4
 For the Osage and other tribes, these were not 
debates over racial purity or blood quantum, as they were for government officials. Membership 
was not a matter of race or biology: it was a birthright verified by a formal kinship system. 
Consequently, ‘mixed blood’ was not a consideration in the determination of membership; it was 
not in itself a cause for inclusion in or exclusion from the community.  
Government officials did not share this view. Race, instead, was something that was 
identifiable by ‘blood’ and verifiable by documentation, the equivalent of scientific proof for a 
bureaucratic system that required recordable evidence just as the scientists studying race did. It 
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 147 
 
could exist in parts – in quantum – and it did matter. It could mean a positive inclusion (the 
presence of Indian blood in any capacity was proof of Aboriginality) or a negative exclusion (the 
lack of enough Indian blood meant an individual was not a ‘real’ Indian). Furthermore, it could 
be proven or verified with documentation, usually by the previous inclusion on tribal rolls, or 
descent from those named on those original rolls. Consequently, an individual of tribal ancestry 
could, from the commissioners’ perspective, claim a right to membership even without having 
lived with the tribe or having any association with, social ties to, or acceptance from the tribe. 
Indeed, the descendants of members who had left the tribe decades ago could come to claim an 
allotment. Essentially, the debate between government officials and tribal authorities was a 
matter of biology versus culture. 
In short, there was no method for dealing with hybridity in a binarized system. The 
debates that ensued from these challenges and the process of establishing legally recognized 
membership criteria were not simply indicators of disagreements between government officials 
and tribal authorities over how membership should be decided or who had the authority to do so, 
although this was certainly a factor. They were also indicators of the ‘problem of mixed-race’; 
that is, the destabilizing effect that mixed-ancestry Natives had on racial categories. The debates 
also demonstrated the dilemma of race faced by officials as they increasingly assumed power 
over tribal membership: the ‘mixing’ that existed in tribes and larger society, managed with 
kinship-based identity-constructions, created ambiguity for government officials and the legal 
categories they were attempting to apply. Officials were unwilling or unable to negotiate the 
discrepancies between Indigenous systems and race-based government policies. Between 1887 
and 1934, this dilemma manifested itself in Native American policy in two ways: in the power 
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struggle between tribal and government officials over membership; and as the production of a 
mixed-race discourse which demonstrated the increasing concern over racial ambiguity.  
As in Canada, the desire to eliminate this racial ambiguity drove Native American policy 
just as much as the goal of assimilation and the pragmatic concerns to free up land. Throughout 
the nineteenth century, federal authorities in the US worked to gradually redefine the terms of 
tribal citizenship by replacing kinship systems with race-as-biology structures and to develop 
legal definitions of ‘mixed blood.  Although they were not entirely successful until 1934 when 
blood quantum was officially and uniformly enacted, the battle was in actuality waged in the 
decades prior. By mere practice, if not by actual definition, tribes exercised self-government and 
sovereignty rights during the treaty era by deciding their own memberships.
5
 Significantly, this 
meant that legal definitions of ‘Indian’ or ‘mixed blood’ were unnecessary. Governments had 
fairly consistently (though not entirely without exception) recognized the tribal control over their 
membership, which included mixed-blood individuals, but then attempted to usurp that authority 
in the allotment era. Understanding the emergence of blood quantum criteria and the mixed-race 
discourse that accompanied it in the late nineteenth century, then, requires an understanding of 
the relationship between Indigenous peoples and the American state in the early nineteenth 
century, and thus begins with treaties.  
Treaties 
In all, there were close to 400 treaties and agreements in the US. Relatively few of them 
explicitly acknowledged mixed-ancestry Natives, but they are important because of the sense 
they give about the place of mixed-ancestry Natives in treaties and communities by both tribal 
and government authorities. There are two important considerations about these treaties. The first 
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speaks to the fur trade geography. Historians have long made the argument that the fur trade has 
produced new and distinct identities, though admittedly not all resulted in ethnogenesis as did the 
Canadian Métis. Nonetheless, the fur trade produced pockets of mixed-ancestry groups with their 
own unique identities, separate from their parent tribes, though still related. Accordingly, the 
treaties which acknowledged mixed-ancestry Natives as groups separate from the tribe reflected 
the geography of the fur trade and the identities it produced. It is not surprising then that the bulk 
of the treaties which explicitly included concessions for mixed-ancestry Natives occurred in what 
were, historically, fur-trade areas: the Great Lakes region, the Midwest and Montana.  
The second interesting point stemming from the treaties is the silence in the vast majority 
of them about mixed-ancestry Natives. In the text of most treaties, mixed-ancestry Natives were 
not mentioned or singled out. However, the absence of any reference to mixed-ancestry Natives 
in the bulk of treaties and agreements does not preclude their presence in those tribes. As many 
officials noted, mixed-ancestry Natives within tribes were common. Francis A. Walker, who 
served as Indian Affairs Superintendent in the 1870s, commented on these demographics. He 
noted that “Half-breeds, bearing the names of French, English, and American employees of fur 
and trading companies, or of refugees from criminal justice ‘in the settlements,’ are to be found 
in almost every tribe and band, however distant.”6 But because blood quantum was not a major 
determining membership criterion for most tribes, and because tribes controlled their own 
membership during this period, the presence of mixed-ancestry Natives did not always warrant 
discussion among treaty commissioners – an apt example of ‘silent archives. And where there 
was discussion, treaty records show no indication that officials contested the requests of chiefs to 
include mixed-ancestry Natives.  
                                                          
6 Francis Amasa Walker, The Indian Question (Boston: J.R. Osgood and Co., 1874): 96. 
 150 
 
The widespread presence of mixed-ancestry Natives as tribal members is also well 
supported by agency statistics later in the post-treaty period. Numerous reports from agents 
across the country demonstrated, either formally through detailed census counts or informally 
through general tallies, that mixed-ancestry Natives were present among tribes. This presence is 
recorded, not only in ‘expected’ places, like areas of intense fur trade activity throughout the 
Great Lakes and Midwest, but also in other locations, like Oregon, Oklahoma,  Kansas, 
Nebraska, and Iowa, places where treaties had not explicitly acknowledged their presence. 
Census information, however, is highly inconsistent among agencies across both time and space, 
and one can often glean only a general sense, not specific details. Some agents offered detailed 
counts, including an individual breakdown of each person’s blood quantum, gender, and age, 
while others offered only final tallies, without any detail. The interesting point, then, is not that 
mixed-ancestry Natives existed, but that they were not always singled out or distinguished from 
other tribal members by government officials.
7
 As would be evidenced by specific treaty terms, 
mixed-ancestry Natives could occupy a range of identities based on their cultural affiliations, 
lifestyle choices, and kinship ties. This would be contrasted in the allotment era by the 
application of a stricter biological criterion by government officials. 
Those treaties that do explicitly acknowledge mixed-ancestry Natives tell us much about 
how both tribes and government officials thought about mixed-ancestry Natives. They also 
suggest some important conclusions about mixed-ancestry Natives, identity, and belonging. First, 
tribes retained authority over membership. Although government officials expressed their own 
opinions about eligibility, and even attempted in some cases to assert their views, tribes’ 
decisions were for the most part respected. Second, the maintenance of tribal relations through 
kinship, residence, or even geographic proximity determined membership and thus, rights to 
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inclusion in treaties. Third, race alone was not a reason for exclusion as far as tribes were 
concerned: mixed-ancestry Natives could be considered equal parts of the tribe just as they could 
be considered distant and unequal relations with limited, finite rights to tribal property and 
assets. Finally, while government officials generally observed the terms of tribal membership 
criteria, race still mattered. In fact, officials attempted to introduce an early form of the blood 
quantum rules that would later make up the basis of legal identity in the post-1934 period. The 
differences between how government officials viewed identity and how Aboriginal people 
viewed identity would be highlighted by debates over eligibility. It is in this way that the 
tensions over an official mixed-ancestry Native identity first emerged.  
That race alone was not the sole criterion for membership is indicated by the varying 
degrees to which tribes included their mixed-ancestry Native kin. Inclusion was not uniform, just 
as mixed-ancestry Natives themselves were not homogenous as a group. In fact, tribes 
distinguished among their mixed-ancestry Native kin, demonstrated by the diversity of relations 
and categorization of them in the various treaty concessions. There were roughly three ways in 
which mixed-ancestry Natives might be included in treaties and agreements: as full members, 
equal with ‘full bloods’; as a separate, distinguishable group with reduced concessions; and as 
individuals, who might either have some relation to the tribe, or to whom debts, 
acknowledgements, or gratitude were owed. In all three situations, though, inclusion came at the 
request of tribal authorities, and was approved. This is what makes US treaties and agreements 
such a contrast to Canadian ones: the demands and wishes of tribal authorities regarding mixed-
ancestry Natives were respected and granted.  
Government officials, too, might differentiate among various mixed-ancestry Native 
groups, but with a different set of criteria. Ottawa and Chippewa treaties around the Great Lakes 
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offer some of the earliest indications about the role mixed-ancestry Natives would play in policy 
and the contrasting ways in which government and tribal officials would view that role. The 
1836 treaty is particularly significant, not only as one of the earlier major land cession treaties 
with the US, but also as one of the first treaties to explicitly include concessions for mixed-
ancestry Natives. In this case, their “half-breed relatives” were to receive a cash payment from a 
$150,000 fund for their share in the rights of the land being ceded to the United States.
8
 That 
payment was to be divided among those eligible according to their degree of relationship with 
the tribe. 
The challenges commissioners would face with this distribution and with determining 
eligibility were two-fold. First, commissioners needed to distinguish the eligible from the 
ineligible. Fraudulent claims by individuals not actually related to the tribe or resident in the 
territory were a major concern for the commissioners. There needed to be measures taken to 
protect lands from fraudulent claims, but there also needed to be a system to ensure everyone 
was properly counted – the second problem commissioners encountered. The half-breed payment 
was a one-time concession, and individual payments were calculated by dividing the number 
who were eligible by the total amount of the fund. If someone missed the census count, there 
would be no recourse or remedy: once the fund was spent, there could be no concession. In 
addition, officials sometimes distinguished a confusing array of half-breed ‘classes’ based on 
blood quantum. Instructions from C.A. Harris, then Commissioner of Indian Affairs, to treaty 
commissioner John W. Edmonds indicated that half-breeds were to be divided into three classes, 
one-quarter, one-half, and three-quarters respectively. Payments would be calculated 
accordingly: the more ‘Indian blood,’ the higher the payment. However, the Chippewa objected. 
Not all mixed-ancestry Natives were, from their perspective, eligible to share in the benefits of 
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the land sale. Instead, eligibility required tribal connections and, as the text of the treaty noted, 
residency: eligible members had to be living within the boundaries of the ceded lands. As 
Edmonds soon found out, the Chippewa understanding of half-breed “included those who were 
akin to the Indians and who had descended in part from white ancestry.”  Edmonds did not agree. 
Concerned that fraudulent claims would be made by anyone claiming Indian ancestry, he decided 
to admit only those “one of whose parents or grand parents was of pure Indian blood.”9 
In his negotiations with the Chippewa, Edmonds began to recognize the difference 
between government and tribal views of race and membership. The government’s view of race as 
something to be determined by blood quantum stood in stark contrast to a tribal view where the 
importance of family connections and tribal association determined membership and belonging – 
what the Indians had meant when they referred to individuals as “akin.”  It quickly became 
apparent to Edmonds that half-breeds could just as easily reside among the Chippewa and be 
considered full members of the tribes as they could adopt a ‘white, civilized’ lifestyle. This 
translated into policy considerations. The differing classes in which half-breeds were to be 
categorized were redefined to reflect their connection to the Chippewa. As Edmonds explained to 
Harris, “Those who were ‘held in highest consideration by the Indians,’ who had ‘the greatest 
capacity to use and take care of property and consequently the most power to aid their Indian 
connexions’ were to constitute the first Class – those less so the second Class, those least so, the 
third Class.”10 Whereas these classes had originally been constructed based on blood quantum, 
they now became based on degree of relationship – a decision in which the respective chiefs 
would be instrumental. This treaty would serve as a precedent for others. 
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The issue over “classes” of mixed-ancestry Natives was widely contested and far from 
decided. Despite the conclusions that Edmonds reached, the idea of blood quantum never 
entirely disappeared. The practice of dividing mixed-ancestry Natives into classes based on their 
blood quantum was the topic of much debate in Congress over the next few years – a crucial and 
busy time in treaty-making. Particularly as commissioners worked their way through the Great 
Lakes tribes, the issue repeatedly presented itself. Commissioners continued to contemplate 
awarding treaty concessions based on the blood quantum of mixed-ancestry Natives who might 
be considered entitled. For instance, a similar division was made for the distribution of a cash 
fund to half breeds related to the Winnebago in the 1837 treaty. As with the Chippewa, 
commissioners also initially divided the group into three classes for this purpose.
11
 But, as Indian 
Agent General Joseph M. Street noted in 1838, this kind of schema was never the intention of 
either Native Americans or government officials: 
The only question that could arise under the treaty was between the amounts to be 
granted to half and quarter breeds: whether half-breeds should draw the same as quarter-
breeds, or if half breeds would not be entitled to full shares, and quarter-breeds to half 
shares. But no one, from reading the treaty, will say that the commissioners, or the 
Indians who made the treaty, intended any thing but the equal division amongst all their 
relations not further off than quarter-blood, of $100,000, share and share alike. The 
idea of any classification of the relations was never thought of by the Indians; and a 
classification which has grown out of this measure, giving to a quarter-blood a full 
share, and to a half-blood less than half the amount given to the quarter, is monstrous; 
and to the Indians, especially those who make the treaty, unsatisfactory.
12
 
Kinship was acknowledged as the determining factor in the end, but the language of race and 
blood quantum had continued to frame a counter ideology that would only grow over the next 
few decades. 
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Although the matter would never really be laid to rest, Attorney-General Caleb Cushing 
rendered an opinion in 1856 – the closest thing to a uniform policy the BIA would see until 
1934. According to the Secretary of Interior’s report of the matter in 1890, Cushing held that 
“Half-breed Indians were to be treated as Indians in all respects, so long as they retained their 
tribal relations; that when the question of mixed blood arose there was no intrinsic precision in 
the expression ‘a white man,’ and referred to the fact that there were men of indubitable 
citizenship in various parts of the country who had Indian blood in their veins.”13 With some 
exceptions aside, then, Aboriginal determinations of identity based on their kinship ideologies 
would remain the dominant factor in determining eligibility. The matter was never really 
resolved for government officials, but the American custom of dealing with tribes as nations 
persisted throughout the treaty era. So, even though blood quantum was seeping its way into 
policy, it did not yet override the tribe’s authority over its own membership. Kinship trumped 
race, and the final decision about eligibility came down to residency and tribal relations.  
Later Chippewa treaties reflected the resolutions worked out in 1836. Both the unratified 
1863 and ratified 1864 Chippewa treaties granted land scrip to any mixed-blood “who is related 
by blood to the said Chippewas of the said Red Lake or Pembina bands who has adopted the 
habits and customs of civilized life, and who is a citizen of the United States, a homestead of 160 
acres of land.”14 This treaty reflected the acknowledgement of Chippewa systems of identity: 
those mixed-ancestry Natives living among the tribe would be considered full members, while 
those living separately and not part of the Chippewa culture would receive a limited, finite form 
of compensation. They would not be eligible for further consideration in tribal interests, thus 
officially severing their connection to the tribe. 
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Other treaties followed suit, though the terms for mixed-ancestry Natives might vary. 
Concessions might include compensation in the form of cash or an allotment of land, either title 
to lands they already occupied or new allotments in the form of scrip. As with the allotments in 
the 1836 Sauk and Fox treaty, individual mixed-ancestry Natives would receive an allotment of 
land in tribal territory, but outside of the main reserve. Similar concessions for mixed-ancestry 
Natives could be seen in an 1859 treaty with the Kansa tribe. Article 9 granted 40-acre 
allotments to “the children of their half-breed relatives.”15 Significantly, those lands would not 
be alienable: like other Indian lands, they could only be disposed of to the US federal 
government or revert back to the tribe. Treaty concessions to mixed-ancestry members of the 
tribe would be awarded as long as the members remained part of the tribe, and as long as the land 
would always remain ‘Indian’ land or tribal property. In other words, those who separated 
themselves physically or culturally from the tribal entity lost their claim to its property.  
Another situation of allotment concessions, in this case, land, to mixed-ancestry Natives 
occurred in the 1865 Osage Treaty. Article 14 held that “the half-breeds of the Osage tribe of 
Indians, not to exceed twenty-five in number, who have improvements on the north half of the 
lands sold to the United States, shall have a patent issued to them, in fee simple, for eighty acres 
each, to include, as far as practicable, their improvements, said half-breeds to be designated by 
the chiefs and head-men of the tribe.” 16  As had become common practice, it was tribal 
authorities, not government officials, who decided which mixed-ancestry Natives should be 
granted treaty concessions.  
Land was not the only way to acknowledge kinship ties in treaties: money was also 
awarded to mixed-ancestry Natives. An 1842 Chippewa treaty in Wisconsin set aside $15,000 to 
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be divided among “their half breed relatives.”17 Another 1836 treaty also set aside money for 
mixed-ancestry Natives associated with the Ottawa tribe. Article 6 of the Treaty with the Ottawa 
held that $150,000 would be set aside as a fund for mixed-ancestry Natives in lieu of a separate 
reservation. The article also noted that “no person shall be entitled to any part of said fund, 
unless he is of Indian descent and actually resident within the boundaries described in the first 
article of this treaty,”18  suggesting that proximity to tribal territory was a criterion of eligibility. 
As with earlier treaties, officials continued to note how relations with the tribe could vary, and 
awarded treaty concessions relative to that relationship. Here, the terms stated that, “The 
commissioner shall call upon the Indian chiefs to designate, if they require it, three classes of 
these claimants, the first of which, shall receive one-half more than the second, and the second, 
double the third. Each man woman and child shall be enumerated, and an equal share, in the 
respective classes, shall be allowed to each.”  
The acknowledgement of mixed-ancestry Natives in treaties by their tribal relatives was 
not always a recognition of their membership, and further suggests that ’blood’ did not guarantee 
membership. Several treaties granted concessions to individuals who may have been related by 
blood, but not considered eligible tribal members. For instance, an 1836 Ottawa treaty granted a 
provision of money ($48,148) to specific individuals of mixed ancestry as an expression of 
gratitude, not of legal entitlement. Article 9 of the treaty noted that, “Whereas the Ottawas and 
Chippewas, feeling a strong consideration for aid rendered by certain of their half-breeds on 
Grand River, and other parts of the country ceded, and wishing to testify their gratitude on the 
present occasion, have assigned such individuals certain locations of land, and united in a strong 
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appeal for the allowance of the same in this treaty.”19 It was also stipulated that this latter class 
(the individuals mentioned in Article 9) would have no further claim to tribal assets, including 
funds or reservation lands. Thus, these individuals were not really considered legitimate 
members of the tribe, though there may well have been a distant kinship tie. The same scenario 
was repeated in the 1860s among the Osage. Concessions to individual mixed-ancestry Natives 
as shows of gratitude were included in the 1865 treaty. Article 6 stipulated that one particular 
mixed-ancestry Native, Charles Mograin, would be offered one section of land “in consideration 
of the long and faithful services rendered” by him.20 Mograin had, it seems, lived with the tribe 
for some time, congruent to their lands. In another example, two adult mixed-ancestry Natives 
were granted 640 acres of land each by the terms of the 1861 Arapaho and Cheyenne treaty in 
Kansas Territory.
21
 An 1854 Omaha treaty granted $1000 to a half-breed, Lewis Sounsosee, for a 
debt the tribe had not been able to pay.
22
 There were a number of circumstances, then, under 
which mixed-ancestry Natives might be included in a treaty. Those circumstances were clearly 
dictated by tribal authorities, not government officials. Furthermore, those varying circumstances 
under which mixed-ancestry Natives were included demonstrate that their membership was 
determined by factors outside of their racial composition.  
Another way in which mixed-ancestry Natives might be acknowledged is through 
concessions made especially for mixed-ancestry children. For instance, an 1836 treaty with the 
Sauk and Fox ceded lands in Missouri. The treaty made specific provisions for seven individuals 
who had mixed-blood children. Each received $1000 “for the use and benefit” of their children. 
The money was to be set aside so that the money and interest from it could “be expended for the 
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benefit of the children as said agent shall deem proper and necessary” when they turned twenty.23 
Such concessions might then be considered an acknowledgement of some small, limited interest 
in the tribe, although the terms resembled an inheritance more than a right.  
However, mixed-ancestry Natives could also be counted as equal members of the tribe, as 
can be seen in both the 1868 Crow treaty in Montana and the 1868 Gros Ventres treaty. They 
both included the same clause for mixed-ancestry Natives which read: “The half-breeds of said 
tribe shall share equally per capita with the Indians aforementioned in the distribution of annuity 
goods, and that the said tribe of Indians shall have the right to select and appoint a proper and 
suitable person to assist in the distribution of annuity goods, and see that they are distributed 
fairly and equally.”24 This placed mixed-ancestry Natives on equal footing with other tribal 
members – not entirely uncommon, but not always explicitly acknowledged in the text of 
treaties. One, then, did not require a certain blood quantum to be considered a tribal member or 
to share equally in the tribe’s property. 
As became increasingly evident in the treaty stipulations, residence was just as important 
as kinship, for both Aboriginals and government. In many treaties where scrip was offered to 
mixed-bloods as their compensation, only those living in or near the tribe were considered 
eligible. A typical example in this regard is the 1854 Chippewa treaty of Lake Superior. In that 
treaty, mixed bloods were considered part of the tribe, albeit somewhat separately from tribal 
members. They received compensation in the form of scrip (80 acres), although this was not 
settled until some years later.
25
 In the process of administering the scrip, though, administrators 
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asked questions about eligibility that were similar to the kinds of questions encountered by 
Canadian scrip commissioners on late nineteenth-century prairies. In the end, the Indian Office 
decided that the terms or definitions should not be strictly adhered to.  
There were other instances when residency was used as a criterion for participation in 
tribal treaty rights. One such example was the 1867 Chippewa treaty. Article 4 stipulated that 
“no part of the annuities provided for in this or any former treaty with the Chippewas of the 
Mississippi bands shall be paid to any half-breed or mixed-blood, except those who actually live 
with their people upon one of the reservations belonging to the Chippewa Indians.”26 The 1858 
Treaty with the Ponca made a similar stipulation, and even specifically articulated that those who 
left the tribe would receive limited concessions: 
The Poncas being desirous of making provision for their half-breed relatives, it is 
agreed that those who prefer and elect to reside among them shall be permitted to do so, 
and be entitled to and enjoy all the rights and privileges of members of the tribe; but to 
those who have chosen and left the tribe to reside among the whites and follow the 
pursuits of civilized life, vis: [lists 8 people], there shall be issued scrip for 160 acres of 
land each, which shall be receivable at the United States land offices in the same 
manner, and be subject to the same rules and regulations as military bounty-land 
warrants.
27
   
Like similar treaties, this clause suggested that those who were offered scrip or allotment were 
not part of the tribe proper, while those who resided directly with the tribe were. Yet, the Poncas 
explained it a bit differently: “there are the half-breeds, about 100 in number, who we view to be 
the same as ourselves, and we want to give each a liberal allowance of land. They have rendered 
us many favors, and are always doing something to serve us, but we have nothing to pay them; 
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and we therefore want you to do it.”28 The combination of gratitude, kinship, and residence, then, 
could constitute one’s participation in treaty provisions. But race was not, according to tribal 
authorities, one of those conditions.  
None of this, though, precludes the importance of race for government officials. Even 
though tribes determined their own membershipIndeed, race as a distinguishing factor among 
groups or individuals was evident even throughout the treaty process. An early form of blood 
quantum, albeit less strict than the 1934 act would establish, was introduced during the treaty era, 
confirming that concerns about race were already present in the first half of the nineteenth 
century, even if underdeveloped. A one-quarter blood quantum was set as the minimum required 
to participate in the treaty process. Instructions from Harris for the 1838 negotiation of a treaty 
with the Sioux at Prairie du Chien demonstrate this point: 
The first inquiry will therefore be, who are these parties? And, in determining this 
question, you will have regard to the information you may receive from the agent, the 
chiefs, and other persons worthy of confidence, who, from their long residence in the 
country, have had means of forming opinions on the subject. The next step will be to 
obtain an accurate list of all the relatives of these parties, who have not less than one 
quarter of Sioux blood. You will receive the applications of all who may deem 
themselves entitled; and, to satisfy themselves of their right to be admitted, it will be 
necessary to have recourse to the statements of the chiefs. These should be made 
publicly, and, if not controverted or disproved, they will be considered conclusive.
29
 
Harris was not alone in his opinion. Debates over the inclusion of mixed-ancestry Natives in 
treaties were contemplated based on the degree of relationship to tribes, or, in later terms, blood 
quantum. The same year, General Street noted that, “In the case of the half and quarter breeds, ... 
it must alone depend, under the treaty, upon one simple fact – whether they were related to the 
Winnigagoes as near as half and quarter blood?  If they were, they were entitled to a share; if not, 
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they ought to be wholly excluded.”30 So, while they distinguished between ‘full bloods’ and 
‘mixed bloods,’ this usually did not translate into a difference in legal status.  
 However they were determined, government officials still often considered mixed-
ancestry Natives as separate from other members of the tribe, and their eligibility or entitlement 
to compensation was limited. Treaties demonstrated, then, that mixed-ancestry Natives were not 
homogenous and could have varying degrees of connection to the tribe, even though the degree 
of connection did not always correlate with government’s racial views. They also show that it 
was tribes who made those decisions about status, based on criteria like kinship and residency. 
For government officials, though, this status was ambiguous, and in fact would be a source of 
debate later on during the allotment era when officials were trying to establish the rights of the 
descendants of the mixed-ancestry Natives included in treaties. 
Allotment, Tribal Rolls, and Blood Quantum 
Two significant simultaneous shifts took place leading up to the allotment era, both of 
which would have major implications for mixed-ancestry Natives. First, government officials 
began raising more serious concerns about mixed-ancestry Natives, their legal status, and their 
place in the racial order. This happened on both a policy level and on an ideological one. In 
practice, officials began having to deal with individuals, as the changing nature of policy 
dictated, and thus, with individual identities. But intellectually, developing ideas about hybridity 
and racial mixing in science were having a trickling down effect, and the scientific debates were 
paralleled in government debates over policy towards mixed-ancestry Natives. Second, 
government officials began infringing upon tribal authority over membership, and increasingly 
inserted their own views in determining which mixed-ancestry Natives should and should not be 
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included on the tribal rolls. Consequently, treaty-era concerns about race and racial mixing did 
not appear as part of policy and practice until the allotment era. 
Apprehension over mixed-race identity occurred on a few fronts. First was the emergence 
of an expressly ambiguous discourse about mixed-ancestry Natives. Officials demonstrated an 
increasing uncertainty as to how to define mixed-ancestry Natives and their place in policy. 
Second, while ‘mixed bloods’ remained ‘Indians’ for the most part in terms of their legal status, 
they were separated by virtue of their ‘competency’ – a term that indicated an individual’s ability 
to manage his or her own affairs. Finally, officials increasingly used blood quantum in attempts 
to formalize the process of dividing Indians from citizens. Over the five decades that spanned the 
allotment era, blood quantum would be developed more fully into the strict legal concept it 
would become in 1934. The legal status of mixed-ancestry Natives would thus be permanently 
fixed. 
The Practice of Allotment 
  The 1871 Indian Appropriation Act marked an important juncture in how ideas of race 
could insert themselves into policy decisions. The act stipulated that tribes were no longer 
viewed as nations. Thus, the capacity tribal authorities had during the treaty era to control their 
own membership was vastly reduced. According to well-known Native policy historian, Francis 
Paul Prucha, reformers increasingly rejected internal tribal sovereignty following the Civil War. 
They insisted that assimilation could not be achieved unless Indians came under US law. As part 
of achieving that objective, the 1871 law declared that Indians would no longer be recognized as 
nations, meaning that tribal members would fall under the US laws from which they had 
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previously been immune.
31
 The 1871 act would do more than that, though. It would have 
implications for tribal authority over its citizenship, and thus, over mixed-ancestry Natives.
32
  
These changes would pave the way for the allotment acts which unilaterally imposed the 
subdivision of land in severalty, with or without tribal consent. It would also initiate the process 
by which government officials would attempt to usurp tribal authority over membership and 
especially over mixed-ancestry Natives. The major pieces of legislation which enacted the 
allotment policy – the Dawes Act of 1887, its extension in 1889 and 1898 to Minnesota and the 
Five Tribes, respectively, and amendments in 1901, 1906 (the Burke Act), and 1908 (the Curtis 
Act) – did not indicate any serious contemplation of racial composition in their texts.33 They 
were all brief pieces of legislation, at least in comparison to Canada’s Indian Act, and, for the 
most part, simply authorized the allotment of Indian land. They did not determine the parameters 
of eligibility. Instead, much like Canada’s scrip policy, eligibility and the meaning of mixed-race 
that it reflected were worked out in policy and practice.
34
 
Just as Canadian commissioners struggled over who was ‘mixed race’ in the scrip policy, 
American commissioners struggled with this question in the allotment policy. Commissions were 
dispatched to create rolls, or membership records, which would determine one’s eligibility for 
allotment: tribal enrollment meant eligibility. Most individuals were entered on the rolls without 
dispute or contestation. However, for those who had difficulties proving their ancestry and 
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whose membership was contested by either tribal authorities or other members, the process was 
more complicated. Hearings were called to resolve disputes and disagreements over the 
commission’s determination of the rolls, or to investigate irregularities or problems in the 
allotment process. It was often the contested position of mixed-bloods in terms of their rights and 
membership that provided the impetus to such hearings. One of two scenarios presented 
themselves as sources of contestation: either a mixed-ancestry Native had been excluded by 
commissioners against his or her wishes; or a mixed-ancestry Native had been included on the 
rolls contrary to the opinion of tribal authorities. Consequently, a mixed-race discourse was 
articulated in the process of creating official tribal rolls in order to determine who was eligible 
for allotment. 
Rise of Racial Ambiguity 
While the allotment policy would prove to be the central site of mixed-race discourse, 
ambiguity about mixed-ancestry Natives had been growing apparent in the few years prior to 
1887. Increased comments about mixed-ancestry Natives, especially in the BIA’s Annual 
reports, suggested that concerns about racial mixing were on the rise. From the 1880s on, agents, 
commissioners, and other officials increasingly commented on the presence and status of mixed-
ancestry Natives, comments comparatively rare or absent from the record prior to that time. 
Contrary to the popular belief that US policy makers saw mixed-ancestry Natives as the route to 
Indian assimilation, many agents actually believed that mixed-ancestry Natives were a negative 
influence on reserves. Reflecting one of the major nineteenth-century theories on hybridity,
35
 one 
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agent noted that “The half-breeds have all the bad elements of the white man and Indian 
combined.”36 It was not an uncommon opinion: members of both the government and the public 
believed in the theory that miscegenation resulted in degeneracy and moral decay. Many agents 
felt that mixed-ancestry Natives were a detriment to their efforts at assimilation, and that like 
some whites, unscrupulous mixed-ancestry Natives would take advantage of “the heathen Indian 
[who] falls an easy victim to their superior cunning in trade and traffic.”37 
Other agents were more in line with the equally popularly held notions that mixed-
ancestry Natives were a positive force. One agent in Oregon commented that “As those mixed-
bloods are nearly all white and have been raised in a civilized manner like whites, they are in one 
sense a good acquisition, as they show to the full-bloods what can be done with good land, such 
as there is here, and how easy it is to make a good living entirely independent of everything.”38 
Mixed-ancestry Natives were often seen as more progressive, more successful in agriculture, and 
more able to adopt the customs of civilization – like Christianity and formal education.39 But on 
this there was no consensus: agents could not agree on mixed-ancestry Natives anymore than 
could nineteenth-century scientists and anthropologists. 
Comments like these were but signals of what was to come. The challenges of sorting out 
so-called mixed from full bloods that would accompany the allotment policy began with the 
Chippewa at White Earth – one of the first recipients of the allotment policy. Government 
officials called in experts to determine blood quantum when it became evident that fraud was 
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likely taking place.
40
 At White Earth several individuals had received allotments who, according 
to the tribal authorities, were not Chippewa and not eligible to receive an allotment. A number of 
fraud cases heard between 1906 and 1915 were meant to determine the legal and racial status of 
those mixed-ancestry Natives who had received allotments. Experts, including anthropologist 
Albert Jenks, medical doctor James Woodward, and Smithsonian curator and physical 
anthropologist Dr. Ales Hrdlicka all served in determining race and racial quantum, either as 
consultants for the Department of Justice or expert witnesses in the fraud cases. 
The central issue of these cases was whether or not allottees were eligible under law to 
sell their allotments. Under US law, minors and legally-recognized Indians were technically 
wards of the state and thus prohibited from conducting land sales without departmental approval. 
On the other hand, individuals of mixed ancestry who had been deemed ‘competent’ by virtue of 
their ‘white blood’ were considered legally capable and could sell their lands. Therefore, in order 
to determine if allotment lands were sold legally, the racial status of the original allottees had to 
first be confirmed. Extensive genealogical research, undertaken by both the attorney general’s 
office and the defendants’ attorneys attempted to simplify the ambiguity of identity by 
designating a 50% blood quantum as the dividing line between ‘full blood’ and mixed blood,’ or 
‘competent’ and ‘ward.  Test cases were sent to the court to determine descent rules, but the 
district court came back with a different conclusion: mixed-blood Indians would be deemed 
competent at a minimum quantum of one-eighth white blood. A series of appeals took the cases 
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to the US Supreme Court, where the final ruling stated that any Indian not 100% Indian blood 
was legally a mixed-blood.
41
   
Jenks, Hrdlicka and Woodward were brought in to help make such determinations 
following the court rulings, but their testimonies seemed to further complicate matters. While 
each claimed to be able to conduct examinations and conclude an individual’s quantum based on 
physical features such as hair, nails, and gums, the difficulty, and even impossibility, of 
determining blood status was apparent. If the process itself did not reflect ambiguity about mixed 
race, then the actual assessments certainly did. Dr. Woodward commented about one particular 
individual under consideration:  “I should say she was a full blood. Those people are so mixed up 
that you cannot tell. But from her dark complexion I should judge she was a full blood Indian, 
although she may have been slightly mixed.”42 While it would seem that it was the good doctor 
who was “mixed up,” others shared his confusion. Under cross-examination, Jenks admitted he 
would not be sure of one’s status without having knowledge and seeing in person members of 
their family. Indeed, certainty of one’s blood quantum upon visual examination seems absurd 
today; but in the early twentieth century, anthropometric evidence would be the deciding factor 
in many of these cases. 
Such assessments did not go unchallenged by the Chippewa themselves and suggest 
opposing views about the identities of mixed-ancestry Natives. As David L. Beaulieu notes in his 
study of these claims,  
The Chippewa classified a person Indian if he lived with them and adopted their habits 
and mode of life and classified him a half-breed if he adopted the white man’s life. 
Some Chippewas in using this general rule tended to focus on style of dress as the main 
feature in distinguishing Indian and mixed-blood. Indians wore breachcloths [sic] and 
                                                          
41
 Beaulieu,“Curly Hair and Big Feet.” 
42
 James S. Woodward, Medical Doctor at White Earth, Testimony in Relation to Affairs at the White Earth Indian 
Reservation, Minnesota, March 8, 1887. Senate Committee on Indian Affairs, 49
th
 Congress, 2
nd
 session, 
Washington, D.C., 113. 
 169 
 
had braids in their hair whereas mixed-bloods wore hats and pants. Some noted 
economic style in trapping; when Indians trapped they only trapped enough to pay off 
exactly what was due the trader whereas mixed-bloods trapped the entire season in an 
effort to gain a surplus. To others this general rule was more precisely determined by 
the nature of intermarriage whereby children of Indian and white parents and children of 
persons who were both mixed-blood were defined as mixed-blood. Children of mixed-
bloods and Indians were considered Indians or “Anishinabe” or of “our people.”43 
The testimonies indicate the confusion that might have resulted between officials and the 
Chippewa over different uses of terms like ‘half-breed’ or ‘mixed-blood.  To each, they 
represented something quite different. While the Chippewa could consider an individual of 
mixed-descent a full-fledged member of the tribe and ‘Indian’ in the same sense as any full-
blood, government officials took a different meaning. Debates like these represented the different 
views Indigenous peoples and government officials had about cultural identity and the role that 
biology played. 
White Earth was in some ways precedent-setting. It was the first application of allotment, 
and the first commission to create rolls. It also remains one of the most poignant examples of the 
expression of the racial ambiguity that emerged out of late nineteenth-century scientific debates. 
But while White Earth has been well examined in the literature, it has not been examined as part 
of a longer continuum that constitutes a mixed-race discourse in Aboriginal policy. Blood 
quantum was used here, not just as a means of dispossession, as many have argued. It reflected 
the ambiguity of race and the ambivalence government officials felt towards such a category. 
The allotment experience of the Osage also makes up part of this continuum. Challenges 
over the rolls there began in 1896. Under specific scrutiny were the 37 individuals to whom, on 
three separate occasions, the Osage council refused membership. Government officials had 
repeatedly submitted these names for consideration, but the Osage remained firm: in line with 
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the reasons Kohpay gave in 1910, these people were not Osage members, no matter what their 
documentary evidence claimed. As the council reported in 1908, during its second assessment of 
this group’s eligibility, “The Osages always have required affiliation of persons claiming to be 
Osages and who want to share their property. The Osage constitution and laws are modeled after 
those of the Cherokees... Their laws, usages, and customs are against enrolment of the applicants 
who claim some small portion of Osage blood, but who were born either among whites and are 
white citizens or were born among other tribes and have never lived with the Osages.”44 Indeed, 
there were problems, and they were not limited only to confusion over the status of mixed-
ancestry Natives. Non-Natives, either those who had an affiliation with the tribe or those who did 
not, also made claims on Osage property in order to receive allotments, often fraudulently. Some 
people on the rolls were whites put there for charity or debt owed; they were not considered full 
or permanent members, and now their relatives were coming to claim an allotment. The Osage 
council was quite angry, since their own children born after 1906 could not claim an allotment.
45
 
Also of issue were individuals of mixed Osage-Kaw ancestry, some of whom had received 
allotments among the Kaw. The Osage council objected to all claims made by any individual, 
related or not, who was not a practicing member of the tribe. Tribal membership rules certainly 
added to the complexity of ascertaining a mixed-ancestry Native discourse that was already 
convoluted in common-sense silence and ambiguity, but it does not take away from the fact that 
at the heart of the difficulty experienced in allotment was racial ambiguity.  
The debates that arose during the Dawes Commission hearings offered yet another 
example of racial ambiguity. In many ways, policies and laws for the Five Tribes often differed 
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from those applied to other tribes, and for two reasons. First, the Five Tribes were treated 
differently than many other tribes because officials viewed them as more ‘civilized.  Second, the 
presence and integration of blacks among those tribes meant race, hierarchy, and mixing had 
different results and connotations.
46
 However, issues about racial ambiguity similar to those 
officials dealt with at White Earth and in Oklahoma were experienced with the Five Tribes. As 
historian Gary Zellar explains about the Creek, 
The principal effect of the Dawes Commission taking control of citizenship and identity 
questions, then was not to enrol more Creek freed people than was justified but to 
eliminate the luxury of racial ambiguity. The systematic recording and cataloguing of 
people’s identity and descent according to standards demanded by the dominant white 
society quantified racial abstractions with an air of finality that was in sharp contrast 
with the lackadaisical, informal, and at times corrupt methods employed by the Creeks 
themselves, as the Dawes Commission judged Creek citizenship practices. And while 
the kinship-based social structure of the Creek society had undergone severe disruptions 
attended by removal, the alarming mortality and dislocations of the Civil War, and the 
onslaught of intruders in the postwar years, kinship relations were still the governing 
principle that governed legitimate citizenship for the Creeks.
47
 
Indeed, the elimination of this racial ambiguity would become the hallmark of Aboriginal policy 
all across the colonial world in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries. 
The confusion produced by such racial ambiguity was evident in the official records, too. 
In 1895, during a Congressional debate over an amendment to the Indian Appropriation bill, 
congressman Dennis Flynn proposed that those among the Five Tribes should not be considered 
‘Indian’ if they had more than half white blood. The amendment proposed that, “any member in 
whom the white blood predominates of any Indian tribe or nation in the Indian Territory, or in 
the Territory of Oklahoma, shall be taken and considered a white person, and as such be entitled 
to and invested with all the privileges and franchises of a citizen of the United States and 
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henceforth be ineligible to vote or hold any office of honor, trust, or profit in any tribe or 
nation.”48 Yet, when describing the ‘problems’ of how those tribes were constituted, he opined 
that no full bloods existed at all:  
They talk about the five Civilized Tribes as if they were just as they always had been. I 
tell you that a full-blood Indian in the Five Civilized Tribes is about as much a curiosity 
as he would be in the city of Washington. These men who are charged with controlling 
and monopolizing the affairs of the tribal government are not Indians. Nine out of ten of 
them are men who were not born in the Indian Territory. Some of them were born in 
France; some of them were educated in Canada; others either in Arkansas or some of 
the adjoining States.
49
 
The lack of logic was apparent: if all members of the Five Tribes were mixed-ancestry Natives, 
then there would be little need to distinguish between full and mixed bloods with a blood 
quantum rule. The debate did not end there – nor did the ambiguity. The following month, James 
Kyle, a member from South Dakota, suggested a further amendment that would create a 
definition to reflect tribal notions of mixed-ancestry Native identity. In essence, he claimed, 
those of any blood quantum who “lived and maintained tribal relations with and were recognized 
members of any tribe of Indians” should be legally considered Indians.50 This tension between 
the impetus to apply biological racial categories and to concede to the tradition of recognizing 
tribal authority over membership would remain a hallmark of the allotment policy. In this case, it 
would appear that Kyle recognized the reality of mixing, particularly as a result of the fur trade, 
and how tribes incorporated outsiders in this manner.
51
 
While Kyle’s acknowledgement of cultural realities might have been rare, Flynn’s 
ambiguity was not. Particularly in the south among the Five Tribes, it is evident (and widely 
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acknowledged in the literature) that officials’ views were shaped by public demands for more 
land. But they were also shaped by growing states’ needs for tax revenue. Lengthy debates in 
Congress over this matter confirmed that officials were concerned with not only freeing up land 
for agricultural settlement but also turning inalienable, allotted Indian lands into taxable bases for 
their states.
52
 These pragmatic demands became entangled with intellectual discourses on mixed-
race, and soon became a justification for lifting restrictions on allotted lands for mixed-ancestry 
Natives. Increasingly, allotments held by mixed-ancestry Natives were exempt from restrictions 
that impeded taxation. Undoubtedly, the obligation of governments to respond to these public 
demands swayed the shaping of policy in regard to the status of the privatization of tribal lands. 
But these pragmatic concerns should not take away from the presence of ideological ones: racial 
thinking provided the epistemological framework for what was economically preferable.
53
    
The only consistency demonstrated in these three cases was the confusion experienced by 
officials over the question of mixed-ancestry Natives. Officials grappled with the discrepancies 
between their ideas about race as biology and tribal practices of membership based in kinship 
and residency. They also struggled with the internal contradictions of racial classification. The 
rise of racial ambiguity in the post-1887 era certainly brought with it its fair share of discord, 
complaint, and chaos. By the 1890s, government officials were fully aware of the problems 
created by this tension. In 1896, a Senate report considered the rights of mixed-blood Indians in 
an attempt to bring some order to the chaos. After reviewing the history, the Senate committee 
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aptly (if not somewhat belatedly) concluded that there was a need to create consistency in policy 
where mixed-ancestry Natives stood. It noted that:  
The term “Indian” does not seem at all times to have been accurately defined in our 
legislative history, and it is thought advisable to give it a precise meaning as applied to 
the holding and allotment of public lands; and therefore it is provided in section 1 of the 
bill that where the word “Indian” occurs in any law or treaty of the United States with 
any nation or tribe of Indians, “Indian” shall be held to mean and include not only 
Indians of the full blood, but also Indians of the mixed blood of whatever degree, 
whenever such mixed-blood Indian, at the time of passage of any such law or the 
ratification of any such treaty, lived with and was a member of the tribe and maintained 
tribal relations with his tribe who were interested in or affected by any such law or 
treaty. 
It will be observed, therefore, that the test is whether such Indian possessed Indian 
blood of any degree at the time of the passage of the law or treaty by which he may be 
affected and actually lived with and was recognized as a member of the tribe by his 
people and maintained tribal relations with them.
54
 
Obviously, as witnessed by the experiences of the Osage and others, this was not an observed 
conclusion. There were many cases where individuals who had not lived with the tribe, and who 
were not recognized members of the tribe were included on tribal rolls by commissioners. 
Nonetheless, officials continued to cite tribal membership and community acceptance as the 
litmus test for legal Native American identity, but then promptly usurped tribal authority by 
imposing their ideas of race on tribal communities.
55
   
As these tensions between stated and practiced policy suggested, there was undoubtedly 
ambiguity about the definition of mixed blood. There also continued to be debate over whether 
or not federally recognized tribal membership was dependent upon residency and acceptance by 
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the tribe, or if blood quantum – the one-quarter quantum that others saw as ‘standard’ – would 
factor into the definition. Native Americans did not easily accept this shift and objected to 
decisions made by commissioners that undermined their own authority and their own rules of 
membership. An agent in Minnesota, for instance, noted how the Chippewa were opposed to the 
government’s use (or rather, misuse) of the term ‘mixed blood’: “I find there is quite a feeling of 
dissatisfaction among the full-bloods in regard to the distribution of funds as at present made, as 
they think the term “mixed bloods” is too general and far reaching, and thus takes in a good 
many whom they believe are not entitled to receive payments and are kept on the rolls through 
political influences.”56 This terminology did not correspond with tribal understandings of it. 
Other officials were aware of this discord. For instance, an agent in Union Agency in Indian 
Territory noted that instructions to the Dawes Commission given in 1896 did not correspond to 
this practice: 
The Dawes Commission was given a jurisdiction to examine into citizenship claims 
only so far as was necessary to determine whether a person making application was in 
fact and law a citizen of the nation; that the commission had no power to admit a person 
of Indian blood to citizenship in a tribe merely because he was descended from a person 
previously a member of that tribe; but that before enrolling such applicant something 
more than the fact that he was of the blood of the tribe to which he claimed a right to 
membership was necessary to be established, namely, that he was in fact and law an 
actual member of that tribe.
57
 
The continuing albeit contradictory persistence of respecting a tradition of acknowledging tribal 
authority over membership created a tension among officials who strived for but never achieved 
consensus about mixed-ancestry Natives. 
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Gender and Descent  
In addition to the many above questions raised about the meaning and definition of 
mixed-ancestry Natives, gender also played into the debate. More specifically, it was unclear to 
officials in cases where mixed-ancestry Natives had one white and one Native parent, how 
descent should be determined. It was not clear if such individuals should follow the American 
tradition (based in British common law) of patrilineal descent, or if they should follow 
matrilineal descent – far more common among Aboriginal cultures. 
In good government fashion, there had never really been uniformity on this matter. An 
1847 ruling, US v. Sanders, held that blood quantum would not determine the status of mixed-
ancestry Natives, and that the mother’s status would be followed.58 However, the 1848 ruling in 
Reynolds held that the status should follow the father’s, in the common law tradition.59 The 
context is particularly significant in this case: its main goal was not the determination of the legal 
status of mixed-ancestry Natives, but rather, the legal status of a white man married to a mixed-
ancestry Choctaw woman whose paternal grandfather was white. Reynolds had committed a 
murder, and the ruling determined whether or not he would be held accountable to US laws, 
since previous case law held that US courts had no jurisdiction over Indians who were not 
enfranchised US citizens. It was not attempting to set a standard for the identity of mixed-
ancestry Natives, thus its applicability to all mixed-ancestry Natives for purposes other than 
criminal matters should not be assumed. 
Nonetheless, the decision remained important to the consideration of mixed-ancestry 
Natives in Aboriginal policy. In his 1890 report, the Secretary of the Interior indicated that he 
was not in agreement with the Reynolds decision. He noted: 
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There is no doubt that there is a stage at which, by the admixture of white blood and 
non-affiliation with the Indian tribes, persons would be debarred from participating in 
tribal benefits. The admixture of blood, however, must be considered in connection with 
all the circumstances of each case; consequently a fixed rule equally applicable to all 
cases can not well be adopted. Every application for tribal rights by mixed bloods 
should, as a matter of justice to the Indians, be closely scrutinized.
60
 
This opinion was supported in 1892 by the Indian Commissioner’s acknowledgment that the law 
of descent be construed “in accordance with Indian usage and our American administrative 
sanction.”61 In essence, the rule of paternal descent could not be strictly applied – if at all – to 
Indians. Instead, their own customs should prevail. Indeed, the differences between the two 
views were most evident when it came to cases of determining the status of mixed-ancestry 
Natives.  
Allotment agreements reflected the Secretary’s interpretation of descent rules. An 1892 
agreement with the Yankton Sioux stated that allotment was available to all members of the 
tribe, “including mixed-bloods, whether their white blood comes from the paternal or maternal 
side.”62 Ten years later, the Rosebud Sioux agreement read almost verbatim.63 However, officials 
were not well-informed on this issue. In fact, some officials were entirely unaware of the debate 
and its history. One member of a joint committee on enrolment in 1909 commented that, “Where 
no statutory provision exists fixing the membership of the tribe, children of white fathers and 
Indian mothers and of Indian fathers and white mothers have alike received recognition in the 
various tribes, and a person having Indian blood is regarded generally as an Indian whether 
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enrolled with a tribe or not.”64 Quite contrary to the original Reynold’s decision, later cases 
upheld tribal traditions. For instance, a Nebraska court case ruled that “a person of white and 
Indian parentage is deemed to be a mixed blood, without regard to the sources of the Indian 
blood...therefore, no distinction can be drawn between those who derive the Indian blood from 
the mother and those who derive it from the father.”65 This case itself was following a Supreme 
Court decision which ruled that treaties should be construed “in the sense in which they would 
naturally be understood by the Indians.”66 This policy, then, was an acknowledgment of Native 
American descent rules, in keeping with the US’s tradition of acknowledging tribal authority 
over membership – and a contradiction to rising racial concerns.  
The case of Mrs. Jane Waldron of the Sioux reservation serves as an apt point in case of 
the confusion and ambiguity surrounding descent rules, mixed race status and the law. Jane 
Waldron, who identified herself as an Indian, had, according to BIA records, one-quarter blood 
quantum. Waldron claimed to have been born upon the rolls at the Cheyenne River Agency and 
had received rations at that agency. Other than the few years where she had drawn rations, she 
had lived among the whites. Tomahawk, who belonged to and resided with the tribe, claimed she 
was not a legitimate member. Using the justification that children follow the status of the father, 
a commission ruled that she was a non-Indian citizen, a decision in keeping with the Reynolds 
ruling but contrary to the apparent practice of the BIA. The reasons for the ruling were also 
contrary to the membership criteria of the tribe: the father’s status would not have alone 
determined her status.
67
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The Waldron case made its way to the courts. In the 1891 case, Black Tomahawk v. 
Waldron, the judge ruled in line with the Reynolds decision: “the common-law rule that the 
offspring of free persons follows the condition of the father prevails in determining the status of 
children born of a white man, a citizen of the United States, and an Indian woman, his wife. 
Children of such parents are, therefore, by birth not Indians, but citizens of the United States, and 
consequently not entitled to allotments under the act of March 2, 1889.”68 As the committee 
noted, the impact of this ruling varied. It was meant to apply specifically to allotments made 
under the 1889 act (the Chippewa at White Earth), but was eventually applied to all allotments 
made under the 1887 act.
69
 In reality, though, even this policy would prove a failure: there would 
be no uniform application of any court case ruling.
70
 
Competency 
Clearly, the problem of racial ambiguity would not be resolved by the courts, but policy 
officials did not abandon their efforts to eliminate it. The next attempt to find a means of 
separating mixed ancestry Natives into existing racial categories came with the introduction of 
‘competency’: a legal status conferred upon Indians who were deemed capable of managing their 
own affairs. By law, Native American status was comparable to that of a state ward, meaning 
that they lacked the basic rights over their property. Competency, like enfranchisement in 
Canada or, as discussed later, exemption in Australia, granted the full rights of citizenship. 
‘Competent’ Indians would immediately be granted title to their allotment, while those deemed 
‘incompetent’ would have to wait a 25-year trial period. The policy reflected underlying beliefs 
in racial stratification, the role and meaning of nineteenth-century notions of ‘civilized,’ and the 
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unspoken, assumed notions about the place of Aboriginal people in that order. Competency, like 
racial inequality, was seen in the realm of ‘nature. Dominant beliefs held that it was the natural 
order of things that whites would overpower the so-called inferior races. Thus, it was seen as 
natural for a ‘real’ or traditional Indian (understood to mean ‘uncivilized’) to be deemed 
incompetent, while one more civilized (usually taken to mean a low Indian blood quantum) was, 
‘naturally,’ more likely to be deemed competent. In fact, the notion of competency was an 
integral aspect of the idea of race in the US – a point aptly argued by Beaulieu regarding 
allotment fraud and defining mixed blood in White earth Chippewa groups.
71
 
Officially, competency commissions did not start until 1913 under Frank Knight Lane, 
Secretary of the Interior. He established this commission to determine which Indians were 
competent – a status which he measured by literacy and economic self-sufficiency – to manage 
their own affairs and be released from government care.
72
 In practice, this decision was usually 
made on the recommendation of the Indian agent, but the effect was the same.
73
 Competency 
was a fast-track to assimilation: the 1906 Burke Act made the 25-year probation period 
established by the 1887 Dawes Act more flexible, allowing the Secretary to remove restrictions 
on the land before that time had lapsed. An allottee could accordingly have that period reduced if 
he or she were deemed “competent and capable of managing his or her own affairs.”74 However, 
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there was no consistent or efficient manner in which competency might be applied for and 
determined.
75
 Lane’s design changed that. 
Unofficially, competency as a determinant of allotment eligibility was already in place by 
1913. Since the 1890s, commissions and hearings debated competency as they debated the value 
of blood quantum in determining allotment eligibility, US citizenship, and tribal membership. In 
1910, a competency commission had been established on the Omaha reservation in Nebraska.
76
 
As would become increasingly evident, there were clear overlaps between competency and blood 
quantum. The likelihood of being deemed competent increased with the perceived amount of 
white blood, though this number varied regionally – half in the south-east and one-quarter in the 
Midwest. Either way, a lower Indian blood quantum was, for most officials, reason enough to be 
considered competent. As a House of Representatives Report noted in 1896, “Indians having 
only one-quarter of Indian blood ought to be able to assume the responsibility of citizenship and 
bear some of its burdens equally with their white neighbours.” 77  This matter did not go 
uncontested and was the subject of serious debate. Commissioner D.M Browning wrote in the 
same year about his objections to the removal of restrictions on title for mixed-ancestry Native 
allotments. He believed that “there are many others, mixed bloods as well as full bloods, to 
whom the issuance of such patents would be extremely unwise, and who would receive no 
permanent benefit from the land thus allotted them.”78 He accordingly recommended keeping the 
25-year probation in place where the US government would retain title.
79
 Browning’s was the 
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minority opinion, though. Allen’s comments more closely reflected the majority view among 
government officials: those allottees with one-quarter blood quantum should receive land 
patents, granting them full and clear ownership. He explained: 
This provision is important to the Indians as well as to the white settlers in the States 
and Territories where Indian lands are located. It is believed by your committee that a 
mixed blood Indian having one-quarter or less Indian blood in his veins is quite as 
competent to perform the duties of citizenship intelligently as many white men, and that 
the percentage of incompetency among the Indian tribes of one-quarter Indian blood or 
less is not greater than that to be found among a like number of white persons. It is 
therefore believed to be unjust both to the Indian and taxpayers where these lands are 
found that the Indians should be deprived of the right to alienate their lands and be 
exempt from just local taxation.
80
 
Pragmatic concerns, such as taxation, were often intermingled with ideological considerations 
when it came to determining racial status. Separating the two was impossible. In any case, the 
notion of competency played an important role in that determination. 
Browning’s objections clearly had little impact, while Lane’s vision of competency 
would receive widespread support. In 1916, only a few years after the introduction of Lane’s 
policy, the Senate recommended the removal of restrictions on mixed-blood Quapaw in 
Oklahoma. The legislation proposed to “remove restrictions from any part or all of the allotted 
lands of adult allottees, particularly the mixed bloods, of any of the tribes, including the Modocs, 
belonging to the Quapaw Agency in the State of Oklahoma, whenever he shall be satisfied that 
any allottee is competent to manage his or her own affairs.” 81  Increasingly, allotment was 
providing a means of eliminating racial ambiguity, and indeed, taking on the characteristics of 
elimination through legislation, like scrip in Canada. 
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By the following year, the use of blood quantum to determine competency was 
accelerated. A new policy declared that all Indians of half or less blood quantum would be 
deemed competent and receive patents to their land.
82
 The department would now take a more 
liberal ruling on these matters – that is, they would be more inclined to find the individual 
competent. Indeed, if there had been any previous ambiguity about the competency of mixed-
ancestry Natives, at least in the eyes of the law, it was confirmed with this announcement. Indian 
Commissioner Cato Sells corroborated this interpretation in his annual report:  
While ethnologically a preponderance of white blood has not heretofore been a criterion 
of competency, even now is it always a safe standard, it is almost an axiom that an 
Indian who has a larger proportion of white blood than Indian partakes more  of the 
characteristics of the former than of the latter. In thought and action, so far as the 
business world is concerned, he approximates more closely to the white blood 
ancestry.
83
   
While Sells probably did not have the consensus of opinion he believed, his words demonstrated 
an emerging pattern in policy: it was increasingly more acceptable to deem mixed-ancestry 
Natives competent by sheer virtue of their ‘white blood. The racial ambiguity that had plagued 
officials throughout the allotment era was, then, disappearing. 
Blood Quantum 
What this all amounted to was the application of blood quantum as a criterion for Indian-
ness. Indeed, as the competency requirements increasingly demonstrated, blood quantum was 
fast becoming the standard of dividing mixed-ancestry Natives into one of two racial categories – 
that racial binary that had become one of the hallmarks of colonialism. Although it would not be 
made an enforceable legal concept until 1934, it was already articulated and defined during the 
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allotment era.
84
 True, there was no uniform definition of ‘Indian’ that used a blood quantum 
criterion prior to 1934; but it was still a practiced concept during the allotment era. It was, more 
specifically, through the development of the concept of ‘competency’ that blood quantum 
became a useful tool for officials to distinguish between ‘Indians’ and ‘white citizens.   
Allotment Conclusion 
Those mixed bloods who were descendants of treaty signatories were considered part of 
the tribe. Sioux chief Red Cloud made this point in response to Senator Pettigrew’s question if 
mixed-bloods should be entered on the rolls and share in tribal property: 
Here is the difference we notice: those half-breed children of Indian women who lived 
with us in old days in wild life are considered Indians, and the husbands of those 
women were considered adopted Indians, and they signed the treaties. The children of 
those half-breeds who signed the treaties are considered  Indians. That is the difference I 
want to make. But those mixed bloods who have come in later and never signed any 
treaty we think should be excluded from the tribe.
85
 
In the end, it mattered little. Allotment was forced upon all tribal members, irrespective of their 
blood quantum, thus ending their status as Indians and indeed, the tribal entity itself. 
The allotment era, then, represented a major shift in thinking about mixed-ancestry 
Natives. The specific characteristics of this era – competency, the rise of blood quantum as a 
legal status associated with citizenship, and the forced acknowledgement of an increasing mixed 
ancestry population – placed administrators into a new position: they had to define ‘mixed blood’ 
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and their place in Aboriginal policy and in the larger American society. As the Secretary of the 
Interior noted in his 1890 report, 
When Indian reservations were remote from white settlements and practically valueless 
for the purposes of those engaged in civilized pursuits, questions concerning the rights 
of persons of mixed blood to tribal benefits were rarely presented, and were deemed of 
little moment. But since the steady march of civilization has brought the red man into 
close contact with the dominant race, and the real value of tribal lands has consequently 
increased, and since the Government has inaugurated the system of allotment to Indians 
of lands in severalty, many persons claiming to be mixed bloods have urged this bureau 
to enrol them as members of Indian tribes. The subject has thus become one of decided 
importance, each application requiring careful investigation and consideration.
86
 
While that ‘steady march of civilization’ had resulted in increasing clashes over land, it also 
brought the ‘mixed-race problem’ to the forefront. Land rights could not be determined without 
the clarification of status, and status was in part determined through racial ascription. The 
ambiguity officials and even the public felt toward mixed-ancestry Natives would need to be 
resolved if the policy was to move forward, and if those rights were to be definitively 
determined. It was in this context that the discourse of mixed race was created. 
So, until 1887, the lack of a definition for legal purposes remained a non-issue because 
the US government had made a practice of treating with tribes, not individuals, and observing 
the tribal right to determine membership. Officials, then, rarely had to deal with problems 
associated with eligibility themselves. Consequently, until the Dawes Act, the racialization of 
legal identity for mixed-ancestry Natives remained obscured by the formal and official ‘nation-
to-nation’ relationship between the federal government and tribes. This process was already 
underway in Canada and, as we will see in the next chapter, Australia; but not in the US. It was 
not initiated until the Dawes Act in 1887 compelled officials to define ‘Indian’ on an individual 
level and according to race, despite this long history of ‘nation-to-nation’ relations. 
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By the beginning of the twentieth century, debates produced by the allotment policy over 
mixed race had resulted in a clearer definition of both Indian and mixed blood than had been 
previously witnessed. Indeed, it was only through decades of contemplation, contradictory (and 
often unapplied) court rulings, and ambiguous legal definitions that any discernible definition, of 
either ‘Indian’ or ‘mixed blood’ could be extrapolated. Charles Kappler’s 1913 work provides 
some insight, where he developed definitions based on years of legislation, practice, and case 
law: 
I. Definition: "Indians" is the name given by the European discoverers of America to its 
Aboriginal inhabitants. The term "indian", when used in a statute without any other 
limitation, should be held to include members of the aboriginal race, whether now 
sustaining tribal relations or otherwise."  II. Status and Disabilities. "A. Who are Indians - 
1. By birth - (a) Half-breeds., - The question of the status of half-breeds which usually 
arises in the case of the offspring of a white father and an Indian mother has been the 
subject of conflicting decisions. The weight of authority is, adopting the common-law 
rule, that the child follows the condition of the father. [cites court cases] But the child of a 
white citizen and of an Indian mother, who is abandoned by his father, is nurtured and 
reared by the Indian mother in the tribal relation, and is recognized by the tribe as a 
member of it, falls under an exception to the general rule that the offspring follows the 
status of the father and becomes a member of the tribe of the mother. (b) Mixed bloods.—
The term “mixed bloods,” used in treaties and statutes, includes persons of half, or more 
or less than half, Indian blood, derived either from the father or from the mother. Such 
persons, if they live with the tribe, are Indians.
87
 
Kappler cites a long list of cases and statutes that contributed to this compilation. Notably, these 
cases cite the ‘one drop rule’ applied to Blacks of mixed ancestry, as well as Natives of mixed 
ancestry.  
The change in 1934, then, was not a drastic or unprecedented one. Rather, it solidified the 
otherwise hazy concept of blood quantum that was already in circulation among government 
officials. As the Secretary of the Interior noted in 1934,  
The bill involves several matters contrary to the existing practice. Under present 
regulations the degree of Indian blood is not a factor in the determination of tribal 
rights, which depend upon birth into the tribe on the reservation, affiliation with the 
Indians and recognition by them as a member of the tribe. Hence, with certain 
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exceptions, not important here, children born in a white community after parents have 
abandoned tribal relations would not be entitled to tribal membership and rights. The 
bill admits to enrollment all children up to one fourth degree of Menominee blood 
(except descendants of participants in the “half-breed payment”), no matter where born 
and regardless of tribal affiliation and recognition, and excludes those of a lesser degree 
even though born to members of the tribe on the reservation, among the Indians and 
affiliating with them. In other words it makes blood the sole test of tribal membership in 
the future as to this tribe, instead of the existing criteria of birth into, affiliation with, 
and recognition by the tribe.
88
   
Notably, he recommended that, while limiting blood quantum was a ‘sound’ plan, there should 
be limits on birth, affiliation, and residency. 
Conclusion 
The years 1887 and 1934 are both significant markers in the history of American Native 
policy, as well as of the relationship between law and mixed-ancestry identity. But they also 
represent parts of a continuing discourse about mixed-ancestry Natives that began long before 
allotment in 1887 and carried on long after the Howard-Wheeler act in 1934. Racial ambiguity is 
an evident part of the mixed-race discourse throughout the nineteenth and into the twentieth 
century. It began in the treaty era, though quietly and without effect, and grew louder with the 
close of the nineteenth century. By the first decades of the twentieth century, the debate was in 
full swing, and expressed concerns about mixed-ancestry Natives became more frequent and 
demanding.  
It does not begin as abruptly as the passing of more concise blood quantum rules in 1934 
would have us believe. Blood quantum as a solution to racial ambiguity was a persistent idea that 
followed Aboriginal policy from at least the early nineteenth century. There were various 
practical reasons why policy makers targeted mixed ancestry natives, and land appropriation, as 
numerous analyses of the allotment policy have aptly demonstrated, was among the most 
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significant. Redefining mixed ancestry Natives in law as ‘regular’ US citizens severed their ties 
to the land and their Indigenous rights to it. Consequently, the allotment process opened land to 
both settlement and taxation for growing states. Undoubtedly, there are sound pragmatic 
concerns that help us understand racial categorization and policies that transitioned mixed-
ancestry Natives from one category to another. 
However, this is what we see on the surface. Beneath the appropriation of land, beyond 
the goals of nation-building, and even past removal was an underlying paradigm that people 
belong in certain categories. This becomes more evident with an interrogation of the goals of 
Indian policy. The ideology lurking beneath the practice tells us that race was an imagined 
binary, much as Said’s work has shown us. Furthermore, it has shown us that people do not fit 
neatly into that binary, much as Bhabha has suggested. Instead, the relationship between ‘mixed 
blood’ and ‘Native American’ resembled his concept of periphery and center: categories of race 
were continually redefined in relation to the presence of ‘mixed race. Administrators sought to fit 
mixed-ancestry Natives into the racial binary of colonialism: Indians and whites. They were not 
consistent in this process, and their motives were not always visible. In other words, the 
uncomfortable presence of racial ambiguity – seen here as mixed-ancestry Natives – was one of 
the driving factors behind policy throughout the nineteenth century and into the twentieth. More 
specifically, the desire to eliminate that ambiguity, to define and fix the status of mixed-ancestry 
Natives in the Indian-white binary, was a significant shaping factor in Native American policy.  
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Chapter 6 - Australia: Absorbing Blood 
In 1937, the Chief Protectors and Boards from most of Australia’s state and territorial 
governments met in Canberra to discuss the ‘destiny of the race.’ 1  For the conference 
participants, that ultimately meant solving what had for most states become ‘the half-caste 
problem.  Professor John Burton Cleland, a South Australian pathologist who often consulted on 
Aboriginal affairs, put it most succinctly in his presentation to the conference: 
The number of half-castes in certain parts of Australia is increasing... This may be the 
beginning of a possible problem of the future. A very unfortunate situation would arise 
if a large half-caste population breeding within themselves eventually arose in any of 
the Australian States. It seems to me that there can be only one satisfactory solution to 
the half-caste problem, and that is the ultimate absorption of these persons in the white 
population. I think that this will not necessarily lead in any way to a deterioration of 
type, inasmuch as racial intermixtures seem, in most cases, to lead to increased virility.
2
 
Cleland’s speech reflected the language of theories on racial mixing, particularly the debates 
over the supposed ‘increased virility’ of white races that would come with ‘miscegenation. Other 
conference participants would go on to vehemently disagree with Cleland in the days to follow. 
Their debates would, indeed, reflect those that had taken place among scientists in late-
nineteenth-century Europe: was racial mixing beneficial or detrimental? This was no small 
matter, since the proposed direction in Aboriginal policy was assimilation for ‘mixed-race’ 
Aboriginal people.  
Ultimately, the conference members left with an agreement to pursue a common policy. 
Ministers acceded that ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people should be assimilated, and Aboriginal 
people, segregated. But by accident or design, this was precisely what states had already been 
practicing for decades – as early as the 1880s in some cases. A New South Wales member of the 
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legislature had confirmed as much in 1883 when he argued that Aboriginal people should be 
allowed to continue living in their traditional territories while “the younger half-castes should be 
withdrawn from their midst and gradually absorbed into the general community.” 3  The 
conclusions of the 1937 conference, then, were not that much different from the policies already 
in place. Aboriginal people and ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people should be treated separately and 
differently.
4
  
This dual policy of assimilation/segregation pointed to the very centre of the 
contradictions in Aboriginal policy. On the one hand, most state governments purported to 
impose a policy of assimilation, some even through an explicit program of biological absorption. 
Discourses on racial mixing specific to tropical areas often claimed that ‘miscegenation’ would 
produce a more physically viable population that was better suited in temperament and 
physiology to the climate. These theories warned that Australia might not be suitable for 
individuals of European ancestry, but intermixing with the local Aboriginal populations could 
change that. Scientific theories also maintained that Aboriginal people in Australia belonged to 
the Caucasian group, despite their darker skin, and thus could be readily absorbed into the 
mainstream (and largely white) population. They claimed that any physical markers of the 
‘Aboriginal race’ would disappear. The combination of these two streams in scientific thought 
were reflected in support for Aboriginal policies of assimilation.
5
 
However, goals of assimilation were opposed and thwarted by opposing beliefs based in 
popular attitudes and public fears about the ‘dangers’ of racial mixing. Strong anti-miscegenetic 
                                                          
3
 New South Wales. Legislative Assembly, Aboriginal Mission Stations at Warangesda and Maloga, 1883, 4. 
4
 Australian historiography often cites 1937 as a turning point in Aboriginal policy from one of protection and 
segregation to one of assimilation. As noted, this is not entirely accurate: while most policy officials maintained that 
so-called ‘full bloods’ should remain segregated, most also believed that mixed-ancestry Natives should be 
assimilated. See for instance, Larissa Behrendt, Chris Cunneen, and Terry Libesman, Indigenous Legal Relations in 
Australia (South Melbourne, Vic.: Oxford University Press Australia & New Zealand, 2009), 27. 
5
 For a discussion about attitudes towards miscegenation and hybridity in early twentieth-century Australia, see 
Anderson, “Ambiguities of Race.” 
 191 
 
feelings among both policy officials and the wider public ensured that policies of assimilation 
would not be unanimously supported. These attitudes were also reflected in policies that 
ultimately sought to keep Aboriginal people, even those of mixed ancestry, from truly integrating 
into towns and cities. The result was policies that were ambiguous and ambivalent, 
demonstrating broader transnational debates about race and racial mixing. This uncertainty 
manifested itself in a number of ways, but especially in the legally enforced anti-miscegenetic 
sentiments that were codified into legislation. Racial mixing, then, produced laws that were 
inherently contradictory: they simultaneously purported assimilation and segregation.
6
  
In Australia, there is no great revelation in acknowledging that racial mixing played an 
important role in Aboriginal policy. Unlike the more tacit forms of racial thinking that influenced 
policy in Canada and the US, the discourse of racial mixing in Australia is more readily apparent. 
Government officials were blatant about their thoughts on racial mixing. They rarely minced 
words, as will be evident throughout this chapter, and gave little consideration for how those 
words might be interpreted half a century later. While there were many differences in Aboriginal 
policy from state to state, two factors were shared: ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people were viewed 
as the primary ‘Aboriginal problem’; and there was significant ambiguity and ambivalence about 
what the solution to that ‘problem’ was. Administrators could never form a consensus on 
whether ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people should be considered Aboriginal. Contradictory policies 
and ambivalent positions were especially evident in key areas across states: legal definitions of 
both ‘Aboriginal’ and ‘half-caste,’ policies of exemption, the regulation of girls and women, the 
close scrutiny of Aboriginal labour contracts, and the regulation of marriage. As in Canada and 
the US, there was an inherent tension between the ideal of a racial dichotomy and the reality of 
social and cultural hybridity. Fundamentally, the ambiguity and ambivalence of scientific ideas 
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about mixed race were reflected in policies that expressed a tension between biological 
absorption and anti-miscegenetic sentiments.  
The ‘Half-caste’ Problem 
As evidenced by the proceedings of the 1937 Native Welfare Conference, there was little 
question that governments saw ‘half-castes’ as a problem that required the intervention of a 
specific policy. Increasingly, the racially mixed were viewed as something to be monitored, 
controlled, and even thwarted. For example, officials in New South Wales at the end of the 
nineteenth century expressed concern about the growing number of ‘half-castes. The ‘solution’ 
was widely contested, but there, as in Victoria, officials saw assimilation as the only viable 
option. As the Board wrote in 1888, “it is hoped that whilst no special scandal arises from their 
presence in the community their absorption into the general population may at some future date 
be accomplished.”7 That absorption would be greatly hindered by a stronger anti-miscegenetic 
sentiment that thwarted policy goals until well into the twentieth century. 
As in Canada and the US, there was a context to how Aboriginal policies were framed. In 
all three countries, the management and administration of Aboriginal populations was one that 
came with costs, and governments as well as the public supported that undertaking only 
begrudgingly. There were always pressures, especially from the political opposition, to justify 
and reduce those costs. In 1886, for instance, a debate in the Victoria legislature highlighted the 
financial burden of Aboriginal policy. As one member said, the intent of the proposed Aboriginal 
protection bill “was introduced chiefly with the object of making the half-castes useful members 
of society, and gradually relieving the State of the cost of their maintenance.”8 Another member 
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agreed, and added that “he believed [the bill] represented the unanimous wish of the people of 
the country with regard to the half-castes.”9 In short, the notion that ‘half-castes’ represented an 
additional burden on the public purse was a factor in policy considerations about them.  
Again, dividing pragmatic from ideological causes to human behaviour is not always 
possible. Indeed, governments were concerned about fiscal responsibilities; yet decisions about 
Aboriginal policy were not made solely on economy. Although Australia did not recognize the 
same legal responsibilities concerning Aboriginal title as Canada and the US did, it did 
acknowledge its humanitarian obligations. They factored in significantly to the development of 
policy in Australia, perhaps more so than in the other two countries discussed here. Furthermore, 
as many states acknowledged, it was not as simple as legislating them out of existence. Even if 
Aboriginal people were ‘de-Indianized,’ there still remained the issue of biological absorption. 
Those who did support this policy felt that integration must be closely monitored and carefully 
regulated if it was to be ‘successful. Many officials from a variety of state governments believed 
that the ‘problem’ was more long term than such swift legal action could remedy. Moreover, one 
of the major theories of the day was that assimilation could only happen over successive 
generations: it could not be achieved immediately or swiftly. If this were in fact the case, states 
with higher populations of Aboriginal and ‘mixed race’ Aboriginal people would have greater 
‘obligations.’ 
But there was another, larger ‘problem. The fear that ‘half-castes’ would overtake the 
white population reflected strong anti-miscegenetic sentiments that would act as a counterforce 
to those humanitarian concerns. New South Wales was among the first to report this population 
increase. Reporting in 1903, the chief protector intimated that, “The number of full-bloods is 
gradually decreasing, as last year’s census shows that there are now only 2786 as against 6540 in 
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1882, when the first census was taken, though the ‘half-castes’ have increased from 2379 to 
4148.”10 He was not alone in his concerns with numbers, as the opening quote to this chapter 
suggests.
11
 Whether or not these concerns were based in actual numbers or simply racists’ fears 
is debatable, and perhaps even unimportant for the purposes here. Instead, the mere articulation 
of such fears, especially in official records, suggests the potency and tenacity of these attitudes. 
As Amselle suggests, documenting populations and their traits is the starting point to assigning 
difference. While neither Canada nor the US kept track of population counts as meticulously as 
Australian officials did, they all three participated in attempts to identify individuals of mixed-
race in official records. The recording of populations and the consistent albeit failed attempts to 
divide them into categories based on blood quantum also suggests the place these issues 
occupied in government agendas. Despite a policy of assimilation, ‘half-castes’ in Australia 
continued to be considered Aboriginal by non-Aboriginals, and the racial anxieties were 
expressed in the words and actions of officials who ultimately feared that a ‘half-caste’ 
population would take over and supplant a white one. 
These fears were perhaps most prevalent in the Northern Territory where racial 
demographics made a majority ‘half-caste’ population a distinct possibility. The Territory’s 
settler population was already small. But in the early twentieth century, it was also shrinking. 
Combined with a relatively larger Aboriginal and ‘half-caste’ population, government officials 
and the public alike expressed alarm about the potential to be ‘outnumbered. As Chief Protector 
Cecil Cook remarked,  
There is now a population of half-castes numbering one-fifth the total whites, and 
having a natural increase of 18 per 1000 compared with the white rates of minus .3 per 
1000, and it is only a matter of a few years before the half-caste population will 
approximate that of the white population. In my opinion, the Northern Territory cannot 
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absorb all those people in employment, and, consequently, the question of disposing the 
half-caste population arises.
12
 
As Cook went on to describe, the problem was not just one of ‘taking over,’ but also where they 
would be employed. The assumption remained that ‘half-castes’ would only be offered a limited 
number of jobs, leaving preference to ‘white citizens.  Cook’s racial anxieties were couched as 
labour concerns, but the subtext of his comments suggested more. This sentiment not only 
reflected specific attitudes towards Aboriginal peoples, it also paralleled popular attitudes 
towards immigrant racial ‘others’ that were perceived as threats to white labourers.  
Similar fears about rapid increases in the ‘half-caste’ population were also expressed in 
Western Australia, even well into the middle of the twentieth century.
13
 Officials feared that the 
conditions in Australia were optimal for widespread miscegenation, resulting in the overtaking or 
even elimination the white population. These fears contrasted with other beliefs that Aboriginal 
people could be readily absorbed into the white population and eventually ‘disappear,’ but 
coincided with the policy of a ‘white Australia’ between 1901 and 1949. Although this policy 
focused on the restriction of immigrants, especially Asians and Pacific Islanders, Aboriginal 
people clearly did not fit into the world conceived by that policy.
14
 These competing and 
contradictory streams indicated overarching ambivalent attitudes towards Aboriginal people of 
mixed ancestry.  
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Racial Anxiety and Legal Definitions 
Australian racial anxieties about a growing ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal population quickly 
translated into anti-miscegenetic policies and practices. Laws that sought to control Aboriginal 
peoples regulated marriage, threatened to punish white men who had sex with Aboriginal 
women, and even claimed the right to examine Aboriginal people for sexually transmitted 
disease, sometimes without their consent.
15
 But in a country of state and territorial governments 
that repeatedly and clearly claimed a goal of assimilation, laws and policies just as repeatedly 
and clearly worked to the contrary. It was particularly in the legal prohibitions in place to 
discourage relationships between the races – and especially between white men and Aboriginal 
women – that the obvious contradiction of policy was most evident. 
As introduced in Chapter Three, Aboriginal policy in Australia was framed by a series of 
state-level acts commonly titled “Aborigines Protection Acts,” called so because of their initial 
premise to protect Indigenous peoples from the perils of colonization.
16
 In actuality, they 
legalized forced assimilation. Comparable to Canada’s Indian Act in many ways, these acts 
defined and restricted the lives and identities of Indigenous peoples in an attempt to assimilate 
them by regulating their activities in labour, marriage, travel, residency, lifestyle, alcohol 
consumption, and firearms possession. More significantly for the purposes here, they spelled out 
the terms by which ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people would cease to be Aboriginal. These laws 
were introduced at varying times across the Australian continent, a process that reflected the 
varying rates of colonization. Victoria, New South Wales, and Western Australia witnessed early 
colonization and thus, an earlier introduction of these acts compared to states like Queensland 
and the Northern Territory, which were colonized later and much more sparsely than the eastern 
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seaboard states. In any event, they were enacted throughout Australia, introduced between 1869 
and 1911, and followed a surprisingly similar pattern in terms of how they targeted individuals of 
mixed ancestry. Ultimately, they all expressed fears and anxieties about racial mixing; but they 
all also expressed ambiguity and uncertainty about it, too. 
How ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people were ultimately defined in law often came down to 
how they lived and with whom they lived. Those who were ‘living among the Aborigines,’ as it 
was often stated in legislation, would also be classified as Aboriginal people. But those deemed 
capable of assimilation or whose skin tone was ‘too light’ were declassified as ‘Aboriginal’ 
under the law. Both administrators and members of the public often expressed disapproval of 
‘near whites’ living on Aboriginal reserves or in camps. To them, it seemed inappropriate and 
unnatural. Notions of racial purity and ‘authenticity’ factored into how Aboriginal people were 
categorized, and those who did not carry enough of those racial markers lost their status as 
Aboriginal. In these cases, they were forced to move into towns and cities, as laws prohibited 
non-Aboriginals from residing in Aboriginal communities such as reserves, stations, or even 
camps. Administrators met many challenges as this policy had the effect of separating family 
members from each other. Aboriginal people resisted when they could, often in more subtle ways 
like establishing residence on the fringes of official Aboriginal communities in order to maintain 
close proximity to their family and friends.
17
 
Nonetheless, individual state policies and the definitions created by them shared similar 
principles. First, mixed-descent individuals were divided from those considered ‘full-blood’ 
Aboriginals. This sometimes had little practical effect, but other times, it came with serious 
consequence such as being disqualified from receiving certain state benefits, or from 
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participating in government programs created specifically for Aboriginal peoples. Second, the 
protector was made legal guardian over all Aboriginal and ‘half-caste’ children. This granted him 
the means to target ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal children for assimilation, either for removal to 
institutions, or for older children, labour contracts. Third, special regulations were included for 
girls to help reduce racial mixing. Finally, and closely related to the third, marriages were often 
controlled by the state and would usually only be approved when they resulted in the dilution of 
Aboriginal blood.  
Definitions were key to the mixed race discourse that emerged in Australian law. The 
first of these acts was Victoria’s 1869 Aborigines Protection Act. This act identified and defined 
‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people, or ‘half-castes,’ and considered those living or associating with 
Aboriginal people to also be Aboriginal. Herein was the kind of inherent contradiction that 
would become a hallmark of legal definitions of ‘half-castes’: although distinguished from 
Aboriginal, they were still classified as Aboriginal. The first Aborigines Protection Act in 
Western Australia in 1886 and Queensland in 1897 both included an almost-exact definition of 
‘half-castes. They both defined the term, not by a specific blood quantum (suggested or stated), 
but rather, by where and how they lived. Those who lived ‘as Aboriginal’ and with Aboriginal 
people in camps, reserves, or stations recognized as Aboriginal communities were accordingly 
considered Aboriginal. Racial ascription thus took on a specific lifestyle criterion, vague as it 
might have been, in a vein similar to Canada’s use of “Indian mode of life” in attempting to 
distinguish Halfbreeds from Indians during the scrip policy. What defined a ‘half-caste,’ then, 
was assumed and not clearly articulated. This, too, would be a common feature among 
Aboriginal policy in all three countries. 
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In fact, legal definitions demonstrated the very ambiguity that was characteristic of racial 
thinking. While definitions of ‘Aboriginal’ might be considered central to Aboriginal policy, 
definitions of ‘half-caste,’ like definitions of other mixed-ancestry Natives in Canada and the 
US, would prove to be central to understanding the contradictions and ambiguities of that policy. 
But the apparent confusion was even more evident in Australia where ‘half-castes’ were 
simultaneously considered ‘Aboriginal’ and constituted their own separate category within 
protection acts. While this contradiction presented a number of fallacies of logic, administrators 
felt this dual definition was necessary to facilitate the policy of assimilation, and further supports 
the argument that a two-policy system, one for ‘Aboriginals’ and one for ‘half-castes,’ had 
always been followed. A memo from E. Guinnes, Protector in Victoria in 1886, laid out the 
reasons why the Aboriginal population would be divided into these two legal categories. He 
explained that “the object of the bill is ... directed with the view as far as possible of merging 
half-castes and other persons of mixed aboriginal and European blood into the general 
population.”18 Legally designating individuals of mixed ancestry as ‘Aboriginal’ by law would 
make it easier to identify those who were to be assimilated. Guinnes was aware of the “arbitrary” 
nature of this distinction, given the difficulty of establishing blood quantum or its relevance to 
lifestyle, but felt the distinction was necessary for the purposes of designating policies of 
segregation or protection and assimilation. As he explained, it allowed all ‘mixed-race’ 
Aboriginal people to come under the bill.
19
 
As the mixed ancestry population increased (or, as officials and the public became more 
aware of that increase), legal definitions became more detailed and complex. By the first decades 
of the twentieth century, they came to include additional and sometimes complex and 
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contradictory criteria in an attempt to distinguish so-called ‘full bloods’ from ‘half-castes.  
Despite the many differences among the states’ laws, there was a common pattern: increasing 
concern and ambiguity over the presence of ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people and their role in 
society. The evolution of legislation in Victoria serves as an apt example. Its first act in 1869 
included ‘half-castes’ as Aboriginal if they lived as and with Aboriginal people – a stipulation 
not dissimilar from Canada’s pre-Indian Act legislation. However, in 1886, an amendment made 
sweeping and broad changes to that definition. First, it separated definitions of ‘half-caste’ and 
Aboriginal, albeit with the same ambiguity that usually accompanied attempts to define the 
racially mixed.
20
 As other states would also do eventually, it excluded ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal 
people from being included legally as Aboriginal in certain aspects of the act. In effect, this 
exclusion granted power to administrators to deny benefits (such as rations) or residency on an 
Aboriginal station or reserve without actual cause – a way to maintain legal control over ‘mixed-
race’ Aboriginal people without according them the status of Aboriginal people and the 
concessions that might go with that status.  
These broad yet ambiguous definitions served another function: they extended 
administrative powers over undefined populations. First, they allowed governments to avoid the 
finality of blood quantum rules. Unqualified references to descent granted administrative power 
over Aboriginal people of any degree of Aboriginal ‘blood,’ not just those who fit the literal 
criterion of ‘half-caste’ or 50 percent blood quantum.21 Second, they also extended their powers 
by including ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people who lived or associated with Aboriginal people, as 
well as mixed-race females who were married to Aboriginal men. Thus, two things occurred 
simultaneously with these definitions: first, ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people were being 
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separately defined from purportedly ‘full-blood’ Aboriginal people; and second, both definitions 
were increasingly complex and contradictory. In particular, there was an inherent contradiction 
in separately defining ‘half-caste’ and Aboriginal, then including ‘half-castes’ within the 
definition of Aboriginal. This contradiction paralleled the ambivalence that was produced from 
the scientific debates over racial mixing. 
The increasing concern over the presence of ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people became 
evident in Victoria’s next amendment. In 1910, the act was extended to include power over all 
‘half-castes,’ not just those identified in the 1890 definition. According to legal scholar John 
McCorquadale, this had the effect of removing the distinction between ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal 
people and those considered ‘full blood.’22 Either way, this distinction would be short lived. In 
1915, another amendment reinstated this distinction, an oscillation that reflected ambivalence 
about the implications of racial mixing. The amendment read, “The term half-caste whenever it 
occurs in this Act includes as well half-castes as all other persons whatever of mixed aboriginal 
blood; but when used elsewhere than in this and the next succeeding section the term shall unless 
the context requires a different meaning be read and construed as excluding such half-castes as 
under the provisions of this Act are to be deemed to be aboriginals.”23 If ever there was a case of 
confusing and incomprehensible legalese, it was here. While administrators attempted, on the 
one hand, to include ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people under the power of the act, they on the other 
hand explicitly excluded them. In effect, the legislation allowed them complete discretionary 
power over ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people without having to resolve the inherent ambivalence 
towards ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people.  
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If Victoria’s legislation did not reflect serious ambiguity, then Queensland’s legislation 
certainly would provide a potent example. Its first act in 1897 defined ‘half-castes’ as Aboriginal 
if they lived or associated with Aboriginal people – quite similar in wording and intent to the 
first acts in New South Wales, Victoria, and Western Australia. What distinguished 
Queensland’s legislation, though, was its definition of ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people as “the 
offspring of an Aboriginal mother and other than an Aboriginal father” – a wording which 
suggested the same confusion and genealogical ignorance as Canada’s scrip policy in the 1880s. 
Officials did not initially fathom that two ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people might have a child 
together, nor that any other combination of parents would produce a ‘half-caste’ child – perhaps 
indicative of the debates in science over the effects of racial mixing on fertility. Initially, then, 
‘half-caste’ in Queensland was understood to indicate a child born of a white father and an 
Aboriginal mother, which by definition, excluded a child born of a half-caste mother and a half-
caste father. So, some administrators clearly understood ‘half-caste’ in the strictest of terms, 
suggesting ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people had one Aboriginal and one white parent. In reality, 
though, and because of confused or absent definitions, ‘half-caste’ could just as easily refer to 
the offspring of two parents of mixed ancestry. Furthermore, the ambiguous legal definitions of 
‘half-caste’ and its casual usage among both administrators and the public suggested that ‘half-
caste’ was not used to describe someone with 50 per cent Aboriginal blood quantum, and did not 
only include individuals of the specified parentage. Instead, and in contrast to the text of the law, 
the term was used to identify any person of mixed ancestry.  
Queensland’s next major amendment in 1934 expanded this definition. It included a 
lengthy addition to its definition of Aboriginal that combined the contradictory terms of 
residency, lifestyle, and blood quantum. Only under certain conditions, though, would blood 
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quantum be considered with residency – usually when an official found it difficult to establish 
parentage with any certainty. Residency also extended to spouses, indicating that mixed-ancestry 
Aboriginal individuals not deemed ‘half-caste’ under the act would acquire a legal Aboriginal 
status through marriage.
24
 In this way, the definitions of ‘Aboriginal’ and ‘half-caste’ 
collectively covered all individuals of Aboriginal ancestry. Thus, in the course of time between 
the two acts, thinking on ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people was changing rapidly: officials and the 
public were becoming increasingly concerned about the implications of racial mixing and 
ambivalent about its consequences, especially as successive generations proved how complex 
racial mixing could be in a world attempting to maintain racial boundaries. In turn, legislative 
efforts extended the power of protection boards to encompass as many Aboriginal people as 
possible. But this drive for control was countered by continuing ambivalence about where 
‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people belonged in Australian society. Thus, complicated and 
ambiguous definitions not only reflected attempts at broad sweeping powers: they also reflected 
attempts to bring clarity to ambiguity. 
The evolution of the definition of ‘half-castes’ in Western Australia was even more 
illuminating, in part because of the major difference in racial demographics. In every other state 
in Australia, Aboriginal people constituted minorities; but in Western Australia, they were the 
growing majority, a fact further illuminated by a declining birthrate among Australians of 
European ancestry after 1890. Its first act in 1886 was very much in keeping with other states: 
‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people were defined as Aboriginal if they lived as and with Aboriginal 
people. One notable difference was that judges were granted the authority to decide if someone 
was Aboriginal. The act stated that a judge could “in the absence of other sufficient evidence, 
decide on his or their own view and judgment whether any person with reference to whom any 
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proceedings shall have been taken under this act is or is not an Aboriginal.”25 Thus, skin colour 
and other visual characteristics grew in importance and potentially to the exclusion of other 
important cultural factors. As racial mixing became a great concern throughout Australia, visible 
biological features like skin colour and facial features took precedence over lifestyle, kinship and 
residency in determining identity. 
The major challenge for officials in most states was creating a definition that did not 
interfere with policy directives, whether they be for segregation or assimilation. Definitions had 
to be inclusive enough to give Boards control over as many Aboriginal people and descendants 
as they wanted without interfering with those who were living in mainstream society, especially 
those ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people. As one member of Parliament noted during the debate 
over the 1909 Aborigines Protection bill in New South Wales, the act should not interfere with 
‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people “who elected to lead the life of white men, and to go out 
working for their living” – what this particular official called “an ordinary decent life.”26 In fact, 
the stated primary purpose of New South Wales’ 1909 act was to focus on what was considered 
the ‘half-caste problem.  For New South Wales, as elsewhere, this was a combination of social, 
health, and moral issues that included disease, prostitution, premarital and interracial sex, and 
illegitimate children unclaimed by their white fathers. From the perspectives of policy makers, 
these were social transgressions that challenged the centrality of the nuclear family to the social 
fabric of a newly forming country in a vulnerable state. This bill would provide greater control 
over and reduction of a mixed population, and thus, rectify this problem.  
According to the New South Wales government, the problem only increased. In 1914, 
amendments were again proposed to remedy the ‘half-caste problem. Greater powers over 
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children would be granted, allowing the Board to remove them without consent. The problem for 
officials was that some Aboriginal individuals were able avoid the reaches of the law my moving 
out of state. Some parents relocated in close-by Victoria where the New South Wales law no 
longer applied. Since states often made residency a requirement for the definition of Aboriginal, 
Aboriginal people of New South Wales would not be considered Aboriginal in Victoria and 
consequently, not under the power of that act.
27
 They would also be free from the New South 
Wales act if they were not physically present in that state. Indeed, this was the case throughout 
Australia and a way in which Aboriginal people could circumvent the paternalistic control of the 
law: simply by moving across state lines. 
Aboriginal or half-caste? 
The factors that went into creating categories of ‘Aboriginal’ or ‘half-caste’ extended 
beyond legal definitions. Indeed, even how those legal definitions were applied in practice was 
never as clear or consistent as the law – and the law was rarely clear or consistent. Instead, 
officials showed far greater ambiguity about where ‘half-castes’ belonged. As legislation in some 
states suggested, residency was a significant factor in determining status or identity of those 
individuals who might otherwise be considered racially ambiguous. But sometimes ‘mixed-race’ 
Aboriginal people were included as Aboriginals no matter what their living situation. For 
instance, a 1948 survey report in Western Australia claimed that in terms of labour, ‘half-castes’ 
were not equal to whites and should be considered on par with Aboriginals. F.E.A. Bateman, 
magistrate and author of the report, believed that “neither his living conditions nor his 
commitments are comparable with those of the white.”28 Bateman’s comments served as an apt 
example of the ambivalence Australians felt towards ‘mixed race’ Aboriginal people: where laws 
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excluded them as ‘Aboriginal,’ society excluded them as ‘white. They were also an example of 
the ‘relational’ way in which ‘mixed race’ people were defined. 
While Bateman separated ‘half-castes’ from whites, others were clear to separate them 
from ‘Aboriginals. In New South Wales in 1883, the Protector noted in his annual report that 
‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people should be “compelled to work” while Aboriginals should be 
“aided in doing something for his own sustenance and comfort.” 29  Residence should also 
distinguish Aboriginal and ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people in the opinion of many 
administrators. In Western Australia, Moseley argued, “The native camps should contain only 
full blood aborigines. As I have already observed, there is a duty on the community to see that 
half-castes are placed in surroundings and given a training which will fit them later to take their 
place, if necessary, in a white civilisation.”30 Of course, not all Western Australian officials 
agreed with this division, but states like Victoria and New South Wales had more consistently 
applied a distinction between the two groups. 
Officials did not always separate ‘mixed race’ Aboriginal people in relation to this 
binary. As in Canada, a few exceptional administrators recognized the diversity that could exist 
among mixed populations. John Bleakley, protector in Queensland, explained that “we 
distinguish between cross-breeds of definite aboriginal leanings, and those of civilised leanings.”  
Educational policies were fitted according to these classifications, as ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal 
people were more likely to receive education and vocational training than Aboriginals. Yet, this 
commission still “found them sorely at a disadvantage by reason of racial, educational, and 
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temperamental disabilities.” Bleakley’s own ambivalence towards the education of ‘mixed-race’ 
Aboriginal people was thus apparent.
31
 
Outside of residency, blood quantum could also make up one of the factors considered in 
determining status. However, instead of bringing the certitude that quantification might, it 
brought more ambiguity. As in the US, there was a general agreement among many officials that 
one-quarter blood quantum drew the line between white and Aboriginal. In reality, the rule was 
not held with any meaning. Even though most governments did not actually track individuals’ 
exact blood quantum, they attempted to distinguish ‘half-castes’ from ‘quadroons’ and 
‘octoroons’ – terminology that reflected an antebellum US more than it did a typical Aboriginal 
policy. In part, the introduction of these terms was a response to continuing, and even increasing, 
ambiguity about the meaning and definition of ‘half-caste. Literally, it meant a one-half blood 
quantum. But as discussed above, the term was used loosely and ambiguously to define any 
person of mixed Aboriginal ancestry. The increasing use of these more specific terms was also a 
response to what was interpreted as an expanding Aboriginal population. As one official in New 
South Wales commented in 1912, “In the past, the only distinction made in the collection of the 
census has been between ‘full-bloods’ and ‘half-castes,’ and in the latter term have been 
embraced all who are not of the full-blood, including quadroons and octoroons, who have really 
no right on a reserve set apart for the use of aborigines, and will, it is hoped, be gradually weeded 
out.” 32  Indeed, many policy makers were vehemently opposed to the inclusion of ‘lighter 
skinned’ Aboriginals being included as Aboriginal in the legal and financial sense. 
While there were, again, concerns about the costs of Aboriginal affairs at work here, 
there was also an impetus to make the problem less visible. With an ‘out of sight, out of mind’ 
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approach, governments solved their ‘problems’ by simply removing ‘mixed race’ Aboriginal 
people from Aboriginal reserves and stations. States like Victoria took up this initiative with full 
vigour. By simply making it illegal for ‘half-castes’ to reside at Lake Tyers, the last of the 
Aboriginal reserves in Victoria in the twentieth century, the ‘problem’ conveniently disappeared, 
at least as a government matter.
33
 There, as was the case in most states, officials believed that 
‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people with light skin did not need protection and were thus ineligible 
for state aid. Instead, they were viewed as ‘lazy paupers’ living off the state.34 For instance, one 
Aboriginal man was denied permission to marry a mixed-ancestry woman as, the Board 
explained, “the marriage of an Aboriginal to a half-caste is not desirable.”  Such a marriage 
would also have made this man ineligible to live on the station unless this marriage was 
sanctioned by the Board.
35
 It was in ways like this that the state barred ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal 
people from being legally considered Aboriginal.
36
 But this was nothing more than an opportune 
excuse for government officials looking to reduce their obligation: eventually, all Aboriginal 
people, no matter their blood quantum, would be forced into mainstream society. 
As is now well known, these definitions were also used to establish wardship over 
Indigenous and mixed-ancestry children. The protector essentially became the sole custodian of 
Aboriginal children, and especially for those of mixed descent. Contrary to the basic premises of 
child welfare laws, the directorate could remove mixed-ancestry children from their homes, and 
often did, even without justifiable cause or reason. In these instances, that meant removing them 
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from the care and influence of their Aboriginal parents and placing them in state-run schools, 
homes, or private residences to carry out domestic and other low-skilled labour duties.  
With little question, this policy was specifically designed to facilitate the biological 
absorption of Aboriginal people into the white population. The predominant twentieth-century 
belief regarding race and aboriginal people was that their physical traits could be absorbed within 
three generations if properly administered:  within this time frame, some hypothesized, all 
physical traces of Aboriginal heritage would disappear. This ‘biological absorption’ was seen as 
an easily achievable goal since there was already a growing mixed-ancestry population. By 
removing them to towns and cities that were predominantly white, it was believed that they 
would naturally assimilate and integrate into those societies, marrying “up” (the term used for 
marrying white or lighter), and eventually, eliminating all traces of the Aboriginal race. 
Creating definitions of Aboriginal clearly did not coincide with Aboriginal identity 
practices. The trauma caused by these removals, for both the children and the parents, is now 
well documented. But also, as elsewhere, the impositions of state law onto cultural definitions 
created a legacy of social and cultural alienation. Cultural and social patterns of ‘mixed-race’ 
Aboriginal people were evident in the officials’ reports, even if they were not respected or 
understood. In Western Australia in 1956, for instance, Commissioner of Native Affairs Stanley 
Middleton noted that there were many ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people who, despite their mixed 
genealogy, were part of Aboriginal communities. He explained that they were “fully accepted 
and their different skin does not count anymore.”37 In addition, officials in states and territories 
across the country repeatedly reported that Aboriginal people objected to having their 
communities divided by blood quantum. The law would rarely heed those protests, though. As in 
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Canada and the US, the imposition of categories onto individuals of mixed ancestry would 
continue to clash with Aboriginal kinship systems of identity. 
Sex, Marriage, and Racial Mixing 
While the ambivalence of policy makers continued to complicate Aboriginal policy, the 
anti-miscegenetic sentiment was even more contradictory to states’ goals of assimilating ‘mixed-
race’ Aboriginal people. Administrators commented extensively and frequently on matters 
relating to the increase of the ‘half-caste’ population, particularly in regard to women and sexual 
conduct. The moralization of interracial unions occurred in Canada and the US, too; but it was 
more pronounced in Australian official discourse.
38
 This sentiment was so entrenched, in fact, 
that it was legislated in most states: laws prohibited sexual relations between the races, regulated 
marriages to the extent of requiring approval, punished white men for associating or living with 
Aboriginal women, created a set of regulations to control the movement of Aboriginal women 
and girls, and informally regulated sexual morals among Aboriginal people, but especially 
among Aboriginal women and women of mixed ancestry.
39
 Thus, while policy claimed to be 
working towards the assimilation of ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people, a counter force was in 
actuality working to maintain racial boundaries. 
From the perspective of most government officials, the link among racial ambiguity, the 
‘problem’ of mixed-race, and women was evident. As has been well established elsewhere, the 
associations between race and character in nineteenth-century racial thinking were often 
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gendered.
40
 But it was perhaps more evident in Australia. As one Queensland official stated in 
1896, “We can hardly expect the emotions of the savage woman to be under more severe control 
than those of the white. All aboriginal girls, with a few rare exceptions, would drift towards one 
common destination involving their own degradation and additional burdens on the State.”41 The 
barely disguised message remained clear: Aboriginal women were oversexed, unable to control 
themselves, and the cause of the ‘mixed race problem.  This problem – or rather, its solution – 
lay in controlling this “sexual promiscuity,” as administrators all across Australia would attempt 
to do. Officials in all states sought to achieve this end by regulating the activities and limiting the 
freedom of women of Aboriginal descent – those seen as responsible for propagating a ‘half-
caste race’ and those who bore the brunt of society’s scorn. 
‘Propagation of the Species’ 
That administrators saw an increased ‘mixed-race’ population as a problem was perhaps 
obvious. But more specifically, what administrators saw as the propagation of a ‘mixed-race 
species’ was at the heart of this perceived problem. There were two related issues at stake here. 
First was the increase in the number of mixed-race individuals. Just as concerning to officials, 
though, were their ties to Aboriginal communities. For those who believed it would be easier, 
and even desirable, to assimilate ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal peoples, continuing community 
connections were considered detrimental. As the 1899 annual report for Western Australia noted 
with alarm, “The intercourse between the races is leading to a considerable increase of half-
castes. Many of them find their way into the Missions, but a far greater number are probably 
reared in native camps, without any sort of education. This is a question which, I think, should 
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receive consideration by the Legislature.” 42  The comment suggests that the increase of the 
‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal population was implicitly an increase in the Aboriginal population. This 
was not an anomalous comment: for the next several years, the chief protector continued to 
lament the growing half-caste population, and to offer solutions in the way of marriage 
regulation. He expressed his “great anxiety” over “the multiplication of them in a more rapid 
degree in years to come.” 43 In order to stop propagation of a ‘half-caste’ race, women would 
need to be supervised, ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people would need to be removed from 
Aboriginal communities, and marriage choices would need to be carefully monitored.  
In addition to concerns that ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people were being absorbed into 
Aboriginal communities were concerns that they were forming their own communities, 
especially in larger centers. Neither, apparently, was acceptable to Protection Board officials. 
Towns such as Broome in Western Australia and Alice Springs in the Northern Territory were of 
special concern to administrators there who were anxious about their growing ‘mixed-race’ 
Aboriginal populations. Moral conduct was seen as lacking especially in these centres. For 
instance, a 1935 Western Australia report cited “the dangers of bringing a certain type of highly 
sexed half-caste girl to the city.”44 It commented further that, 
Broome has, and for some time past has had, greater police protection than any other 
Northern or North-West town, and yet we find in the Broome Police District, according 
to latest returns, 417 half-castes – more than half the total half-caste population of the 
North. The town of Broome is not responsible for all these. Some of them have been 
brought from other districts to Missions within the Broome Police District, but it is 
generally admitted that a great number of them were born in Broome, and to-day the 
number of half-castes in the town itself is not far short of 150.
 45
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Part of the solution, according to this official, was to keep Aboriginal camps a distance from 
town limits. This would supposedly reduce the amount of contact between Aboriginals and 
whites, and thus, put a check on the growing mixed-ancestry population. Logic obviously defied 
this particular administrator: ‘half-castes’ would continue to increase as a result of endogenous 
pairing.  
The anti-miscegenetic sentiment was almost as noticeable in Australia as it was in US in 
regard to African Americans. Government officials, including Western Australia’s Moseley, 
commented openly: “it is regrettable that my investigations have satisfied me that in certain parts 
of the North intercourse between the white man and the aboriginal woman exists to a degree 
which is as amazing as it is undesirable.”46 A Queensland reverend similarly recommended that 
it was desirable to stop “promiscuous intercourse of [Aboriginal] women with Europeans.” 47 
Indeed, racial mixing appeared to be a personal affront to some of its observers.  
In addition to this personal affront, and in violation of a widely accepted British code of 
ethics, one of the problems of racial mixing was the sheer difficulty of identifying and 
classifying individuals. As one official in Victoria made blatantly clear in his 1957 report, 
‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people fundamentally disrupted the order of census-taking and statistics 
production. He complained that, 
The principal inaccuracy arises from the difficulty of assessing the percentage of 
aboriginal blood in many cases. Over the succeeding generations, dating from the very 
early days of settlement till now, there has been such a high degree of miscegenation, 
and of sexual promiscuity on the part of aboriginal women and white men (and some 
coloured men of other nationalities), that such an assessment could, at best, be only 
approximate. Personal observation on my visits to aboriginal communities indicated 
that, included in the figures given, were some who were fairly obviously of less than 
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one-fourth aboriginal blood, but who, brought up by their mothers in aboriginal 
communities, are generally regarded, by themselves and others, as aborigines.
48
  
The inability to clearly classify mixed ancestry individuals suggested the level of anxiety about 
racial mixing. It was made worse by ‘near-white’ individuals who, despite their appearance, 
lived as Aboriginals – what seemed as a contradiction to those who adhered to racial ideologies. 
In short, racial mixing made a person’s identity ambiguous. That in itself defied the principle of 
racial thinking: that people could be classified according to a set of biological traits. 
Sex  
The sexual activities of Aboriginal women and girls were of considerable concern for two 
primary reasons. Not only did they produce that unwanted mixed-ancestry population, but they 
also contradicted the moral code of Victorian Britain. Women were having sex out of wedlock, 
and were producing non-nuclear families. This, as one administrator in the Northern Territory 
put it, was wrong: “there is no doubt that evil is increasing, and will increase, and, though I do 
not think any amount of legislation would stop it, still so much check might be put upon it as 
would prevent that damage to both races which appears to be inevitable without legislation.” 49 
This contempt was widespread, and only seldom was it accompanied by either sympathy 
or critical thinking about the situation of these girls and women or the cultural protocols of 
Aboriginal people. Rarely was consideration given to the violence and absence of consent that 
could often accompany these liaisons. Officials were aware of such circumstances, as the same 
Queensland report noted in 1896 in discussing the activities of beche-de-mer (or sea cucumber) 
and pearl-shell boaters on the coast of Queensland. Commissioner Archibald Meston, author of 
the report, acknowledged that “in some cases the women were taken by force, and in the 
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disturbance that followed one or more of the men were shot.” 50 Awareness of this incident or 
others like it, though, did little to incite action from government officials.
 51
 Instead, they focused 
their efforts – and legislation – on prohibiting consensual unions. As Tony Austin says about the 
Northern Territory, “It was common knowledge that much of the conflict on the frontier was 
caused by the sexual exploitation of Aboriginal women. Yet retaliation by Aborigines against 
whites who abducted or otherwise abused their women was not regarded as noble.”52 Instead, 
Aboriginal women were blamed as the instigators of these incidents.  
The opinions administrators had of Aboriginal women were low; but they were often 
even lower of mixed-ancestry women. A 1910 annual protection report for South Australia 
commented on “the sad condition of the half-castes, especially the females, who are considered 
by many to be a proper prey for their passions. If the half-caste female remains with the tribe we 
lose a possible good addition to European civilization, while with her undoubted high instincts 
she is not regarded as a favourable addition to the camp. If she is brought into civilization she 
finds no companionship, and naturally drifts downward.”53 A similar sentiment was repeated in 
the Northern Territory in a 1938 report, where the administrator, C.T. Abbott, lamented that: 
The female half-caste life’s history is generally a sad one... Most unfortunately from the 
age of puberty she is the prey of the degenerate white and strangely enough, but to a 
lesser degree, of the black. As a rule she is not so much immoral as unmoral, and does 
not appear to have any powers of resistance. The result is that practically every female 
half-caste in the Darwin area has become the mother of at least one illegitimate child 
and very often more than one. For the last year, since I have been here, the Quarantine 
Station has been used for the purpose of treating V.D. women, all of whom have been 
half-castes and some of whom are married women.
54
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Female ‘half-castes’ were thus accorded at least the potential to advance, but that was often all 
they were granted. Implicitly, they were blamed for the degradation of moral and public health. 
However, white men, labelled as unscrupulous and immoral by government officials, 
shared some of the blame. An 1896 Queensland report claimed that “one of the first effects on a 
black race of contact with a white one is to excite cupidity, involving degeneracy towards a 
social and moral depravity that even sacrifices the virtue of the women in order that the cupidity 
may be gratified.” 55  The public was often involved in this persecution. Complaints were 
sometimes sent into the Board telling of white men living unlawfully with ‘half-caste’ women. 
The 1910 case of W.G. Moir in Western Australia is a case in point: Mr. Moir was convicted of 
an offence under s. 43 of the Aborigines Act, which stated that the cohabitation of a non-
Aboriginal man with an Aboriginal woman was punishable by a fine. Mr. Moir believed that the 
girl was not an Aboriginal under the act, having lived with white people her whole life (or, at 
least that is what he claimed). The Chief Protector of Western Australia, C.F. Gale, deemed that 
she was in fact Aboriginal under the law. As a ‘half-caste’ who had resided with her mother 
(considered a ‘full blood’ Aboriginal person), Gale declared the daughter an Aboriginal under 
the law, making their relationship criminal. It was ‘concerned citizens’ writing into the 
department to report these specific incidents that made the law, otherwise difficult to enforce, 
any success at all.
56
 The public then served as a check on otherwise unenforceable anti-
miscegenation laws.
57
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White men, then, were included in laws to punish them for consorting with Aboriginal 
women. Interracial sex became posited as an ‘unnatural’ act in terms of scientifically-informed 
anti-miscegenetic attitudes, as well as a moral violation in terms of Victorian principles of social 
conduct. ‘Mixed-race’ Aboriginal people thus took on the additional scorn of society. The 1934 
Queensland act included the punishment of non-Aboriginal males for consorting, cohabiting, or 
soliciting any Aboriginal female for “immoral purposes” or “carnal knowledge.”58 For white 
men engaging in sexual relations with Aboriginal women, the issue was not so much the act as it 
was their lack of responsibility for the child afterward. As Neville asserted at the 1937 
Commonwealth Conference, “What does matter is that, when a child is born and the father 
cannot be found, the child becomes a charge upon the state.”59 Indeed, these fathers were not 
encouraged by the fine awaiting them to come forth and claim their children. As Austin notes for 
the Northern Territory in 1920-21, “there were 20 recorded births of ‘half-castes’ and 
‘quadroons,’ but there was sufficient evidence for the Courts to compel only one father to 
contribute to a child’s maintenance.”60 In a country that overwhelmingly claimed assimilation 
through biological integration as its main goal, anti-miscegenetic laws were an obvious but 
unexplained contrast. 
Unsurprisingly, not everyone agreed, and some even fully supported racial mixing. A.O. 
Neville, Chief Protector of Western Australia, is probably the best known of these, depicted as he 
is in the popular movie Rabbit-Proof Fence attempting to convince a women’s Christian group 
that biological absorption was possible within three generations.
61
 He held that “the aborigines 
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have intermarried with our people. I know of some 80 white men who are married to native 
women, with whom they are living happy, contented lives, so I see no objection to the ultimate 
absorption into our own race of the whole of the existing Australian native race.”62 There were, 
perhaps, few options for a state where the demographics did not favour ignoring the problem – as 
had also been the case in Victoria. 
Marriage 
Far less difficult to regulate than sexual unions were marriages, already licensed under 
state law. However, it was never entirely clear what administrators were trying to accomplish in 
doing so – that is, if they were attempting to slow miscegenation, or encourage it to accelerate 
biological absorption. The 1905 Western Australia act regulated marriage by including the clause 
that “no marriage of a female Aboriginal with any person other than an Aboriginal shall be 
celebrated without permission, in writing, of the Chief Protector.”63 But their powers extended 
beyond that: “In practice, no permission is granted for a white or a half-caste to marry an 
aboriginal woman. Half-caste males and, where possible, Europeans, are encouraged to marry 
half-caste girls. Half-caste girls are encouraged to marry whites approved by the Chief Protector. 
The question of whether the Government will pursue the policy of encouraging half-caste 
women to marry whites is at present receiving consideration.”64 The actual application of the law 
reflected the attitudes of officials in ways that were not as accessible in the wording of the law 
itself: the racial hierarchy dictated marriage consent. 
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And not everyone agreed that biological absorption through marriage was the key to 
assimilation. At the 1937 Commonwealth Conference, Queensland’s Mr. McLean argued that his 
state was opposed to the marriage of mixed-ancestry females to white men for three reasons: 
 (1) None but the lowest type of white man will be willing to marry a half-caste girl, and 
as the half-caste women married by the white men are likely to gravitate to aboriginal 
associations such marriages have very little chance of being successful. (2) there is the 
danger of blood transmission or “throw back”, as it is called, especially as the 
introduced blood, as in many Latin races, has already a taint of white blood; (3) such a 
scheme makes no provision for other wives of young men of the same breed.
65
 
His concern about ‘throw back’ was a reflection of the precarious balance of what proponents of 
biological absorption saw between white and Aboriginal blood: without the ‘right’ formula, the 
eventual biological absorption predicted by some would fail. In reality, few actually believed the 
scientific claims of the day that any visible sign of Aboriginal ancestry would disappear in three 
generations. Furthermore, officials found such unions difficult to fathom. In South Australia, at 
least one administrator did not think it likely that white men would want to marry a mixed-
ancestry woman, especially if given the choice. He opined that “no white men, if white women 
are available, will marry a half-caste aboriginal.”66 Myth or fact, the attitudes towards mixed 
marriages were evident.
67
 
Only three states, Western Australia, Queensland, and the Northern Territory actually 
incorporated marriage regulation into law, but many others practiced the policy nonetheless.
68
  In 
Victoria, for instance, there was no legislation to regulate marriage, yet officials did so anyway. 
According to historian Katherine Ellinghaus, marriages were regulated by controlling residence 
on stations. She argues, “when the BPA had the power to remove people from their families and 
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homes and force them into a racist community without any financial support, legal power to 
prevent marriages was hardly necessary.”69 With or without that legal power, no consistency 
would be practiced. While some officials granted licenses only in rare circumstances, others, like 
the Northern Territory’s Chief Protector, Spencer, granted them liberally, especially in cases 
where the union was long standing or had already produced children.
70
 More significantly, as Dr. 
Morris noted at the 1937 commonwealth conference, “you cannot stop them from having babies 
even if they don’t marry.”71 
Finally, in the 1930s, official policy supported the promotion of ‘racial’ integration: 
mixed marriages were encouraged, in stark contrast to a previous policy that prohibited 
interracial unions.
72
 This change might have, in part, been attributable to a countervailing belief 
that persons of mixed descent were better suited for the Australian climate. It was also likely part 
of a process of elimination: by this point, other attempts to ‘civilize’ Aboriginal Australia had 
clearly failed. It was also obvious that any attempt to control interracial sexual relations was 
futile. This shift in policy, then, seems to be more a shift in tactic than in actual thought. 
Consistently, official policy had attempted assimilation by targeting mixed-blood populations.  
Race and Labour 
Labour as a site of interracial contact also became an area to be regulated. In contrast to 
Canada and the US, labour played a significant role in Australian Aboriginal policy. Labour 
contracts, legislated by protection acts in most states, defined the terms of employment for 
individuals considered Aboriginal under the law. In Australia, Aboriginal people could not be 
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employed unless the permission of the protector was granted and a labour contract negotiated. 
The state then supervised, regulated, and controlled Aboriginal labour in Australia. Purportedly, 
this was for the protection of Aboriginal people; but in reality, it was often to prevent unmarried 
men of European descent from acquiring female Aboriginal labourers.
73
 The regulation of 
Aboriginal labour thus afforded the opportunity for officials to reject potential employers that 
might make contributions toward that growing ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal population officials were 
so concerned about. Consequently, labour played an important role in governments’ policies 
towards ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people.74  
Clearly, the primary concern for government officials was that unsupervised interracial 
interactions meant opportunities for interracial mixing. In fact, this is where much of it occurred. 
Protectors in almost all states commented frequently about the number of girls hired out as 
domestic labour returning pregnant or with babies. A Victoria official commented on this 
problem in 1882: 
The hiring out of the half-castes is a matter that has been frequently under the 
consideration of the Board. The difficulty (with regard to females) is not in finding 
people who would undertake to employ them, but in finding those who would also hold 
themselves responsible to the Board for their well-being, moral and physical... I think it 
is a very dangerous thing that half-caste girls should be allowed to go out into service, 
as we have to receive them back with babies.
75
 
Even though the labour of Aboriginal females was regulated, then, it still resulted in what were 
from the department’s view unwanted pregnancies. However, Aboriginal people constituted a 
much-needed labour source for the sparsely populated new Australia. Young women of mixed 
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ancestry were the preferable choice for domestic labour in white Australian homes, so the labour 
needs of the country, then, contrasted the racial morality of its citizens.
76
  
Exemption 
The policy of exemption worked in concert with legal definitions of Aboriginal peoples 
and highlighted the inherent contradictions of those definitions. Under this policy, eligible 
applicants were exempted from the terms of the protection act. Exemption, not dissimilar from 
policies of enfranchisement and allotment in Canada and the US, purported to grant full 
citizenship rights to certain individuals who met criteria, after which they would no longer be 
subject to the terms of Aboriginal legislation, such as the Protection acts that most states had. 
Like most policies of this nature, it had a dual nature: on the one hand, it lifted certain legal 
restrictions from individuals, allowing them the freedoms that were accorded to citizens. But on 
the other hand, it ‘de-Indianized’ them and forced them to sever ties to their Aboriginal 
communities, resulting in what were sometimes detrimental consequences for their cultural 
identities.
77
 While the exemption policy was indeed a process of legal elimination and 
paternalistic control, as has frequently been argued,
78
 it also demonstrates the ambiguous nature 
of racial identification, and the ambivalence officials felt about ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people.  
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Most states administered an exemption program.
79
 Queensland was the first to enact such 
a clause in its 1897 protection act, granting authority to the Minister to issue a certificate of 
exemption to any ‘half-caste’ he deemed eligible. Western Australia followed suit in 1905, 
though exemptions could be granted to Aboriginals as well as ‘half-castes.  South Australia’s 
1911 act provided a similar clause, though it, too, allowed Aboriginals to receive an exemption. 
The terms there extended to those fully employed who did not reside on the reserve, and to 
females who were married to a non-Aboriginal.
80
 As Austin has argued, it was more difficult for 
mixed-race women from the Northern Territory working in South Australia, who had to apply 
for exemption. They were singled out as in need of full protection, even beyond their transition 
into adulthood, because of the stereotypes associated with mixed-race Aboriginal women, 
particularly in regard to their ability to handle money or their sexual behaviour. As Austin further 
explains, “in an age in which State girls were considered, by virtue of the background from 
which they came, to be at greater moral risk than the rest of their age cohort, ‘Half-caste’ girls 
were considered too low even to warrant the same treatment as State children.”81 Exemptions for 
female ‘half-castes’ in the Northern Territory became even more difficult after 1931 when Cecil 
Cook, a particularly paternalistic bureaucrat, became Chief Protector.
82
 It became increasingly 
difficult to receive exemption, and as discussed earlier, some Aboriginal people chose to leave 
the state, in which case the act would no longer apply to them. 
In the first years of the exemption policy, there appeared to be little direct impact, at least 
in terms of its intended effect. Few exemptions were initially granted.
83
 But by the late 1930s, 
officials in several states made a more aggressive effort at increasing the number of exemptions 
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– a process which would reduce the Aboriginal population through legal de-Indianization. 
Several states amended their acts to broaden the policy. For example, in 1936, Western Australia 
expanded its exemption clause to include terms of revoking the certificate. In 1939, South 
Australia did the same, while also greatly expanding its clause on exemption certificates, 
focusing on the inclusion of criteria such as “intelligence” and “character” – a policy that 
paralleled Canada’s own enfranchisement policy. That same year, Queensland amended its 
exemption clause to include Aboriginals, not just ‘half-castes,’ and power to revoke the 
certificate. This was also the period when New South Wales implemented its own exemption 
policies. 
This policy, then, could vary from state to state, but generally, the terms were similar in 
nature if not wording. All states required applicants to demonstrate some degree of ‘civilization,’ 
which might be proved through education, employment, or lifestyle. Additionally, they all also 
required the applicant to sever his or her ties with Aboriginal family and friends, and by 
consequence, could not continue living on a reserve or camp. It was eligibility that varied. Some 
states accepted only ‘half-caste’ applicants, while others considered Aboriginals as well. 
As became typical for Australia, policy was not always followed by practice. Officials 
frequently displayed ambivalence toward the policy and the implementation or application of 
these criteria. For instance, the policy of a woman taking on her husband’s status was not 
adhered to. An example in Western Australia demonstrates this. Alred Eudes, of Aboriginal 
descent, applied for an exemption. The Chief Protector did not require him, as a ‘quadroon’ to 
receive exemption since, under the law, he was not considered Aboriginal. Yet, his ‘half-caste’ 
wife was considered Aboriginal under the law, and so was required to apply for exemption.
84
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Thus, there was a discrepancy between the state’s legal-racial designations on the one hand and 
how individuals were actually treated on the other. 
Another significant way in which the exemption policy demonstrated ambivalence 
towards ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people was in its reasoning – or lack thereof – for rejection. 
One of the more common considerations was the purchase of alcohol. Those designated legally 
as ‘Aboriginal’ were prohibited from purchasing alcohol. This prohibition became increasingly 
contentious especially as ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people moved into towns and cities and joined 
the labour force. For instance, one 1912 application for exemption by a ‘half-caste’ was denied 
because the Chief Protector believed the exemption “would undoubtedly be abused in the 
direction of supplying Aborigines with liquor, which would be against the public peace, and a 
source of annoyance to many Europeans living in the vicinity where natives are camped.”85 The 
‘half-castes’ who applied for these exemptions were understandably offended. As their protests 
indicated, they associated the freedom to purchase alcohol and have a drink at the local 
establishment after work as part of the male workforce culture and a sign of their acceptance into 
mainstream society. To be denied this right was not only a violation of their rights of citizenship, 
but it was emasculating: these individuals were ultimately denied participation in their workforce 
culture. Nonetheless, officials were highly concerned that ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people would 
purchase alcohol, either for themselves or for Aboriginals in camps or stations. Alcohol was 
closely associated with what officials perceived as immorality, of which racial mixing was also a 
part. Thus, the connections between alcohol, morality, sexuality, and racial mixing comprised a 
matrix of reasoning, illogical as it may have been, in regard to policy and how officials made 
decisions about ‘half-caste’ identity. However, no one seemed to notice that ‘mixed-race’ 
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Aboriginal people applying for exemption were expected to live up to moral standards that 
exceeded that of their white counterparts – a situation not dissimilar from Canada’s 
enfranchisement policy. 
Another situation in the Northern Territory demonstrated continuing ambivalence. Three 
Alice Springs half-castes who had all served in the Army Labour Corps during World War II had 
applied for exemptions and were denied. Again, the reasoning was the purchase and 
consumption of alcohol. The Director of Native Affairs felt that “It was not fair to subject them 
to temptations above their level.”86 That is, even though ‘half-castes’ were considered eligible to 
contribute to the war efforts of their country, they were not deemed capable enough to handle a 
drink with their comrades. This was in part an extension of concerns about Alice Springs, and 
what was seen as its ‘moral demise’ due to the number of ‘unseemly half-castes’ there. The large 
presence of ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people itself was considered problematic; but the 
combination of that with drinking and gambling made it intolerable from the government’s 
viewpoint. It was recommended by the director that these three be moved away from Alice 
Springs to a more northern location. In short, the Director of Native Affairs recommended 
segregation as a means of dealing with the so-called ‘native problem.’ 
Yet another example from the Northern Territory demonstrates the policy’s continuing 
ambiguity, particularly how its actions contradicted its stated goal of assimilation. In 1938, Mrs. 
Reid requested exemption from the act. While she had previously been married to an Aboriginal 
man, she had since left him. She was living in a common law relationship with another man – not 
Aboriginal – and had two children by him. C.E. Cook, then Director of Native Affairs, denied 
her application on the grounds that she “is not of sufficient standard of education or social 
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conduct to merit exemption. Her request can have no other motive than to legalise her present 
relationship with Crombie [her common law husband]. It seems that the application is being 
pressed, not so much for the freedom of Mrs. Reid as for the immunity of Crombie.”87 Mrs. Reid 
had, according to the Northern Territory Administration, been released from the Half-Caste 
institution “on the condition that she did not cohabit with Crombie, who had previously been 
convicted for this offence.”88 So, even though the claimed goal was racial integration, and Mrs. 
Reid was doing precisely that, she was prohibited from doing so. Their relationship remained a 
criminal one, and her partner, subject to prosecution. 
Protests did not just come from men wanting to get a drink after work. A group of women 
in Broome, Western Australia, still held to be Aboriginal under the act, requested their 
exemption on the grounds that they worked for and lived as whites. They also argued that their 
marriage prospects were limited by their legal status, which had the effect of deterring non-
Aboriginal suitors. But mostly, they asked for their freedom – the freedom that any other citizen 
in their position enjoyed – so they could “rule our lives and make ourselves true and good 
citizens.”89 Neville refused to deal with their complaints, citing the limitations of the law as his 
excuse, but did suggest that the forthcoming amendment might alter their position. Whether or 
not these women ever received exemption is not indicated by the surviving record, but even in 
1935, when the petition was addressed, officials did in fact have the authority to do so. The 1905 
act contained an exemption clause, and the residency clause in its definition rendered the women 
non-Aboriginal. But, as discussed earlier, Broome was considered one of the ‘problem’ centres 
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in Australia, where immorality and debauchery, unchecked, resulted in the further increase of a 
‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal population – much to the chagrin of government officials. This is 
perhaps why Neville refused their petition in 1935. 
Success and failure are difficult to discern in relation to this policy. Like elsewhere, 
Aboriginal people in Australia rejected the exemption policy by simply refusing to apply. It was 
both demeaning and difficult, and for many, not worth the effort. However, the social burden of 
discrimination forced some Aboriginal people to use exemption as an escape from the tutelage of 
the act, particularly for those who had situated themselves in towns and cities, or those who had 
or were searching for jobs.
90
 For those who did apply, the legacy of exemption has resulted in 
what Judi Wickes calls the “erasure of Indigenous cultural identity” as generations of people 
lived with the long-term effects, especially the disassociation from Aboriginal kinship and 
Country.
91
 But, more significantly for the purpose here, it was an ambiguous policy, and despite 
the differences in state law, this was a feature they all shared. As one Western Australian official 
explained, exemption was for “Natives who have reached a state of civilization equivalent to 
whites,” yet true equality was rarely accorded.92 Individuals of Aboriginal descent continued to 
be considered Aboriginal, even if they did not live in an Aboriginal community or as Aboriginal 
people in a cultural sense. Thus, the contrast between social and legal perspectives produced a 
void for Aboriginal people who did not fit the imagined racial dichotomy of the colonized world. 
What became apparent in twentieth-century Australia was that government officials were 
uncomfortable with facilitating the full and complete absorption of Aboriginal people into 
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mainstream society. Even more to the point, they were uncomfortable with relinquishing legal 
control over the lives of those individuals. 
Most significantly, exemption did not work because of the refusal of Aboriginal people to 
participate. Again and again, officials in various states found that Aboriginal people were 
unwilling to sever ties with their relations and ancestral lands, or ‘Country. Ultimately, 
exemption was part of a larger policy that sought to better define the division between 
Aboriginals and ‘half-castes,’ and especially to define the powers of officials over ‘half-castes’ 
who might otherwise be excluded. The impetus arose when government officials debated the 
inherent problems in a policy that either restricted assimilation or failed to prohibit certain 
undesirable activity, like purchasing alcohol. Policy thus sought to provide enough legal power 
over ‘half-castes’ to administer them when and if they lived as Aboriginals, while also granting 
them the freedom to release ‘half-castes’ from legislative control when and if they lived as 
whites. Since officials were ambivalent about that division, law needed to have a built-in 
flexibility but remain internally coherent and logical. It also needed to validate the actions that 
officials wanted to take. Exemption policies thus granted officials full liberties to control the 
lives of ‘mixed-race’ Aboriginal people as they saw fit. 
By the 1940s, the concept of exemption was gradually giving way to that of citizenship. 
A discourse of rights and citizenship was gradually replacing that of assimilation and 
segregation, and in the post-WWII climate, even government officials were becoming aware of 
the problems of keeping Aboriginal people under such paternalistic legal status. However, this 
did little to change their attitudes: officials still overwhelmingly believed in the idea of race and 
the merits of assimilation. Only the rhetoric changed. This was evidenced by Western Australia’s 
1944 Native Citizenship Act, which sought to grant full citizenship rights to Aboriginal people. 
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The act proved to be little more than its predecessor of exemption: Aboriginal people still had to 
apply for it, and meet criteria similar to those laid out for exemption, in this case, to demonstrate 
they possessed “the manner and habits of civilised life.”93 
Shifting Ideas 
Between the 1940s and 1960s, Aboriginal Affairs throughout Australia underwent major 
change. As the policy of assimilation gave way to a post-World War II climate of social equality, 
states altered and even repealed the protection acts which had fathered those policies. Aboriginal 
Affairs officials, then, were not seriously interested in assimilating Aboriginal people until after 
the 1940s. Until then, and quite consistently, officials professed to be interested in assimilating 
‘half-castes. In reality, though, officials could never really get behind this idea: Aboriginal 
people, even those with a low blood quantum, were still Aboriginal, and resistance to racial 
integration by a country dedicated to a ‘white’ policy trumped department plans or pragmatic 
considerations. Integrating them into society defied racial thinking and came up against attitudes 
that sought to maintain a boundary between black and white, but yet refused to accept them as 
‘real’ Aboriginals. 
By the mid-twentieth century, ideas about Aboriginal people began to change in a 
number of ways. Slowly officials were acknowledging the problems of racial theories, 
particularly in terms of racial superiority. They were also realizing the role of broader public 
attitudes about Aboriginal people, and the implications of racial discrimination for social and 
economic conditions.
94
 Officials distinguished less and less often between Aboriginals and half-
castes, focusing instead on shared socio-economic problems and rights of citizenship and 
                                                          
93
 Native Citizenship Act (WA), 1944. 
94
 Western Australia. “Report of the Special Committee on Native Matters (With particular reference to adequate 
finance),” 1958. 
 231 
 
equality. Social integration, with or without biological integration, was increasingly seen as the 
solution in a post-WWII era that forced the world to acknowledge the effects of racism and the 
socio-economic disparity it produced. This would become the new policy for all Aboriginal 
people of any degree of quantum. 
The policy of assimilation thus became fast-tracked by its redefinition as social 
integration. While officials focused less on involving themselves in that process, they accelerated 
it by ‘de-Indianizing’ Indigenous peoples though law and policy. In Victoria, for instance, 
stations and reserves were closed, leaving the Aboriginal population to relocate, often to urban 
areas, and search out jobs in the unskilled labour market.
95
 As one member noted of New South 
Wales in 1943,  
I am afraid we have reached the stage at which gradually the aboriginals will have to be 
accepted into the normal life of the community. Their blood is thinning out, generation 
after generation they are becoming more nearly white, and I think that not many years 
hence the aborigines will have to be absorbed into the community as a whole. In view 
of the mistakes that have been made in the past in not segregating them, I believe that is 
the only destiny to which they can look forward.
96
 
The 1951 Commonwealth conference confirmed as much: to most administrators, most 
Aboriginal people were of mixed descent, a point they considered meaningful, and thus, the only 
solution was a uniform policy of social integration for all.  
Conclusion 
While the 1937 Native Welfare Conference was seen as a turning point in Aboriginal 
policy, in reality it simply represented the collective acknowledgement of contradictory policies 
that had already been in operation since the 1880s. The attendees made a commitment to the 
integration of mixed-ancestry Aboriginal people, in contrast with a policy of continued 
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segregation for those Aboriginal people considered ‘full blood. The resolution only gave the 
appearance of commitment, though. Despite differences among state approaches to a commonly 
perceived ‘half-caste’ problem, collectively, individual state policies demonstrated a number of 
common features that suggested the same ambiguity and ambivalence towards ‘mixed-race’ 
Aboriginal people. The rule had been to assimilate ‘half-castes’ and segregate those Aboriginal 
people considered ‘full blood. However, conflicting sentiments of humanitarian concerns and 
anti-miscegenation ensured neither was effectively pursued. Instead, Aboriginal people, and 
especially those of mixed ancestry, were the subjects of ambivalent but exclusionary measures. 
Even though Australian officials stated their racist and anti-miscegenetic attitudes more 
openly, they were just as ambivalent and ambiguous about Aboriginal people of mixed ancestry 
as were officials in Canada and the US. Policies and laws that might be considered more 
restrictive, paternalistic, or even genocidal still reflected the uncertainties about race and racial 
mixing that late nineteenth- and early twentieth-century scientific theories propagated. Despite 
the practice, the same ideologies lurked beneath the surface as they did in Canada and the US. 
Aboriginal people of mixed ancestry provided a key impetus to the development and creation of 
Aboriginal policies throughout Australia. The drive to eliminate racial ambiguity was, indeed, a 
central factor in that process. 
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Chapter 7 - A Transnational Mixed-Race Discourse 
In examining Aboriginal policy with an eye to mixed-ancestry Natives, the ways in which 
these otherwise very different policies in very different countries overlap becomes apparent. In 
Canada, the US, and Australia, mixed-ancestry Natives produced ambiguity and ambivalence, 
and officials struggled to find a place for them in law and policy, and indeed, in their own 
personal paradigms shaped by nineteenth-century racial thinking. From a ‘western’ perspective, 
all of the varied and various peoples that had encountered each other over centuries of western 
colonialism could (or should) be understood in terms of clear-cut and immutable categories.
1
 
That much was clear. But the implications when those categories overlapped, mixed, blurred, 
and intersected were not. 
Over what was a relatively long period of time, law and policy in all three of these 
countries persistently and manifestly demonstrated ambiguity and ambivalence toward mixed-
ancestry Natives. The government officials who created and animated these laws and policies 
demonstrated ambiguity and ambivalence in applying them, too. They oscillated between 
defining mixed-ancestry Natives as Aboriginal and non-Aboriginal, and between employing 
policies of assimilation and segregation. Individual government officials vehemently debated 
these choices, and rarely, if ever, came to a consensus. But within this ambiguity and 
ambivalence lies one important consistency: government officials and even the public at large 
were uncertain about where mixed-ancestry Natives belonged. This uncertainty persists among 
the three countries under consideration here, over almost a century of law and policy. 
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Shifting Terrains of Mixed Race 
There is a clear correlation between what was happening in these laws and policies and 
what was happening in scientific debates at the end of the nineteenth century. As discussed in 
Chapter Three, scientists debated the merits and possibilities of racial mixing in an attempt to 
answer key questions about race and biology, particularly questions about species which hinged 
on fertility and origins. In short, two races that produced fertile offspring would be considered 
the same species, and if all races were the same species, then it followed that all humans had the 
same origin. The government officials who created and administered Aboriginal policies cared 
less for the finer points of science and religion, but the broader questions about the feasibility 
and desirability of racial mixing were significantly considered and debated. Questions about 
whether or not races should mix, and what the long-term implications were, proved to be quite 
significant to Aboriginal policy. At any rate, mixing produced uncertainty. The desire to 
eliminate racial ambiguity was simply a matter of attempting to reconcile a faulty worldview 
based on race with the reality of hybridity.  
In all three countries, concerns about racial mixing arose around the same time. In 
Canada, the gradual rise was evidenced in pre-Indian Act legislation that slowly but gradually 
eliminated mixed-ancestry Natives from its definition of “Indian.” Beginning in 1850, a series of 
legislative changes, all of which revolved around mixed ancestry, increasingly limited legal 
identity, either directly or indirectly. These provisions first established authority to define who 
was and was not Aboriginal, then eliminated mixed-ancestry Natives by parentage, and finally, 
excluded women who married non-Aboriginals.
2
 Simultaneously, the changing attitudes about 
racial mixing were reflected in changing treaty policy: what started out with an absence of 
                                                          
2
 Contrary to this clause, the 1876 Indian Act allowed non-Aboriginal women to take on status when they married 
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regulations or concerns for membership gradually came to exclude mixed-ancestry Natives from 
the terms of treaties. Finally, scrip reflected the uncertainty over the boundary between ‘Indian’ 
and ‘Halfbreed. Commissioners and Indian Agents struggled over how to draw that boundary 
when faced with the prospect of allowing treaty Indians to change their status to scrip 
Halfbreeds. Nothing more was required than to claim white ancestry, which could provide no 
indication of one’s cultural affiliation. In this case, much as with Australia’s exemption 
certificate and the US’s competency status, determining ‘race’ was a matter of determining a 
supposed degree of civilization and ability to support oneself.  
In the US, there was a similar but even more distinguishable rise in concern about racial 
mixing with the limits of tribal authority over membership. Pre-1871 policy reflected a tradition 
that respected and observed tribal authority over membership, even if that membership was of 
mixed ancestry. There was a marked shift in how government agents discussed racial mixing in 
the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries during the treaty era compared to how they 
discussed it after the middle of the nineteenth century in the allotment era. They expressed little 
or no objection to mixed-ancestry Natives as tribal members during early years; but after the 
1850s, concerns increased, and eventually, officials came to object to mixed-ancestry Natives 
being considered Native American. However, these objections were accompanied by 
ambivalence: as elsewhere, the official categorization of mixed-ancestry Natives remained 
ambiguous as policy officials, tribal authorities, and court judges debated their status. It was only 
with the passage of the 1934 act that any consistency was brought to Indian Affairs policy in the 
form of a uniform blood quantum. 
For Australia, the shift in policy and attitudes towards mixed-ancestry Natives was less 
discernible initially, mainly because there was little if any formal policy prior to 1850 – and in 
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fact, little settlement or contact prior to 1850 – that would provide the same point of comparison. 
Regardless, post-1850 policies unmistakably reflected scientific theories about race and racial 
mixing. Early legislation already demonstrated concerns about racial mixing, though concerted 
efforts to prevent ‘miscegenation’ were still decades away. The first of the protection acts, 
starting with Victoria’s 1869 Aborigines Protection Act, sought to clarify a difference between 
Aboriginal and ‘half-caste’ as legal definitions, but were unable to achieve this. Continuing 
ambiguity towards mixed-ancestry Natives despite stated goals of assimilation made practice and 
policy incompatible in all but a few select areas where Aboriginal populations constituted small 
minorities among a growing settler population. But in other states where the Aboriginal 
population was more significant, especially Queensland, the Northern Territory, and Western 
Australia, a growing mixed-ancestry Native population caused alarm among officials and a 
public who feared they would take over, at least demographically. Goals of assimilation were 
thwarted by policies of anti-miscegenation, where laws essentially prohibited sexual relations 
between Aboriginals and whites. This inherent tension was reflected in confused, ambivalent, 
and even contradictory distinctions between ‘Aboriginal’ and ‘half-caste’ in law, and in 
ambiguous attempts in practice. 
Thus, there is evidence in all three countries that shifting ideas about race and science 
infiltrated Aboriginal law and policy around the 1850s. Ideas and debates about race and racial 
mixing among scientists, especially those in Britain and the US, would instigate significant 
changes in policies specifically directed at mixed-ancestry Natives. These ideas, which came out 
of the post-Enlightenment scientific developments, found scientists debating the merits, viability, 
and desirability of racial mixing throughout the colonial world. As noted in Chapter Three, by 
1850 most of the western world adhered to the taxonomic philosophy of human difference that 
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was defined by categories of ‘race. Racial mixing defied this worldview, and indeed, threatened 
to undermine the entire science of racial categorization. Conversely, it was also a necessary 
contradiction. As Robert J.C. Young best states it, “the idea of race here shows itself to be 
profoundly dialectical: it only works when defined against potential intermixture, which also 
threatens to undo its calculations altogether.” 3  Fundamentally, racial mixing both disproved 
theories of race and perpetuated them. 
What happened from roughly the 1880s on would substantiate this point. Officials in all 
three countries became increasingly concerned and even anxious over the presence of mixed-
ancestry Natives among Aboriginals and increasingly uncertain about what to do with them. 
Questions plagued policy makers: Were mixed-ancestry Natives Aboriginal? Should they be 
assimilated or segregated? Would this population continue to increase, or would it disappear into 
either the Aboriginal or mainstream population? If governments had legal and humanitarian 
obligations to Aboriginal populations, then what were their obligations to mixed-ancestry 
Natives?  At what point did these obligations end, if they even did exist? What role would blood 
quantum play in this decision?  These were questions that applied to policy in Canada, the US, 
and Australia as officials attempted to negotiate the inherent contradictions of policies 
fundamentally based on flawed ideas of race. 
The inability of officials to adequately answer these questions was ultimately reflected in 
the ambiguity and ambivalence of policies towards mixed-ancestry Natives. Increasing concerns 
about racial purity began with a marked shift in policies where mixed-ancestry Natives were 
targeted in more specific and aggressive ways, often for exclusion from legal recognition as 
Aboriginal peoples. In Canada, this targeting was reflected in definitions in the Indian Act as 
well as those generated by the scrip commissions. Mixed-ancestry Natives were increasingly 
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excluded from the category of status Indian, a trend that lasted for a century, and laws found new 
ways of exclusion, such as through marriage to a non-Aboriginal. This meant that, automatically, 
the mixed-ancestry children who were produced by these unions were not considered Aboriginal 
under law. This was also the case for the thousands of former treaty Indians who were withdrawn 
(or voluntarily withdrew) to take scrip: they, too, would no longer be considered Aboriginal in 
the eyes of the state. Scrip was not, then, the government’s recognition of a unique class of 
Indians, even if it was intended to clear the Aboriginal title from Métis lands. Rather, it had the 
added effect of fast-tracking the assimilation of mixed-ancestry Natives. It was especially the 
definitions worked out between 1885 and 1887 in the Northwest Half-Breed Commission that 
lent themselves to this process. 
Around the same time in the US, the onset of the allotment policy in 1887 marked a 
major shift in policy towards mixed-ancestry Natives. The challenges in determining eligibility 
for allotment during this period, as exemplified among the Chippewa, Osage, and Five Tribes, 
reflected struggles to come to terms with a population that defied the compartmentalized 
thinking of nineteenth-century racial ideas. The eventual implementation of ‘competency,’ a 
certificate that was similar in intent and effect to Australia’s exemption and Canada’s 
enfranchisement policies, did little to clarify that ever-elusive line between citizens and Native 
Americans. Instead, it further reflected the ambivalence and ambiguity toward those mixed-
ancestry Natives who were applying for allotment – or having it forced upon them, as the case 
might have been. 
In Australia, protection acts, many of which began in the 1880s and 1890s, and their 
specific clauses reflected this driving concern in a number of ways. Not least among these was 
the confusing and impossible attempts to define Aboriginals and ‘half-castes’ separately. These 
 239 
 
attempts were matched only by the futile efforts to control miscegenation through the regulation 
of marriage, sexual activity, and labour, all of which were exercises in segregation. This was in 
stark contrast to the country’s purported goal of assimilation, especially for mixed-ancestry 
Natives, which would be achieved through programs of education and civilization, not dissimilar 
from residential schools in Canada and the US. Domestic and low-skill labour training was part 
of this program, and would eventually find mixed-ancestry Natives contracted out to work in 
mainstream society, either in individual homes or in Australian industry such as ranching and 
pearling. Ironically, these industries would provide sites for further racial mixing, placing 
officials in a quandary: to meet the labour demands of a new Australia, to respond to 
humanitarian concerns to ‘protect’ Aboriginals, or to assimilate Aboriginals, especially mixed-
ancestry Natives, into mainstream society.  
The Rise of Ambiguity: Comparisons 
Law and policy reflected this uncertainty about racial mixing and the uncertainty felt 
toward mixed-ancestry Natives, but how that ambiguity and ambivalence played out in these 
three countries was surprisingly similar, in concept if not in actual letter. This point is evidenced 
by the contrast within the laws and policies respectively executed in each of these three 
countries. In terms of their specific structures, legal definitions, clauses, and wording, the laws 
and policies in Canada, the US, and Australia were quite different from one another. While there 
are specific points at which we can find similarity – such as treaty policies in Canada and the US, 
legal definitions in Canada’s Indian Act and Australia’s protection acts, or marriage regulation in 
the US and Australia – as a whole, these direct comparisons are rare. Governments did not 
approach policy in the same way, because they were different governments attempting to 
administer different Aboriginal populations in different national and regional contexts. However, 
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the same underlying ideologies informed and shaped them. Accordingly, some of the 
consequences were similar. 
One of the similarities that emerges from a study of Aboriginal policy in all three of the 
countries under consideration here is that assimilation policies were contradictory. This can be 
seen in the competing goals of assimilation and segregation – opposing goals which were often 
applied simultaneously. This was most evident in Australia, where legislation explicitly 
attempted to encompass both goals. Assimilation was encouraged through labour and even in 
some cases, intermarriage; yet anti-miscegenetic attitudes created opposing policies through the 
control of Aboriginal females. Policies in the US and Canada also demonstrated this 
contradiction, though typically more evident between the stated goal and the practiced one. Both 
countries claimed assimilation as their ultimate goal, yet both continued segregationist practices. 
The most evident of such practices was with the codification of Aboriginal identity: it 
maintained, solidified, and made permanent racially ascribed differences among culture groups – 
what Amselle observes as ‘ethonographic reason.’4 Federal governments claimed that their goals 
were the assimilation of Indigenous peoples into mainstream population, yet they consistently 
applied practices that ensured the failure of such policies.  
The second and related aspect that becomes apparent here is that mixed-ancestry Natives 
were often at the center of this contradiction between segregation and assimilation. There was 
little question as to how to solve the ‘Aboriginal problem,’ or how to classify individuals 
identified as such. But in each and every case, there was serious debate over the role that mixed-
ancestry Natives could and should occupy. Examples can be seen in a number of policy 
initiatives, but the most poignant include debates over legal definitions in Australian protection 
acts; in the US, by eligibility for allotment; and in Canada, in eligibility for scrip. Each one of 
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these debates also signified questions about both ‘problems’ and ‘solutions’: should mixed-
ancestry Natives, too, be segregated, or assimilated?  Did they need to be ‘civilized,’ or were 
they already so by virtue of their white blood? Could they serve as a conduit to civilization for 
Aboriginal people, or would they be a degrading element like the infamous ‘unscrupulous 
whites’ from whom governments already had to ‘protect’ Aboriginal peoples? Were they eligible 
for lands allotted under Aboriginal policies, or independent citizens?  The definitions of mixed-
ancestry Natives in these policies were ambiguous; thus, so were eligibility and government 
obligation. These questions and others revolving around individuals of mixed ancestry plagued 
government officials for decades between the end of the nineteenth and beginning of the 
twentieth centuries.  
These questions spoke directly to the debates about racial mixing scientists were having 
at the time. Scientists who pursued questions about race, hybridity, and species were really 
pursuing questions about human difference. While some stand out as particularly derogatory, 
most were attempted serious lines of inquiry – even if the hypotheses they developed were not all 
that logical. Nonetheless, the uncertainty expressed by government officials about mixed-
ancestry Natives originated in the kinds of questions upon which those scientists were basing 
their inquiries. What were the biological differences and similarities between races? How much 
did phenotype dictate character? What were the implications of racial mixing? Their answers 
were just as varied as those from policy makers, but it was especially the latter one that plagued 
Aboriginal policy and became the source of its ambiguity. Some scientists, such as James 
Prichard, believed there was no harm in mixing, while others, like Robert Knox, posited that 
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racial mixing was a ‘degradation of humanity.’ 5  There were more who posited themselves 
somewhere between extremes, arguing that some mixing could and should occur, though only 
between select races. These hypotheses typically consisted of the argument that ‘proximate’ 
races, that is, those who were similar, could mix without consequence, but distant races, like 
blacks and whites, could not. The absence of any consensus on the matter made the information a 
confusing array of contradictions to non-scientists, like government officials, who were trying to 
navigate their own debates. 
Another significant similarity was that the presence of mixed-ancestry Natives was 
identified or framed in all three countries as a problem. How this was expressed varied from 
country to country, but the ‘Native problem’ administrators frequently spoke of often included 
mixed-ancestry Natives. In Australia, it was a problem of miscegenation and morality, a social 
problem that intersected acceptable behaviour pertaining to sex, alcohol, and marriage. Frequent 
comments from government officials suggested the ‘moral affront’ that racial mixing posed, 
what Professor Cleland had dubbed “a very unfortunate situation” when he spoke at the 1937 
Native Welfare conference in Canberra.
6
 Officials worried that this problem would only grow 
and spread – perhaps even take over – as mixed-ancestry Native populations grew. In the US, the 
problem was one of citizenship and landownership. Who would be deemed an American citizen 
to whom rights and privileges, such as individual ownership of land, would be accorded was 
dependent upon an individual’s racial constitution. Those with enough ‘white blood’ would be 
assimilated into the folds of American society, while those with too much Aboriginal blood 
would remain segregated in tribal communities. Allotment provided such an avenue, and 
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competency provided the test, especially for those tribal members who were “nearly all white,” 
as the Oregon agent had commented in 1885. And finally, in Canada, the problem was one 
couched in terms of the government’s legal obligation and the expenses that went along with 
that. The actions of Indian Affairs represented fiscal concerns more than social or moral 
obligations, and the Department’s relationship with Aboriginal peoples had as much to do with 
fulfilling legal requirements, like extinguishing title, as set out by earlier British precedent. 
Decisions about how to proceed with policy were premised by these considerations. Where both 
legal and financial obligation could be extinguished, it was done, and the formal relationship 
between the federal government and Aboriginal peoples ended. The scrip policy, especially after 
1885, accomplished these goals. Either way, in all three countries, these so-called problems were 
framed around mixed-ancestry Natives.  
But those who were posited as ‘problems’ already had their own way of establishing their 
identities, and they rarely coincided with those views expressed by government officials. Indeed, 
in each of the three countries, there was a clash between how Aboriginal people constituted their 
identities and how officials attempted to constitute their identities. These differences were 
evident in every situation where governments imposed legal definitions on Aboriginal people, 
but the application of those definitions on individuals of mixed ancestry served to highlight the 
problem. In cases in Canada, the US, and Australia, Aboriginal groups demonstrated that race 
was not a major defining feature of membership, if it was relevant at all.
7
 They contested the 
ways in which administrators categorized them, and they protested when those categories did not 
correlate with their own systems of identity. They sometimes did so in overt and public ways, as 
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Kohpay did in 1910 in front of the House of Representatives hearing, or in passive ways, such as 
Aboriginal people in Australia did by camping on the fringes of reserves when they were 
expelled. While we have much to learn about Aboriginal systems of membership, kinship, and 
identity-construction, even this cursory look into the issue exposes a number of patterns. They all 
suggest that government attempts to impose identity were contested. 
In essence, each of these countries experienced similar patterns of policy change in a 
flow that would reflect the rise and fall of racial mixing as a major impetus for policy direction. 
They expressed these ideas in different ways, with different policies, but with similar intentions 
and goals: to eliminate racial ambiguity. In this, they were all unsuccessful. Indeed, this 
dissertation is as much about the failure of policy as it is a critical analysis of it. Each of these 
countries invested time, money, and energy in a program of assimilation to which they could 
only half-heartedly commit. They all maintained a persistent belief in the merits of the policy, 
but individuals only occasionally demonstrated any serious commitment to them. Academics and 
government officials themselves cited economy and time as the reasons the policy failed. 
Undoubtedly, these explanations are valid and true. However, they do not explain the underlying 
ideological and intellectual reasons for failure. 
The Imagined and the Real: Orientalism and Hybridity 
 It is in turning to postcolonial theory that we can develop an understanding of the more 
mundane ways in which colonialism was acted out on a daily basis – an understanding that might 
otherwise not be evident. The empirical evidence here suggests two important points that mirror 
postcolonial theory: first, that colonizers imagined populations as racial binaries, analogous to 
Said’s theory of ‘orientalism’; and second, that populations were in reality ambivalent and 
ambiguous, not unlike Bhabha’s conceptual framework of hybridity. The relationship between 
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these two seemingly opposite conceptual frameworks offers a potential explanation for the 
contradictions of policy when taken together. On the one hand, the actions and attempts of policy 
makers and other government officials to fit mixed-ancestry Natives into one of two perceived 
immutable racial categories reflects the ‘us/them’ binary posited by Said’s ‘orientialism. On the 
other hand, the reality of hybrid spaces reflects Bhabha’s ‘hybridity. In the case of Aboriginal 
policy, officials’ attempts to place mixed-ancestry Natives into the imagined racial binary failed 
because of the reality of hybridity. The idea of ‘mixed’ cannot exist without a pre-existing belief 
in categories, but categories cannot be accurately applied to that which is ‘mixed.’ 
Said’s orientalism helps explain the concept of racial categories and the premise of 
Aboriginal policies in these three countries when considering the role of mixed-ancestry Natives. 
Said examined the dichotomy produced by colonialism as well as how it was an imagined 
function of colonialism. As discussed in Chapter Three, he suggests that colonialism is premised 
on polarizing populations into binaries: oriental/occidental; us/them; or colonizer/colonized. But 
these binaries are based in ‘imagined’ difference. That is, they do not reflect the reality of 
colonialism but rather serve as a justification for continuing inequality and the subjugation of the 
colonized.  
Mixed-ancestry Natives posed a dilemma for the belief in a racial binary. Mixing blurs 
the boundary between colonizer and colonized, and thus, challenges the beliefs upon which race 
was propagated. What confused this binary was, of course, the very existence of mixed-ancestry 
Natives. They defied the entire idea of categories, and thus produced ambivalent actions and 
policies. The empirical evidence parallels this theoretical construct. In Canada, this dilemma 
emerged during the scrip policy, where the boundary between “Indian” and “Halfbreed,” and 
thus, eligibility for scrip, was blurred by administrators’ confusion over qualifying criteria. In 
 246 
 
Australia, the challenges of legal definitions found in most protection acts reflected the 
uncertainty officials felt about how to classify mixed-ancestry Natives. In the US, it was 
allotment that posed the greatest challenge, where decisions about eligibility were inconsistent, 
and sometimes even conflicted with the courts’ interpretations of who was Native American. The 
challenges of maintaining the idea of categories in a hybridized world were very real. 
Indeed, these examples demonstrate that the attempts of colonizers to place mixed-
ancestry Natives into one of two racial categories – a racial binary that is a reflection of what 
Said has called Orientalism – fails, and it fails because strict racial categories do not work on 
hybridized populations. Certainly, much has been said about the inherent fallacy of racial 
categorization, and racial mixing has, as discussed above, demonstrated that. Indeed, it is the 
inherent contradiction of race that it cannot be sustained. Bhabha’s work on hybridity, and 
especially his rejection of primordial identities helps us understand this fundamental 
contradiction, and the consequent failure. 
Bhabha’s conceptual framework of hybridity includes three key concepts relevant to the 
question of racial mixing in colonialism: ambivalence, mimicry, and periphery. Ambivalence, a 
recurring theme in his work, situates itself in stark contrast to the dualism of Said’s orientalism. 
It posits that strict binaries do not exist, whether they be in consideration of culture, identity, 
power, or any other way in which the actors of colonialism might intermingle, mix, or meet. 
There are a number of differing interpretations of this particular concept, but for the purposes 
here, it is best understood as the oscillation between acceptance and rejection, assimilation and 
segregation, or likeness and difference.
8
 And in terms of the ways in which law and policy have 
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targeted mixed-ancestry Natives, it can be understood as the failure to define or re-interpret the 
identities of those individuals.  
Ambivalence ties in closely with the second concept here: mimicry. According to 
Bhabha, mimicry has multiple facets that consider the ways in which both colonhizers and 
colonized attempt to replicate themselves in colonial settings. What is of particular relevance 
here, though, concerns the failure of the colonized to redefine the colonized in their own image. 
Colonization claims assimilation as its underlying goal, but it ultimately fails in achieving this 
claimed end.
9
 This is not only a failure on the part of the colonizers, but also on the part of the 
colonized. This failure is the result of both the ambiguous actions of the colonizer, as well as the 
resistance of the colonized – that same half-hearted commitment evidenced by the actions of 
policy makers. What results, then, is not a clear, one-sided power relationship; but rather, a 
continually negotiated and unstable power dynamic. Mimicry also helps to explain the 
ambivalence of colonizers: they hesitate to fully implement assimilation because even mixed-
ancestry Natives remain perpetually ambiguous, or, in Bhabha’s words, “not quite/not white.”10 
Finally, Bhabha uses ‘periphery’ to describe the position of colonial actors. He suggests 
that there is a dialogical relationship between the centre and the periphery, whereby the centre is 
continually re-defining itself in opposition to the periphery. The ‘centre/periphery’ analogy 
applies here in two important ways: in terms of authenticity and impurity, and in terms of 
‘Aboriginal’ and ‘mixed Native. ‘Centre’ can be likened with ‘authenticity’ in opposition to 
‘hybridity. Notions about racial purity were central to the constitution of racial categories, and 
the idea of ‘authentic’ Indians. They were also juxtaposed by the ‘impurity’ that racial mixing 
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resulted in. But ‘purity’ can exist only in relation to ‘impurity. Racial hybridity thus defines 
racial purity: mixed race defines race. Thus, mixed-ancestry Natives assume a critical role in 
colonialism, in defining both ‘racial purity,’ and in defining ‘Aboriginality. This puts hybridity in 
a determinant role in colonialism. It becomes the thing to define all else against. 
Thus, ambivalence, mimicry, and periphery work in concert here to help develop a more 
nuanced understanding of the role of mixed-ancestry Natives in Aboriginal policy in Canada, the 
US, and Australia. Together, they suggest that the roles of those who are ‘mixed’ are central to 
colonialism, including its laws and policies that are formulated for the purposes of distinguishing 
the Aboriginal population from the dominant one. They are the counterpart in a corresponding 
relationship. They also collectively suggest that the ambivalence and ambiguity evidenced by the 
practices of Aboriginal affairs officials are an expected consequence of colonialism, and that the 
contradictions that seem a typical part of administration and bureaucracy, anomalous to logic and 
reason, are in fact typical of a colonialism that is interwoven with the idea of race. There is rarely 
a question of who is white and who is Aboriginal; but there is usually a question of where mixed-
ancestry Natives belong. And on this point, officials were ambivalent and ambiguous. They 
oscillated between segregating and assimilating mixed-ancestry Natives and other individuals 
who were culturally or racially ambiguous.  
Critical theory has long been accused of coming up short on reality. Critics condemn its 
focus on ‘representation’ and in “neglecting the material conditions of colonial rule,” 11 
suggesting that theorists forgo an acknowledgement of the realities of colonialism and its legacy 
for an analysis of its symbolic value. However, as this dissertation demonstrates, representation 
and reality are not always that distinct. As Ania Loomba explains it,  
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It has become commonplace to reject the empiricist divisions between something called 
‘the real’ and something else called ‘the ideological,’ and of course the two cannot be 
bifurcated in any neat fashion. But it is important to keep thinking about the overlaps as 
well as the distinctions between social and literary texts, and to remind ourselves that 
discourse is not simply another word for representation. Rather, discourse analysis 
involves examining the social and historical conditions within which specific 
representations are generated.
12
 
In fact, the representation is acted out in the reality: the ideas and meaning behind colonial rule 
emerged in its practice through laws and policies. But colonialism is not just acted out in the 
fictitious or ‘representative’ texts studied by literary critics: it is also acted out in the so-called 
factual ones that constitute archival records and legislative precedent left by our colonial 
predecessors. As Said himself says, “this evidence is found just as prominently in the so-called 
truthful text (histories, philological analyses, political treatises) as in the avowedly artistic (i.e., 
openly imaginative) text.” 13  Discourse, and more pointedly, its analysis, then, is not just 
something that happens ‘out there. It has as much to do with the realities of colonialism as do 
more seemingly pragmatic concerns like money, power, and land ownership.
14
 Thus, explanation 
emerges from the place where theory meets evidence.  
The ‘idea vs. reality’ debate, and in fact, a premise upon which this dissertation’s 
argument is based, can be found in Said’s definition of ‘orientalism’ itself. Said argues that the 
‘Oriental’ is both an idea and a reality. He explains: 
It would be wrong to conclude that the Orient was essentially an idea, or a creation with 
no corresponding reality... There were – and are – cultures and nations whose location 
is in the East, and their lives, histories, and customs have a brute reality obviously 
greater than anything that could be said about them in the West.
15
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Orientalism, then, is how colonizers imagine and thus create the colonized, but it is also who the 
colonized themselves think they are. Aboriginal people exist independently of colonialism, and 
prior to it; yet there also exists what is imagined or invented about them: the stereotypes, the 
imposed legal identities.  
In effect, the ‘Oriental’ as imagined speaks directly to the meaning behind the emphasis 
on mixed-ancestry Natives that has been uncovered here. The attempt to impose a social 
structure that is built upon a racial binary is evident in all three countries under consideration 
here. The ‘imagined’ racial binary has been applied in very real ways, executed in laws and 
policy that have had very real effects on Aboriginal people. In terms of how Aboriginal people 
could be classified according to the state, there were two options: Aboriginal or regular citizen. 
These were not options that always corresponded with Aboriginal systems, which were mostly 
based on kinship relations, not ‘blood. But rarely were these systems accorded any credibility, 
particularly after the mid-nineteenth century. Instead, colonialism introduced and enforced 
notions of identity that reflected the binary exposed by Said. This imagined binary was set into 
practice in all three countries through the question of whether or not Aboriginal laws and policies 
were applicable to certain individuals. 
As readers of critical theory will already know, the ideas and concepts advanced by both 
Said and Bhabha are infinitely more complex than indicated here. The point is not to offer a full 
treatment of either, as has already been done. Rather, the point is to demonstrate how their ideas 
might be applied in more practical ways to empirical problems that might appear otherwise 
unsolvable. They help find meaning where there might appear to be none, as is the case with the 
inherent ambiguity of colonialism, as expressed in laws and policies in Canada, the US, and 
Australia. 
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Conclusion 
There is, I believe, much to be learned from the parallels between theory and empirical 
evidence, and in comparing the three countries considered here. First, the emphasis on mixed-
ancestry Natives witnessed in all three countries suggests that there is more to the history of 
Aboriginal policy than we have previously acknowledged. Specifically, the widely accepted 
conclusion that the goal of Aboriginal policy was assimilation must be questioned and contested. 
In fact, there were times at which the actions and words of policy officials, and sometimes even 
the letter of the law, demonstrated that segregation of Aboriginal populations was just as sought 
after a goal as assimilation. Also in fact, the ambiguity, ambivalence, uncertainty, and sometimes 
even contradictory behaviour of officials were not simply the consequence of typical 
bureaucracy. They were the consequences of ambiguity, ambivalence, uncertainty, and 
sometimes even contradictory behaviour of the scientists studying race and speculating on the 
merits, consequences, and implications of racial mixing. The influence of nineteenth-century 
racial scientists on Aboriginal policy are perhaps more intricate than might be generally 
acknowledged. 
Second, the mixed-race discourse uncovered here suggests that the elimination of racial 
ambiguity, and the uncertainty felt towards mixed-ancestry Natives were also major driving 
forces of Aboriginal policy. Historiography has previously given credit to fiscal considerations, 
humanitarian considerations, public demands, goals of nation-building, and other pragmatic 
considerations in the direction and determination of Aboriginal policy. Undoubtedly, all of these 
factors played a significant role in the development and execution of Aboriginal policy. But this 
should not be taken to the exclusion of ideological and intellectual factors that prove just as 
influential to Aboriginal policy as these more pragmatic ones. While the intent here is not to 
dispute these conclusions, I do contend that there is something more. I contend that this is as 
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much a matter of epistemology and the desire to uphold beliefs, even in the face of contradictory 
evidence and illogical action. I contend that policy administrators (people) and not states 
(institutions) develop and maintain this system in order to maintain their worldview – a 
worldview based in part on the contributions of nineteenth-century science. 
Third, the time frame clearly suggests that the reactions to mixed-ancestry Natives and 
how they were dealt with in law and policy reflected the developments in racial science in the 
nineteenth century. The rise of debates over racial mixing in the larger genre of racial science 
during the nineteenth century directly coincided with the rise of concerns over racial mixing as 
reflected in Aboriginal law and policy in Canada, the US, and Australia. This period was marked 
by key publications in ideas about racial mixing, especially Knox’s Races of Men and Darwin’s 
On the Origin of Species, and by the rise of specific debates regarding the implications of racial 
mixing. Significantly, it was debates over the possibility of racial mixing, the fertility of those of 
mixed race, and the moral consequences of mixing that informed Aboriginal law and policy in 
these three countries. 
If we re-examine what we thought were such well-known and understood Aboriginal 
policies in the light of mixed-race discourse, we find a different picture. That the goal of 
Aboriginal policy was assimilation of Natives into mainstream society never entirely made 
sense. But, looking at policy through the lens of critical mixed race theory, we can see that a 
second, simultaneous but conflicting, goal might more readily be described as the elimination of 
racial ambiguity – a goal quite different from assimilation, and one which explains the 
contradictions of Aboriginal policy – how it always seemed to fail at the very thing to which it 
claimed to be dedicated. Aboriginal policy is ambiguous, and that ambiguity means something. 
The idea of race fails as the practice of race. The inherent contradictions of Aboriginal policy 
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exemplify this, and this becomes evident when we re-examine otherwise well-known policies by 
focusing specifically on how laws and policies targeted Aboriginals of mixed ancestry. 
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Chapter 8 - After Race 
The historical question of whether or not mixed-ancestry Natives should be treated as 
Aboriginals for the purposes of law and policy remains relevant today. Indeed, everywhere there 
is a legacy of an Aboriginal policy that has usurped power of membership and citizenship, 
Aboriginal people continue to pay the price as federal recognition interferes with cultural 
definitions. Policy administrators have been slow to change definitions or criteria to align with 
changes in racial thinking. Instead, the mixed-race discourse of the nineteenth century continues 
to be found in the twenty-first. The targeting, the racialization, and the de-Indianization of 
mixed-ancestry Natives was not a unique feature of any one particular country, and cannot be 
explained by its unique historical evolution, its legal traditions, or even the agency of individuals 
within those systems. Instead, these processes can only be understood as an institution of 
colonialism – part of the system that spread across the world. 
This particular aspect of colonialism might matter less if we did not continue to live with 
the legacy of the racial thinking that targeted mixed-ancestry Natives. We still live with the 
racialized logic of the nineteenth century, repeatedly evidenced in the requirement for mixed-
ancestry Natives to prove who they are to the courts, to Aboriginal departments and other 
officials, and to the larger public in general who still hold to ideas of “real Indians.”  The 
paradigms of colonialism underpin the very laws and policies that are, to varying degrees, still in 
place. These laws and policies continue to inform identity, direct access to resources, and define 
rights. They also continue to undermine the basic and most fundamental aspect of Aboriginal 
self-determination: identity and membership. There is no decolonization without an 
understanding of this process. 
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What legal spaces, then, do law and policy create or deny? How do they expand or limit 
spaces within which mixed-ancestry Natives can form distinct communities? This is where the 
three countries most visibly depart. And this is where national differences manifest themselves 
most. These three countries offer a kind of spectrum of conditions that have the potential to 
affect identity formation in similar colonial contexts 
Three Scenarios of Modern Mixed-race Identity 
In Canada, the Métis form a distinct collective – socially, culturally, and legally. The 
Métis are well-known as distinct Aboriginal communities of mixed ancestry origins whose 
identities formed over a long period of time as a result of the specific conditions of Canada’s fur 
trade. While the Métis existed as distinct communities before law or policy identified and 
targeted them, law and policy have worked in concert, though perhaps unwittingly, to create a 
space for Métis identities to be codified and fixed. The conditions of treaties, the Indian Act, and 
scrip have collectively achieved this. While treaties and the Indian Act specifically excluded the 
Métis and Halfbreeds as ‘Indians,’ they included them under scrip. In a way, law brought mixed-
ancestry Natives under one policy. There was, then, a formal space created for Aboriginals who 
were excluded from other policies because of their mixed ancestry. And while scrip, as the 
records indicated, might have been intended to make “ordinary citizens” of them, not a distinct 
legal group of Aboriginals, it set a legal precedent whereby the Aboriginal rights of Métis and 
Halfbreeds were recognized and confirmed in law, even if through extinguishing them. However, 
there remains a larger population stuck between the formal definitions of Métis and Indian that 
remain unrecognized.  
In the U.S., mixed-ancestry Natives have been more readily accepted as members of 
tribal entities, although that changed over time. There is no recognition for those who identify as 
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Métis, but there is recognition for those who belong to federally recognized tribes.
1
 Indeed, this 
is the most significant contrast to the history of Canadian law and policy: that is, the inclusion of 
mixed-ancestry Natives. While Aboriginal leaders in Canada were denied their requests to 
include the “Halfbreed cousins” in treaties, this was not the case in the US where officials 
granted those requests to Native American leaders, whether those mixed-ancestry Natives were 
individuals or groups. And until the allotment policy began in 1887, mixed-ancestry Natives 
were not excluded from being considered Native American by any other federal law or policy. 
Even after that point, mixed-ancestry Natives were not targeted in the same way for exclusion 
unless and until the tribe came under the allotment policy. However, the implications of the 
application of a stricter blood quantum in 1934 changed that policy. Twentieth-century policies 
of dislocation, urbanization, and ‘citizenship’ disenfranchised Native Americans from their tribal 
communities in new and multiple ways. 
Australia presents yet another scenario, perhaps even more complex than in Canada or 
the US. No distinct mixed-ancestry identity exists, at least officially. In urban areas, there is an 
indication that communities formed among individuals who have been separated by choice or 
force from traditional communities. In rural areas, evidence suggests the formation of ‘fringe’ 
communities around Aboriginal stations and reserves. But we know little about these processes. 
Widespread policies separated individuals from their families and communities in two significant 
ways, leaving countless Aboriginal individuals separated from their own histories and identities. 
First, mixed-race individuals were excluded from the legal category of “Aborigine,” meaning 
that they were not allowed to reside on the reserves, stations, and other communities with their 
kin groups. Second, individuals of mixed race were sent to schools or institutions, then hired out 
                                                          
1
 Camie Augustus, “Montana Metis: Literature Review, History and Historiography,” in Denis P. Combet, Lise 
Gaboury-Diallo, and Denis Gagnon, Histoires Et Identités Métisses: Hommage À Gabriel Dumont (Winnipeg: 
Presses Universitaires de Saint-Boniface, 2009). 
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to white families in non-Aboriginal communities. Consequently, many individuals of mixed race 
were absorbed by the labour industry or by the towns and cities. These processes of exclusion 
left two potential spaces for congregation and the consequent formation of an identity, but 
geographical and socio-cultural factors inhibited both. Those individuals absorbed into modes of 
labour, such as cattle stations or pearling, did not amass the numbers necessary to form such a 
collective. Their relative isolation and small numbers meant the conditions for congregation 
simply did not exist. This separation is exacerbated by internal politics within the larger 
Aboriginal community that can sometimes divide individuals by ancestry or descent – soft words 
for what are continuing notions of ‘blood quantum’ and notions of racial purity. The 
internalization of such racialized identities is one of the legacies of colonialism, for certain. But 
for the purposes of access to rights, programs, or institutions designated specifically for 
Aboriginal people, individuals of mixed-ancestry are not distinguished from other Aboriginals. 
This comes despite Australia’s long history of singling out Aboriginals of mixed ancestry in law. 
How law and policy contributed to these situations, to their diverse outcomes, becomes a 
question of import, then. 
Mixed Race meets the Courts 
While governments have approached these issues of race and identity with hesitancy, 
apathy, and (unsurprisingly) ambiguity, courts have been more decisive. Indeed, they are at this 
very moment working out definitions of Aboriginal in all three countries, and contemplating the 
role of race, genealogy, and descent in those definitions. If there is hope for a ‘raceless’ future, it 
is perhaps to be found there. 
In 2003, the Supreme Court of Canada handed down the now well-known Powley 
decision. This decision was a long-awaited clarification of Métis Aboriginal rights, as designated 
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in the 1982 Constitution, and of Métis legal identity. Consequently, the case has since had a 
resounding impact. Undoubtedly, the Powley case is considered such a success because it 
confirmed Métis rights under law by defining and clarifying the ambiguities of their 
constitutional entrenchment. What is less clear is how this more recent decision in law reflects 
the much longer historical relationship between the Métis and the Canadian state, and between 
people of mixed ancestry and the Canadian state. This case does, indeed, have a historical 
context, but it is one that is often overshadowed by the seeming importance of the constitution as 
the source of Métis rights. A Métis legal identity was not born in 2003 with that court decision, 
nor was it even born in the 1982 constitution. It has a long history that begins in 1850. And that 
history has little in common with what the historic relationship between Métis and Canadian law 
says. 
A more recent decision by Canada’s Federal Court in Daniels, immediately appealed by 
the Crown, has offered even more promise for a ‘raceless’ future. The judge ruled that Métis and 
non-status Indians, many of whom are of mixed ancestry, do indeed fall under the jurisdiction of 
section 91(24) of the Constitution Act. In other words, they are constitutionally considered 
“Indians.”  In his summary judgement, the judge noted that  
Degrees of “blood purity” have generally disappeared as a criterion; as it must in a 
modern setting. Racial or blood purity laws have a discordance in Canada reflective of 
other places and times when such blood criterion lead to horrific events (Germany 
1933-1945 and South Africa’s apartheid as examples). These are but two examples of 
why Canadian law does not emphasize this blood/racial purity concept. 
2
 
He is wrong in one respect: the Indian Act still uses degrees of blood to decide status, even if it is 
disguised in the language of ‘descent.’  Nonetheless, the mere official acknowledgement by a 
federal court judge that ‘blood purity’ is an outdated concept is encouraging. And given that 
Canada has now taken the direction that all major Aboriginal policy questions will be decided by 
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 Daniels [FCC], 2013. Para. 119. 
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the courts, as it seems unwilling or unable to acknowledge the extent of its obligation and 
fiduciary duty on its own, then the words of one federal court judge are indeed significant. 
What makes this case significant is its decision about mixed-ancestry Natives and their 
official status. The judge ultimately ruled that the federal government intended to include 
peoples of mixed ancestry (both Métis and non-status Indians) in the definition of “Indian” under 
Canada’s original 1867 constitution – a decision which places them squarely under federal 
jurisdiction, despite that government’s insistence for decades that only ‘status Indians’ were 
federally recognized Indians. But, as the history of legal identity in Canada has demonstrated, 
this was perhaps never entirely clear. As the judge noted from the extensive documentation and 
expert testimony, “there was, for administrative purposes, a very unclear or indistinct line 
between Indians and half-breeds.”3 The courts in Canada have, then, acknowledged that the 
practices of Indian Affairs officials were ambiguous. 
Australian courts have also spoken on the issue of ‘race,’ though they have not come to 
the same conclusions. Since 1981, the Commonwealth Aboriginal Affairs department has used a 
three-part definition for Aboriginal, not dissimilar to that developed by Canadian courts. It 
includes descent, self-identification, and community acceptance.
4
  While self-identification and 
community acceptance have been easier to sustain, descent has been contested and debated in the 
courts.
5
  In a 1989 Queensland case, the court created the test of aboriginality according to 
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descent.
 6
   It defined this descent as “genetic,” faulty, as one legal academic points out, since 
“Though science can show a person is descended from particular ancestors it cannot prove that 
that descent is Aboriginal.”7  A 1984 Tasmanian case, Tasmania v Commonwealth continued to 
define Aboriginality in terms of race as a biologically determined and visible trait.
8
 However, 
Justice Deane defined Aboriginality as “a person of Aboriginal descent, albeit mixed, who 
identifies himself as such and who is recognised by the Aboriginal community as an 
Aboriginal.”9  A 1990 Queensland case ruled that a higher blood quantum, made evident by a 
person’s appearance or documentation, could serve to stand alone as proof of Aboriginality – 
that is, without self-identification or community acceptance. A lower blood quantum, on the 
other hand, would require additional support or information, such as self-identification, 
community acceptance, and genealogical proof. Feasibly, then, the courts had at least introduced 
acceptance of mixed-ancestry Natives as Aboriginal even if they held fast to a biological idea of 
race. 
Other cases have suggested that Australia is moving away from biological definitions of 
Aboriginality. While the 1992 Mabo case laid down a biological component of Aboriginality, it 
has not always been interpreted as such. For instance, in 1999, a Tasmanian case found a 
different sentiment in its ruling. Justice Merkel stated in his decision that, “In truth, the notion of 
‘some’ descent is a technical rather than a real criterion for identity, which after all in this day 
and age, is accepted as a social, rather than a genetic, construct.”10 Another case in 2002 in 
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Western Australia held that in determining Aboriginality for the purposes of proving title, the 
relationship to the land was more important than strict biological descent.
11
   
More than Canada or Australia, the US has a history of using courts to determine racial 
status and tribal authority. This history dates back to the 1830 Georgia rulings, discussed earlier 
in this dissertation. In more recent years, courts have separated Native American legal identities 
into ‘political’ and ‘racial. This was the result of a 1974 ruling whereby BIA employees 
challenged the constitutionality of a preferential hiring practice that privileged Native 
Americans. The court ruled that Native American was a political category, not a racial one, 
defined by membership in a tribal (political) entity. While the courts claim domain over the 
political identities, then, they do not over the cultural. Instead of positing Native Americans as 
racialized individuals, the courts now look at identity in terms of membership in a political 
entity. By resituating the ‘tribe’ as a ‘political entity,’ US law has circumvented the issue of race. 
Though this decision may have initially protected Indigenous people, it may potentially 
undermine decolonization efforts by excluding mixed-ancestry Natives who are not tribal 
members.
12
 
In the meantime, the BIA continues to designate Indigeneity based on blood quantum, as 
confirmed in a ‘Certificate of Indian Blood’ issued to an individual upon documented proof of 
Aboriginal lineage. An even larger problem is how the federal blood quantum criterion affects 
tribal membership conditions.
13
 Since a tribe’s access to certain government programs is dictated 
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by the BIA’s approval of their membership code, many tribes see the inclusion of a blood 
quantum criterion as necessary. This has caused considerable debate among Indigenous peoples 
concerning membership and identity. As Eva Maria Garrouette explains it, “failure to negotiate 
an identity as a “real” Indian within the legal definition of one’s tribe can lead to some dire 
outcomes for individual people.”14 In part, the question of ‘legitimate’ identities is a reflection of 
internalized colonialism. But it is also a safeguard against misappropriations, especially for tribes 
who profit from business or resource extraction.
15
 Thus, tribes are caught between possible 
misappropriation and exclusion by race. 
These cases, of course, have an impact on the shaping of contemporary policy in these 
countries, and are in many ways redefining what ‘mixed-race’ means. What they show is that 
race as biology is on the decline, or at least that courts acknowledge the problems. However, 
they also demonstrate a continuing ambivalence: there is still evident hesitancy to completely 
abandon the idea of race in exchange for culture – a concept that would likely require definitions 
to be solely determined by Aboriginal peoples themselves. Race and especially ideas of ‘mixed 
race’ continue to influence and shape our contemporary understandings of what it means to be 
Aboriginal: who gets official recognition, whose rights are protected, and who gets to be a 
member of officially recognized tribes or bands. Historic constructions of race through mixed 
race inform and define contemporary constructions of race through mixed race. Albeit to lesser 
and varying degrees, the persistent myth of racial purity continues to inform identity and 
recognition. 
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People define their own identities according to internal factors. But they do so within the 
limits of external ones. Law is one such limit. It imposed (and continues to impose) an order onto 
groups that perhaps do not define them, but does at least confine them. It creates or denies spaces 
in which groups might grow, develop, merge, separate, or otherwise form. There is no question 
that law does not create culture, but there is a question about its role in the persistence, growth, 
or change in culture. In all three of the countries under consideration here, law has been a 
shaping factor in the formation, limitation, and the expansion of these identities.  
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Note on Sources 
While this dissertation relies primarily on government documents, the records which 
were most useful varies for each country. I searched a number of collections, both government 
publications and archival holdings, between 1850 and 1950. I paid particularly close attention to 
Aboriginal-specific legislation and annual reports of Aboriginal departments, both of which 
provided a focus to research that was broad and expansive. I also examined government debates, 
archival holdings (primarily of Aboriginal departments), and government correspondence, but 
the results were sporadic. There were other peripheral documents that were instrumental in 
interpreting the meaning behind legislation, and especially, definitions of Aboriginal legal 
identities. These peripheral documents are what varied most from country to country. 
In Canada, the three areas of policy that played an important role in the determination of 
mixed-ancestry Native legal identity meant that there were a greater number of collections of 
value. Legislation was, on its own, useful in ascertaining a specific mixed-ancestry Native 
discourse, but the archival record produced little in determining the impetus behind clauses that 
dealt specifically with mixed-ancestry Natives or racial mixing. Reports from Indian agents 
provided more clues in that regard, and other aspects of Aboriginal policy, namely scrip and 
treaties, provided a context for understanding legislative clauses. For the scrip policy, there is an 
extensive collection of correspondence which is revealing in terms of a mixed-race discourse. 
Like most government documents, it privileges officials’ views, but some of the motivations 
behind the actions of those individuals who applied for scrip can be gleaned from the record. For 
treaties, Alexander Morris’ published reports provided a record of discussions, brief as they may 
have been, about the eligibility of mixed-ancestry Natives to participate in the treaty process and 
about how Aboriginal people themselves saw their role in that process. Thus, there was more 
diversity in the types of documents used for Canada. 
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In the US, congressional documents, particularly hearings and committee reports, were 
the most telling in terms of mixed-ancestry Natives. Legislation in the US rarely provided a 
definition of ‘Indian,’ and where it did, there was no consistency. Furthermore, government 
correspondence rarely explained how eligibility would be determined. Discussions about racial 
mixing were surprisingly absent in the records of Indian agents, and even the annual report of 
Indian Affairs provided little information. However, the American system of using hearings as a 
way to clarify any issues in the application of laws and policies provides a record of discussions 
regarding mixed-ancestry Natives, as was especially the case for allotment hearings. In addition, 
a few key publications, namely, Charles J. Kappler’s Indian Affairs: Laws and Treaties and Felix 
S. Cohen’s Handbook of Federal Indian Law were both instrumental in this research. The text of 
treaties, as in Canada, provided the pre-1850 context, and both allowed me to review all the 
legislation relevant to Native Americans quickly and efficiently – not otherwise possible, given 
its size. Overall, the American records provided more information about the views of Aboriginal 
people themselves than did those of Canada and Australia. The hearings were especially useful 
in this regard. 
In Australia, legislation, protection reports, and commissioned reports provided most of 
the evidence. Australian officials tended to be more explicit in their opinions about racial mixing 
and more concerned about it; consequently, there is far more evidence. Legislation frequently 
included lengthy definitions for both ‘Aboriginals’ and ‘half-castes. Thus, the text of legislation 
was revealing on its own. Both government correspondence and protection reports provided 
context to this legislation and specific examples that revealed the impetus for legislative changes. 
Furthermore, the many commissioned reports at the state level, some of which were dedicated 
solely to the ‘half-caste problem’ blatantly revealed government officials’ attitudes about racial 
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mixing. In stark contrast to Canadian and American records, Aboriginal perspectives are far 
more difficult to discern in Australia. However, a stronger tradition of autobiographical accounts 
written or told by Aboriginal people themselves has helped compensate here. 
Ultimately, these records, different as they might be, revealed a common pattern of 
discourse about mixed-ancestry Natives. When viewed over the long term – here, approximately 
1850 to 1950 – they suggested a continuity in attitudes about mixed-ancestry Natives, even 
amidst other major changes in law and policy. Where those clues about attitudes towards mixed-
ancestry Natives were discovered varied from country to country, but were evident in all three.  
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